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Abstract 
 
This thesis draws upon contemporary research in economic geography and the 
social sciences to explore the spatial relationships that exist between residential 
mortgage lenders, investment banks and investors and the subsequent geographies 
that are produced through these intertwined networks. The research is informed 
through empirical material collected through semi-structured interviews with 
directors and associates working in the financial sector to see how consumer 
mortgages are produced and restructured into debt securities. There is a particular 
focus on how the UK financial sector has undergone restructuring, as a 
consequence of the politics of financialisation since the 1990s, which aligned the 
residential mortgage market with the circuits of international capital. The thesis 
examines three areas of banking and finance to comprehend how retail mortgages 
have become embedded within international finance. First, the thesis explores how 
deregulation in the UK initiated a spatial reorganisation of mortgage production 
networks and funding. Second, the research investigates the migration and adoption 
of automated decision-making technologies, highlighting how these devices have 
reshaped the geographies of banking, and are inherently geographical themselves. 
Third, the thesis focuses on how mortgages are (re)engineered into debt-securities, 
with a particular focus on how geography is used to mitigate credit and tax risks. It is 
argued that the restructuring of the UK retail sector and its increased integration with 
the intHUQDWLRQDOFLUFXLWVRIFDSLWDOH[DFHUEDWHGWKHH[SRVXUHRIWKH8.¶VHFRQRP\WR
the effects of the international credit crunch. Furthermore, the thesis underlines the 
effect of geography which has shaped the adoption, of new financial technologies 
and strategies, through local regulations, epistemic cultures and histories.  
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                     Chapter 1 
 
                    Introduction  
 
  
³1RUWKHUQ 5RFN¶V D JRRG H[DPSOH EHFDXVH LW¶V D YHU\ SUXGHQW
VHFXULWLVHU«LI \RX¶UH D VKDUHKROGHU LQ 1RUWKHUQ 5RFN WKHQ LW¶V
EULOOLDQWWKHUH¶VQRULVNIRU\RX\RX¶UHMXVWJHWWLQJSDLGLW¶VDOPRVW
ULVN IUHH«´ (Interview 29: Director of Retail, large UK building 
society, February 2007). 
 
³7KH JRYHUQPHQW LV GUDZLQJ XS SODQV WR QDWLRQDOLVH 1RUWKHUQ
Rock, the stricken UK bank which yesterday announced the 
immediate departure of chief executive Adam Applegarth, as 
XQFHUWDLQW\VXUURXQGLQJLWVIXWXUHPRXQWHG´)LQDQFLDO7LPHV 14th 
December 2007). 
 
 
In 1965 the Northern Counties Permanent Building Society, founded in 1850, and 
the Rock Building Society, established in 1865, merged to form a new society 
named Northern Rock. Northern Rock gradually expanded by absorbing numerous 
local societies, but the roots and operations of this mutual organisation remained 
firmly grounded in the North-East.1 By 1997 Northern Rock had steadily acquired 
53 smaller building societies, and like many mutuals at the time, it decided to 
convert to a bank in order to raise more capital from the wholesale financial 
                                                 
1
 Mutual organisations, such as building societies, are owned by their members who have savings 
accounts or mortgages with the society. As such, the managers of these institutions attempt to run the 
organisation for the benefit of their members, unlike retail banks, for example, that are run for the 
benefit of the private shareholders that own the bank. 
  
 
 2 
markets (Marshall et al. 1997). A year later, this mortgage lender was floated on 
the London Stock Exchange and it began to prepare ambitious plans for growth. 
Unlike its larger competitors, this small, regional bank had a geographically limited 
branch network overwhelmingly concentrated in the North-East of England 
(Hallsworth and Skinner 2008), an historical legacy inherited from the societies that 
it had DEVRUEHG 7KLV SRVHG D VHULRXV FKDOOHQJH WR 1RUWKHUQ 5RFN¶V H[SDQVLRQ
plans as the spatially concentrated branch network would impede its ability to 
increase mortgage sales outside of the North-East region. In addition, the 
geographically limited branch network would have struggled to collect sufficient 
consumer savings to fund a growing mortgage business.  
 
1RUWKHUQ5RFN¶VDQVZHU WR LWV LQKHUHQWO\JHRJUDSKLFDOSUREOHPVZDV WRSLRQHHUD
new business model, which was later replicated by other UK retail banks. Instead 
of expanding its branch network, Northern Rock began to actively reduce the 
number of its branches to decrease costs and began to sell its mortgages through 
third-party brokers and intermediaries. This strategy enabled the mortgage bank to 
extend its geographical reach quickly and cheaply, offering its mortgage products 
across the UK, without the need to expand its branch network. However, Northern 
5RFN¶V JURZWK ZDV VWLOO UHVWULFWHG E\ LWV inability to raise sufficient volumes of 
consumer deposits to fund its growing mortgage business, so it underwent a 
IXUWKHUURXQGRIUHVWUXFWXULQJVRWKDWLWZDVOHVVUHOLDQWRQLWVVDYHUV¶GHSRVLWV7KLV
was initially accomplished in two ways: First, the bank borrowed short-term funds 
from the interbank money markets which could be used to issue mortgages. When 
Northern Rock needed to repay a creditor, frequently other retail banks or 
investment banks, Northern Rock would simply refinance this credit facility with 
another creditor allowing long-term assets to be financed by short-term funding 
(Hallsworth and Skinner 2008). Second, the bank began to access cheaper, long-
term funding by selling mortgage-backed bonds to investors, including retail banks, 
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investment banks, asset managers and insurers, through a process called 
securitisation.2 Northern Rock sold these residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS) for a small profit, but as it began to write larger volumes of mortgage 
business from across the UK, it was able to repeat this process of securitisation on 
D UHJXODU EDVLV DQG WKH FROOHFWLYH SURILWV VRRQ LQFUHDVHG WKH EDQN¶V HDUQLQJV
1RUWKHUQ5RFN¶VEXVLQHVVPRGHO WUDQVIRUPHG LW LQWR WKH8.¶Vth largest lender in 
less than a decade, a model applauded by financial commentators and celebrated 
by shareholders (Wainwright 2009). 
 
Given the plaudits and admiring commentary lavished upon Northern Rock, the 
banking industry, government officials and consumers were shocked to learn that 
on the 13th RI6HSWHPEHU WKHFRPSDQ\¶VEXEEOHKDGZHOODQG WUXO\EXUVW ,W
emerged that Northern Rock was struggling to fund its short-term operations, 
forcing it to approach the Bank of England to seek emergency funding. Northern 
5RFN¶V IXQGLQJ GLIILFXOWLHV ZHUH FRPSRXQGHG E\ WKH PHGLD¶V FRPPHQWDU\ RQ LWV
GHPLVH 'HVSLWH UHDVVXUDQFHV IURP 1RUWKHUQ 5RFN¶V PDQDJHPHQW DQG WKH
government, panicked consumers rushed to withdraw their savings, fearful that the 
bank would collapse imminently (Hallsworth and Skinner 2008). The Bank of 
                                                 
2
 Securitisation is a process which allows lenders to convert portfolios of credit cards, consumer loans 
and car loans into bonds. These are known as asset-backed securities (ABS) where the yield on the 
bond is derived from the repayments on the underlying assets (Langley, 2006). Bonds backed by 
residential mortgages are known as residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). The financial 
returns from the asset pool are not divided equally between the bonds that have been issued, but are 
financially engineered, to produce a range of different bonds. These variants range between high risk-
high yield and low risk-low yield bonds, denominated in different currencies, and redeemable between 
one and five years. The advantage of securitising mortgage assets as opposed to simply selling them 
as a portfolio of mortgages was that a pool of residential mortgages could be engineered into a large 
number of high-quality bonds that were rated by bond-rating agencies as being as safe as government 
bonds. The credit risk of all the mortgages is theoretically concentrated in a small number of high risk 
bonds that provide a higher return to investors willing to accept the greater risk, providing the bond 
pays its coupon. The popularity of RMBS bonds with investors was enhanced as the notes paid higher 
yields than government bonds, but the RMBS bonds were tailored to the specifications of investors.  
 
  
 
 4 
England provided Northern Rock with emergency funding and the government 
began to search for a buyer to rescue the stricken bank. By the 22nd of November 
2007, the government had failed to find an investor to purchase Northern Rock 
leading the government to take the extraordinary step of nationalising the bank. 
Early post-mortems LQWR WKH FROODSVH RI 1RUWKHUQ 5RFN IRFXVHG RQ WKH EDQN¶V
flawed business modelZKHUHLWKDGµERUURZHGVKRUWDQGOHQWORQJ¶. Northern Rock 
had funded the majority of its mortgage issuance through short-term money 
markets and the sale of its mortgage assets to investors though securitisation. Both 
funding strategies had been adversely affected by the US subprime crisis, to the 
GHJUHH WKDW1RUWKHUQ5RFN¶VEXVLQHVVPRGHOZDVQR ORQJHU viable. This raises a 
critical geographical question: how could the defaults of US subprime consumers 
lead to the collapse of a prime UK mortgage bank that did not issue mortgages in 
the US?3 
  
The global credit crunch and the demise of Northern Rock can be traced to the 
development of the US subprime market, its reliance on securitisation and the 
subsequent US subprime crisis. The US subprime market was originally developed 
to supply consumers who had adverse credit histories or unusual circumstances 
(Burton et al. 2004) with mortgages, which proved popular as it increased 
American homeownership.  Although subprime consumers are statistically more 
likely to default on their repayments than prime consumers, the market was 
attractive to US lenders and capital market investors as the higher likelihood of 
defaults enabled lenders WR OHJLWLPLVH WKH SURGXFWV¶ KLJK-interest rates and 
exorbitant penalty fees. As a result, the subprime market was profitable despite the 
higher rates of default.  In the build-up to the US crisis, many subprime products 
were sold by mortgage intermediaries who used aggressive sales tactics to sell 
                                                 
3
 While Northern Rock offered a 125 per cent LTV product, associated with the sub-prime range of 
products, the majority of its products where of prime quality. 
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mortgage products to financially vulnerable individuals could not realistically repay 
their debts (Agnew and Corbridge 1989; Wyly et al. 2004; Kirchhoff 2007; 
Blackburn 2008). Other examples of miss-selling included consumers being sold 
overpriced mortgage insurance that they simply did not need (Aalbers 2008) and, 
in many cases, greedy, fee-driven mortgage brokers sold expensive subprime 
mortgages to low-risk consumers who were eligible for cheaper interest rates 
(Blackburn 2008; Immergluck 2008).  
 
Dymski (2007) argues that before securitisation became widespread in the US, 
mortgage lenders would exercise caution and avoid lending to subprime 
consumers altogether,  as the credit risk of mortgages was held on their own 
balance-sheets. Securitisation meant that high-risk mortgage assets were removed 
IURP OHQGHUV¶ EDODQFH VKHHWV DQG VROG WR LQYHVWRUV VR OHQGHUV ZHUH QR-longer 
exposed to the associated credit risk (Dymski 2007). This enabled subprime 
lenders into designing increasingly riskier products, a trend epitomised by so-called 
NINJA mortgages, sold to consumers with No-Income-No-Job-or-Assets. The 
expansion of US mortgage lending was also supported by a benign 
macroeconomic environment and the Greenspan Put, where the US government 
manipulated monetary policy to gain market stability4.  
 
Although the foundations of the credit crunch were laid through the issuance of US 
subprime mortgages and their sale through securitisation, the effects of the crisis 
did not begin to unfold until 2004 when the US Federal Reserve began to increase 
interest rates. These increases placed a heavy burden on the already vulnerable 
subprime consumers who witnessed unaffordable increases on their monthly 
                                                 
4
 For example, in times of crisis such as the dot-com crash and the September 11th terrorist 
attacks, the US government reduced interest rates to maintain stability ± low interest rates 
that fuelled cheap mortgage lending. 
 
  
 
 6 
repayments, triggering unprecedented levels of defaults. Subsequently, mortgage 
lenders were unable to repay subprime RMBS investors in the US and around the 
globe. It became clear that the financial reengineering applied to US subprime 
securitisations had been grossly miscalculated as many RMBS bond investors 
began to experience heavy losses on their subprime investments. As investors 
witnessed the write-downs on their investments, they stopped purchasing new 
RMBS bonds from mortgage lenders and the global market for RMBS bonds 
effectively closed. By June 2007 Bear Stearns admitted it was exposed to heavy 
losses stemming from subprime RMBS bonds. Bear was soon declared bankrupt 
and investors began to question if any other banks around the globe might collapse 
from their exposure to these toxic US subprime investments. This uncertainty 
materialised as volatility in the global financial markets and the share prices of 
banks depreciated substantially, while the volumes of money being traded on the 
interbank markets began to diminish rapidly as banks were reluctant to lend money 
to their competitors in case they collapsed (Hallsworth and Skinner 2008). 5 
 
As discussed earliHU WKH µVXFFHVV¶ RI 1RUWKHUQ 5RFN¶V EXVLQHVV PRGHO ZDV
dependent on its ability to access cheap interbank funding and to issue securitised 
bonds. The sudden closure of the international RMBS market, coupled with the 
KDHPRUUKDJLQJ RI WKH LQWHUEDQN PRQH\ PDUNHWV ZLWQHVVHG 1RUWKHUQ 5RFN¶V
business model become defunct within a matter of weeks. The growth of the 
wholesale financial markets, on which the Rock had become dependant, emerged 
as a consequence of macro-imbalances that had developed since the 1970s, 
where countries, such as China and Japan had accumulated trade surpluses and 
high volumes of savings, while the US, UK, Ireland and Spain, for example, 
amassed deficits. These imbalances were accompanied by a reduction in interest 
                                                 
5
 Equity investors were wary of having a large exposure to financial stocks because they were 
concerned that more banks would collapse. 
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rates, as countries with trade surpluses lent large volumes of money to countries 
with trade deficits, which fuelled borrowing further. 
 
Meanwhile, investors had witnessed a reduction in the returns on their investments 
due to the low interest rates and they began a search for higher yielding products, 
which included RMBS notes. Investors also sought exposures to funds that 
invested in RMBS bonds, which often leveraged the size of their investments by 
using borrowed money to purchase more RMBS notes, producing additional 
demand for RMBS bonds (Martin and Turner 2000; Wainwright 2009). During the 
2000s, Northern Rock experienced rapid growth, as the interest rates on interbank 
funds had remained low and the market for RMBS bonds had grown. RMBS bonds 
are complex, but the development of sophisticated mathematical modelling which 
attempts to predict the future risk of an asset based on historical data reassured 
investors and helped expand the market (Martin and Turner 2000). The UK 
securitisation market expanded in an environment of low interest rates and plentiful 
access to money. Between 1997 and 2007 the average price of a UK house rose 
by 193 per cent, fuelled in part by the cheap money available from the capital 
markets, and UK consumers willing to buy homes as an investment (Langley 2008) 
6
. Compared to the equity and corporate bond markets, the RMBS market had not 
suffered from any adverse events in its short history, so there was little historical 
HYLGHQFHDYDLODEOHWR1RUWKHUQ5RFN¶VPDQDJHPHQWWRVXJJHVWKRZYXOQHUDEOHWKH
lender would be if the liquidity of these two markets were significantly reduced. 
Although Northern Rock was the first UK retail bank to suffer from the credit 
crunch, because it had a greater dependence on external funding compared to its 
competitors, it was certainly not the last. By September 2008 Bradford & Bingley 
had been nationalised and its branch network had been sold to Banco Santander, 
                                                 
6
 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/housing/housingresearch/housingstatistics/housingstatisticsb
y/housingmarket/livetables/ (Accessed 14/04/09) 
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the owner of Abbey, who later purchased a struggling Alliance & Leicester.  The 
British government also bought substantial volumes of preferential shares in the 
Royal Bank of Scotland, while HBOS and Lloyds, under heavy government 
pressure, merged to form the Lloyds Banking Group, of which the government also 
became a majority shareholder. 
 
The reduced liquidity from the interbank markets and the inability of lenders to 
securitize their assets forced banks into initiating an unofficial policy of credit 
rationing. Consequently, lenders would only issue low-risk mortgage products 
leaving many consumers unable to refinance their mortgages onto new, lower 
priced deals which caused an increase in UK mortgage defaults. The illiquidity of 
the banking system also stimulated the withdrawal of corporate credit for 
businesses, which increased unemployment levels and consequently accelerated 
mortgage defaults, exacerbating the effects of the credit crunch within the UK. 7 As 
building societies did not use securitisation as a funding mechanism, they should 
have been impervious to the negative conditions experienced by securitisers. 8 
However, the societies were still exposed to an increase in mortgage defaults by 
consumers who were unable to refinance their mortgages or because they had 
become unemployed. Many smaller building societies began to amalgamate, 
LQFOXGLQJ 1DWLRQZLGH¶V WDNHRYHU RI 7KH 'HUE\VKLUH DQG 7KH &KHVKLUH DQG
%ULWDQQLD¶V PHUJHU ZLWK WKH &R-Operative as the stability of these smaller 
institutions was called into question as they were exposed to rising levels of bad 
mortgage and corporate debts.9  
                                                 
7
 :KLOHWKHLPSDFWRIWKHFUHGLWFUXQFKRQWKHµUHDOHFRQRP\¶LVDZRUWK\WRSLFRIUHVHDUFKLW
lies outside the scope of this thesis. 
8
 Building societies do not have shareholders, but are owned by their members, who include 
depositors and mortgagees. Since securitisation involves selling the assets to a third party, 
the Directors of building societies have agreed that it would be unacceptable to effectively 
sell-off their members to investors. 
9
 Many building societies were also adversely affected by the collapse of Icelandic banks which were 
managing substantial portions of their capital. 
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The mutation of the US subprime crisis into a global credit crunch has had dire 
FRQVHTXHQFHV IRU WKH8.¶VHFRQRP\7KHPLJUDWLRQRI WKHFULVLV UDLVHV LPSRUWDQW
geographical questions as to how the UK financial services industry, especially 
mortgage lenders, became dependent on securitisation. This thesis argues that the 
LQGXVWU\¶VUHOLDQFHRQVHFXULWLVDWLRQUHSRVLWLRQHGWKH8. economy to become more 
vulnerable to exogenous financial shocks such as the credit crunch. This 
repositioning was orchestrated by the restructuring of the UK financial services 
industry through deregulation and the adoption of new technological innovations 
from the US which led to the spatial reorganisation of UK retail banking. This 
instigated a shift from localised and regional forms of mortgage funding and 
lending, into regional command centres that used the City of London as a gateway 
which embedded the UK mortgage market firmly within the international circuits of 
capital. This thesis poses three key questions which seek to understand how the 
strategic restructuring that transformed the UK financial sector enhanced the 
exposure of the UK economy to the credit crunch: 
 
Question One: What are the geographies of mortgage production, credit-scoring 
and securitisation? 
 
The dissertation will map and interrogate the geographies of mortgage production, 
securitisation and credit scoring; where credit-scoring is understood as a decision-
making tool used by mortgage lenders to distinguish between applicants that are 
deemed: good risks and those deemed bad risks, where the latter are denied 
credit. 10 The aim is to account for the geographies of the particular institutions and 
                                                 
10
 :KDWLVGHILQHGDVµJRRG¶DQGµEDG¶ULVNYDries between lenders and their different mortgage 
SURGXFWV)RUH[DPSOHDFRQVXPHUFDWHJRULVHGDVDµEDG¶ULVNZKHQVFRUHGIRUDSULPHSURGXFW, may 
EHFDWHJRULVHGDVDµJRRG¶ULVNIRUDVXE-prime product that is targeted at consumers that are 
statistically more likely to default. 
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companies that are responsible for the production of consumer credit and 
securitisation.  
 
Question Two: How did the geographies of mortgage production, credit-scoring 
and securitisation emerge? 
 
The research will account for the changing geographies of mortgage production, 
providing a narrative which explains how these geographies have historically 
evolved to create the conditions that have allowed consumer credit, credit-scoring 
and securitisation to flourish. In particular, the thesis will focus on the epochal 
regulatory and technological transformations that occurred in the 1980s. This 
thesis will examine the development and role of new technologies and 
organisational structures so as to understand how the UK mortgage market was 
expanded and how the packaging of mortgages into debt securities was 
orchestrated.  
 
Question Three: How have these geographies been maintained and 
reconstructed? 
 
The thesis will explain how these geographies were reproduced by investigating 
how these institutions encouraged and enabled the expansion of consumer credit 
and securitisation through the 1990s and early-2000s against a back-drop of 
burgeoning financial engineering and the development of a sophisticated risk 
analytics industry. It will also explain how the systematic risks within the 
international finance system that led to the spread of the credit crunch were 
generated. The remainder of this dissertation is organised as follows: 
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Chapter 2 reviews the different theories and accounts of the emergence, role and 
functions of money that have developed in the social sciences. In particular, the 
chapter will review the early debates within political economy, drawing on work 
from Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who developed the idea of commodity 
money, which derives its value from labour power. Karl Marx drew upon these 
ideas to scrutinise the exploitative relations that capitalists hold over the working 
class proletariat. Marx exposed the contradictions within capitalism and began to 
derive an analysis of the role of credit money in overcoming these contradictions. 
7KHFKDSWHUDQDO\VHVKRZ'DYLG+DUYH\EXLOWRQ0DU[¶VZRUN LQRUGHUWRRIIHUDQ
explanation of the geographies of capitalism and in so doing the ways in which the 
operation and circulation of credit money are integral to the functioning of 
capitalism. The chapter then turns to the work of Albert Weber and Georg Simmel 
to understand the social narratives that explain the function, roles and circulation of 
money before exploring the contributions of anthropology and the sociology of 
scientific knowledge (SSK) in understanding the formation and operation of money 
from a social perspective. This chapter also discusses the work of the French 
Regulation School on financialisation and the viability of a finance-led regime at the 
scale of the nation-state, as well as the literature produced by the Critical Social 
Accountancy School (CSA), who consider the effects of the paradigm of 
shareholder value on corporations and households. The chapter concludes by 
exploring the writings of the Cultural School of financialisation which explores the 
mechanisms by which commensurate financialised subjects are being elicited. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews the ongoing debates emerging from the geographies of money 
literature. This theoretical body of work is used in two ways. First, these narratives 
provide a contextual background with which to frame the research. Second, the 
literature has been used to pose new questions concerning the production of new 
geographies that have emerged from the production of mortgages and of 
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securitisation. This chapter discusses the formation of the Bretton Woods System 
(BWS), which provided the institutional architecture for a new international finance 
system after the Second World War, and later enabled the idea of securitisation to 
migrate to the UK. The chapter explores the collapse of the BWS and its 
succession by the new international financial system (NIFS) which was coordinated 
through powerful financial centres (Leyshon and Thrift 1997), in particular London, 
which was subjected to waves of competitive deregulation and a spatial 
reconfiguration as information technology increased the volumes of available 
financial data. This stimulated the emergence of a new generation of spatially 
concentrated epistemic elites to interpret these flows of information. The chapter 
then shifts its focus to study the rise of city-regions that are home to processing 
sites that complete automated and often standardised processing for lenders. 
  
Chapter 4 reviews the contemporary debates that are currently shaping the 
application of research methods in economic geography, especially the important 
implications of the cultural turn. The chapter then discusses the methods used in 
this research project, mainly semi-structured interviews with corporate elites, 
coupled with the analysis of secondary data, including corporate reports. The 
chapter explains why these research methods were chosen and evaluates the 
success of these methods in the context of this research. Uneven power relations 
emerged during the research, owing to the powerful status of the financial elites 
who were the main source of empirical data. Chapter 4 seeks to define what 
makes these financial elites µHOLWH¶DQGKRZWKHLU status affected the research. The 
timing of the research corresponded with the credit crunch, the impacts of which 
are discussed in chapter 4, along with how a flexible methodological strategy was 
used to minimise the effects of access during the research. 
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Chapter 5 analyses the changing geography of residential mortgage credit 
production in the UK and develops a geographical history of mortgage production 
beginning in the 18th century, focusing on the development of dispersed mortgage 
production networks that operated on a regional scale. Chapter 5 then discusses 
the consolidation of mortgage production in the 1980s into specialised and 
frequently automated processing centres outside of London in regional centres. 
This reorganisation occurred as a response to deregulation and technological 
innovations in the 1980s and was instigated across the industry by lenders in a bid 
to reduce operational costs and to manage credit risk more effectively. The thesis 
argues that these regional centres are powerful, if overlooked, spaces that are 
responsible for producing the multi-ELOOLRQSRXQGµFROODWHUDO¶XVHGLQWKHSURGXFWLRQ
of RMBS debt-securities.  
 
Chapter 6 examines the development of credit-scoring, a technology which has 
revolutionised the production of residential mortgages in the US and UK. Credit-
scoring has been criticised for its reductionist epistemology and exclusion of 
consumers from cheap credit, but its adoption by UK lenders has successfully 
reduced operating costs and, to a degree, has standardised the way in which credit 
risk is measured. This chapter explains what credit-scoring is and reviews work 
from the social sciences, statistics and operational management, as well as 
drawing upon empirical material, to trace the history of credit scoring, but also how 
this technology was transferred from the US to the UK. The chapter then discusses 
how credit scoring became central to the expansion of the UK mortgage market, 
and how credit-scoring technology is produced, evaluated and maintained by 
epistemic elites. This chapter also discusses the uneven geographies of 
governance that determine what information is available for use in credit-scoring 
and risk management. 
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Chapter 7 explores the geographical construction of RMBS through securitisation 
and highlights the spaces that are critical in the production of RMBS bonds. The 
chapter discusses how mortgage assets are converted into redeemable RMBS 
bonds, of different maturities, which are designed to offer different rates of return, 
through a complex process of socio-financial engineering. The chapter scrutinises 
how space is manipulated and homogenised by epistemic elites in an attempt to 
tame the credit risk borne by consumers and their (in)ability to repay their 
mortgages. The chapter documents the role of mortgage lenders, corporate service 
providers, investment bankers, and bond-rating analysts, to analyse their roles and 
to develop an understanding as to how each organisation seeks to manage credit 
risk across space.  
 
Chapter 8 discusses the empirical contributions of the research, focussing on how 
changes in regulation spurred the adoption of US based technological innovations 
and business models by UK mortgage lenders. This chapter summarises how the 
geographies of mortgage production were transformed through credit scoring and 
discusses the range of financial service providers and actors that contribute to the 
development of securitisation transactions, such as law firms, investment banks, 
and bond-rating agencies. The chapter also explores the contribution of the 
findings towards political economic theory, and how RMBS notes can be viewed as 
a form of credit money, in an attempt to see how the value of contemporary credit 
instruments can be viewed as being socially constructed by epistemic elites. The 
conclusion also outlines how the politics of financialisation have become more 
deeply embedded in financial institutions through securitisation, a technology that 
enabled lenders to increase their profits between the mid-1990s to mid 2000s. In 
addition, the chapter reflects upon WKHWKHVLV¶FRQWULEXWLRQVWRHFRQRPLFJHRJUDSK\
and its focus on epistemic elites in both the City and in regional centres. Finally, 
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the conclusion suggests the ways in which the study could have been completed 
differently.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Financialisation(s) and monetary forms 
 
 
³«0OOH =pOLH D )UHQFK RSHUD VLQJHU LQ WKH FRXUVH RI D ZRUOG WRXU
gave a concert in the Society Islands and for her fee received one 
third of the proceeds. Her share consisted of three pigs, twenty-three 
turkeys, forty-four chickens, five thousand coconuts and considerable 
quantities of bananas lemons and oranges. Unfortunately the opera 
singer could only cRQVXPHDVPDOOSDUWRIWKLVWRWDO«WKXVDKDQGVRPH
fee which was equivalent to some four thousand pre-1870 francs was 
ZDVWHIXOO\VTXDQGHUHG´-HYRQV cited in Davies, 2002:13). 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In 1949 Bill Williams, an electrical engineer turned economist, completed his work on 
the Philips Machine, or MONIAC (Monetary National Income Automatic Computer). 
The MONIAC was an early simulator or economic model, which represented a 
national economy and used coloured water that flowed through perspex pipes to 
simulate the flow of money through the economy. The flows were represented as 
income, savings, imports and exports that could be adjusted to emulate government 
interaction where transparent water tanks represented stocks of money held as 
reserves (Bissell 2007) $W WKH WLPH :LOOLDPV¶ HDUO\ DWWHPSW DW PRGHOOLQJ IORZV RI
capital through the economy was revolutionary, bearing in mind that modern 
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computers and spreadsheets would not be available for several decades. The 
MONIAC, see Figure 2.1 for a diagram, was completed four years after the Bretton 
Woods System (BWS) was implemented. It could be argued that the MONAIC is 
iconic for its time, as WKH IL[HG IORZV RI WKH 021,$&¶V SHUVSH[ SLSHVPLUURUHG WKH
common assumptions, prevalent at the time, that the new financial system was now 
stable, ordered and predictable.  
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Figure 2.1: Diagram of the MONIAC 
 
 
 
Source: Bissell (2007:71) 
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However, as early as the 1960s the stability of the BWS began to show signs of 
strain, and by the 1970s this ambitious project had failed, undermined by the new 
Eurodollar markets centred in London. It became doubtful that the international 
financial system could never be successfully, fixed and controlled, for it is mediated 
through various forms of money that (are) operate(d) and perform(ed) in different 
ways, and as new types of money enter circulation, old variants are displaced. 
Subsequently, the operations of some types of money are more familiar to bankers, 
regulators and economists, for example state-paper money, making them easier to 
understand, regulate and model. On the other hand, new financial innovations are 
often less well understood, regulated and modelled. In the case of RMBS, they can, 
and have been, entirely misunderstood. It is argued that new financial innovations 
can often fall outside of existing regulation, while poor familiarity with their social 
construction, can frequently lead to a poor understanding of the risks associated with 
particular forms of money, making them difficult to stabilise and control. 
 
To return to the MONIAC metaphor, the economy has become far more complex and 
if Philips were to build a MONIAC today, it would need to reflect the unstable and 
diverse nature of the contemporary financial system. Perhaps the capital, 
represented by water moving through the perspex pipes, would be represented by a 
multitude of different colours, and maybe gaseous states, to represent the different 
types of monetary instruments, while the intimately related flows of consumer 
savings and credit would undoubtedly need to be included. Philips would also have 
to consider connecting a series of MONIACs together, to signify the integrated flows 
between different states and the flows of consumer investments and savings 
between them. Such an endeavour would be useful to represent the politics of 
financialisation that have become more powerful in coordinating the flows of capital 
  
 
 20 
into different sectors of the economy, while drawing attention to the multitude of 
different monetary instruments in circulation today.  
 
This chapter has three broad aims. First, the chapter will explore the theories and 
philosophies of money which have been developed in the social sciences, to be 
discussed in section two.  This will enable the development of a comprehensive 
understanding of research conducted on money and credit in order to contextualize 
and frame the research on consumer credit and RMBS. The second aim is to 
review the contemporary literature on financialisation to understand where RMBS 
and consumer credit can be situated in the context of the deepening significance of 
the role of financial markets in everyday life. This will be explored in section three. 
The third aim is to highlight the spatial sensitivity of these social science narratives 
to understand their attentiveness to the spaces and boundaries of money, credit 
and financialisation, which will be discussed in sections two and three. Section four 
will conclude this Chapter. 
 
2.2. Adding it all up: the theoretical and philosophical narratives of money 
 
Money was symbolised in the MONIAC through the simple flow of coloured water, 
but even a brief foray into the history and philosophy of money immediately 
highlights the inadequacy of this portrayal due to the sheer diversity of different 
monetary forms that have existed through time and across space. Leyshon and 
Thrift (1997:1) observe how the power and complexity of money makes it tempting 
to consider money DV D µVXSHUQDWXUDO GHLW\¶ EXW WKH\ GR QRW UHFRPPHQG WKLV
approach and instead suggest that money needs to be historicised and socialised 
LQRUGHU WRXQGHUVWDQG LWV µUHDO¶ LQFDUQDWLRQV+HUH , VHHN WRKLVWRULFLVHPRQH\E\
focussing on narratives which are sympathetic to the operation of money, but more 
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importantly the particular spaces in which money circulates. This will be important 
to contextualise how RMBS notes can be understood as a monetary instrument. 
 
'RGG¶V (1994) monograph, The Sociology of Money, attempts to develop a 
systematic account of the nature of money and, in doing so, discusses the four 
social functions of money, that are generally accepted by social scientists. The first 
two functions; the ability to act as a medium of exchange, and as a store of value, 
enable it to adopt two additional roles, as a unit of account and as a means of 
payment. These functions combined, enable money to exhibit a dual function 
where it can act both as a lubricant of exchange and as an expression of value 
(Leyshon and Thrift 1997). According to Dodd (1994), these four functions are 
useful for identifying money as each monetary instrument performs these functions 
to different degrees, and demonstrates how particular monetary forms are used for 
different purposes in specific societies, histories and spaces. For example, cash is 
an excellent medium of exchange as it is accepted readily as payment, but it is a 
poor store of value as inflation diminishes its purchasing power over time (Dodd 
1994). On the other hand, government bonds, backed by the state, are excellent 
stores of value as they produce a return over time, but are not accepted as 
payment for everyday goods and services. Leyshon and Thrift (1997) identify five 
forms of money; premodern money; commodity money; money of account; state 
money and virtual money. Each monetary instrument is sustained through 
networks of trust, habit and faith that are reinforced through complex webs of 
technology, institutions and cultural attributes. Such qualities lead Dodd (1994) to 
assert that the production of money is more a craft than a science.  
 
Money has a long history, but it was not until the eighteenth century when formal 
debates on the philosophy of money began to occur. Before the fifteenth century 
there has been little formal analysis of economic activity, and the analysis that did 
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exist was piecemeal (Landreth and Colander 1994). Early writings on money in the 
1600s were the product of merchants, rather than scholars, reflecting a shift at the 
time from feudalism to mercantile capitalism. Trade between cities and nation-
states, was facilitated by the merchants, whose writings highlighted this 
fundamental shift and began to underline the importance of money in smoothing 
trade. Precious metals in the guise of commodity money were used to purchase 
raw materials and the means of production (Landreth and Colander 1994). These 
initial accounts did not seek to theorise money but instead focussed on the 
functions of commerce and trade. For example, the early work pioneered by the 
French Physiocrats, Cantillon and Quesnay, argues that agricultural land was the 
source of wealth because its products sustain humanity (Boss 1990). The 
Physiocrats argued that the wealth was born from land, and was released by 
agricultural labourers, as once the harvest had been collected, the surplus food 
could be sold or exchanged for other commodities. Debates on the value of money 
continued through the 16th century, where philosophers such as William Petty 
began to question the source of value in money (Roll 1992). Petty stipulated that 
value of an object was derived from the human labour necessary to produce it, 
whilst writers such as Locke and Hume argued the value of money was in fact  
imaginary (Roll 1992) and projected onto commodities. A successful transaction 
would be completed when a quantity of gold, representing a specific imaginary 
value and denominated numerically, was exchanged for a commodity with an 
equivalent imaginary value (Roll 1992). The eighteenth century witnessed the 
acceleration of industrial capitalism as serfdom disappeared and industrialists 
seized the power of production causing an epochal shift in the history of western 
Europe (Roll 1992). This economic transformation undermined the authority of the 
Church which had previously attempted to repress the expansion of scientific 
knowledge. This is a key development, because individuals began to freely explore 
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philosophy, which would later be used to develop frameworks to explore the 
relationships which existed between money, the economy and the state. 
 
2.2.1. Money and political economy 
 
One of the earliest writers contributing to this domain was Adam Smith (1976 
[1776]). His theorisations were informed by debates on moral philosophy, which 
DUJXHGWKDWWKHVWDWH¶VRQO\ IXQFWLRQZDVWRSURWHFWSROLWLFDO IUeedom and property 
rights, where markets would effectively regulate themselves, through exchange, 
IDFLOLWDWHG E\ PRQH\ 6PLWK¶V (1976 [1776]) attentiveness to moral philosophy 
placed the worker, protected by the state, at the centre of the economy. In order to 
IDFLOLWDWH H[FKDQJH DQG WUDGH EHWZHHQ VSHFLDOLVHG ZRUNHUV 6PLWK¶V WKHRU\
operated within the territorial space of the state and asserted that there had to be 
one commodity that no worker would refuse to accept, which would act as a 
benchmaUN IRU H[FKDQJH 7KLV ZDV µFRPPRGLW\ PRQH\¶ 6PLWK (1976 [1776]) 
identified tobacco, salt and cattle as early forms of commodity money, which were 
accepted as almost universal payment in the societies within which they circulated. 
However, Smith (1976 [1776]) elaborated on how precious metals such as gold are 
the most preferable money commodity as their physical properties render them 
scarce, non-perishable and easy to divide, making them a privileged commodity to 
lubricate trade. Earlier writers, such as Locke and Hume, considered money to 
have an imaginary, magical quality (Roll 1992), but Smith (1976 [1776]) sought to 
examine the power that gave commodity monies their universal, social power. In 
GRLQJ VR 6PLWK LGHQWLILHG WZR W\SHV RI YDOXH NQRZQ DV µXWLOLW\ YDOXH¶ DQG
µSXUFKDVLQJSRZHU¶11. Ricardo (1951) elaborates on the importance of utility value, 
arguing that a commodity must have a use within society, otherwise no-one would 
                                                 
11
 .DUO0DU[ZRXOGODWHUUHIHUWR6PLWK¶VµXWLOLW\YDOXH¶DVµXVHYDOXH¶DQGµSXUFKDVLQJSRZHU¶DV
µH[FKDQJHYDOXH¶LQKLVDQDO\VLVWREHGLVFXVVHGODWHU 
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want to purchase the object. The second value that Smith (1976 [1776]) attributed 
to commodities was its purchasing power, quantified by the amount of labour 
power embodied in it. This, Smith believed was the true universal value embodied 
within commodities.  
 
Based on this theorisation, Ricardo (1951) asserted that precious metals, such as 
gold, are the most appropriate money commodity because their scarcity demands 
that substantial hours worth of human labour must be expended to extract the 
material, making gold money extremely valuable (Ricardo 1951) :KLOH 6PLWK¶V
narrative of political economy marginalised the role of the state (Landreth and 
Colander 1994), Ricardo (1951) began to examine the explicit role of the state in 
the management of non-commodity money. Ricardo observed that although gold is 
the most valuable commodity money, it is not necessarily an ideal medium of 
labour value, as fluctuations in its supply can distort the labour power that it 
represents, and it is notoriously difficult to transport. As such, Ricardo considered 
paper money, albeit fixed to gold, as being superior to commodity money, although 
it has no direct intrinsic value as a paper-commodity, and so it does not express 
the labour power in the same way as gold or silver. Ricardo argues that state-
paper money is superior to commodity money because it represents the value of 
gold but can circulate more cheaply as money, due to its comparatively low weight. 
However, the success of state-SDSHUPRQH\¶VFLUFXODWLRQLVFRQWLQJHQWRQWKHDELOLW\
of the state to protect the source and legitimacy of its legal tender.  
 
Karl Marx developed the ideas of Smith and Ricardo, borrowing extensively from 
their earlier research (Landreth and Colander 1994) to provide a sophisticated 
account of the role of money under capitalism (De Brunhoff 1973). Unlike Smith 
DQG5LFDUGR 0DU[¶s account of political economy focused on how the exchange 
value of labour is exploited by capitalists, which causes Marx to place money at the 
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heart of capitalism. 0DU[¶VV\VWHPDWLFZRUNRQFDSLWDOLVP OHDGKLP WR LGHQWLI\ WKH
ways in which money is converted into capital and credit money, so as to 
overcome the contradictions of capitalism, which as I shall argue later is an 
important process in understanding the emergence of RMBS notes, a product of 
securitisation. 
 
For Marx, commodity money has two values. First, use value EDVHGRQ 6PLWK¶V 
(1976 [1776]) utility value, requires a commodity to have a specific use. Second, 
GUDZLQJRQ6PLWK¶VWKHVLVRISXUFKDVHSRZHU0DU[KLJKOLJKWVWKHSUREOHPLQWU\LQJ
to compare the value of two qualitatively different commodities in exchange. Marx 
argues that this quandary can be addressed through the concept of exchange 
value, where the value of a commodity is measured by  the quantity of labour time 
required to produce it; a universal value that can be measured in all commodities 
(Marx 1990 [1867]; 1993 [1939]). Subsequently, two commodities can be valued by 
comparing the amount of labour time that has been exerted in their production. As 
with Smith and Ricardo, the universal equivalent of labour power can be embodied 
in any commodity and Marx, like his predecessors also suggested that gold is the 
most appropriate commodity-money. 
 
The nascent political economy theories that were pioneered by Smith and Ricardo, 
had, on the one hand, primarily sought to theorise money and trade in an economy 
where property rights were protected and respected (Smith 1976 [1776]). On the 
other hand, 0DU[¶VDLPZDVWRV\QWKHVLVH this research on commodity money and 
capitalist production to understand the complex relationships that underlie capitalist 
accumulation, with the specific aim of revealing how workers are  exploited by 
capitalists (Marx 1990 [1867]). Leyshon and Thrift (1997) identify three types of 
FDSLWDOZLWKLQ0DU[¶VZULWLQJV7KHILUVWLVNQRZQDVSURGXFWLYHFDSLWDOZKHUHPRQH\
is converted into capital when capitalists attempt to make a profit through 
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commodity production (Marx 1990 [1867]). This transformation occurs when money 
to used to purchase materials, the means of production and labour to produce 
commodities (Leyshon and Thrift 1997). Under capitalism workers sell their labour 
to an industrial capitalist who pays them in exchange for their labour time, but Marx 
(1990 [1867]) argues that the workers are exploited as their wages are not 
proportional to the labour time that is used to produce the commodities. This 
fraction of unpaid work is known as surplus value and is the profit that capitalists 
amass as a return on the capital employed (Marx 1990 [1867]). Once capitalists 
have sold their commodities they reinsert the money and profits back into the 
production process and the capitalist receives greater returns as this cycle 
continues.  This process can be summarised in Figure 2.2 below: 
 
Figure 2.2: 0DU[¶VFLUFXLWRISURGXFWLYHFDSLWDO 
 
M - C
M P
L P
...P...&¶- 0¶
 
Source: Leyshon and Thrift (1997) 
 
8QGHU0DU[¶VFLUFXLWRISURGXFWLYHFDSLWDO0UHSUHVHQWVWKHPRQH\WKDWLVXVHGWR
buy raw materials or commodities (C) that are transformed through the means of 
production (MP), such as machinery, and the labour power of the workers (LP). 
The materials are subjected to the production process (P) which results in the 
GHYHORSPHQWRI D QHZ FRPPRGLW\ &¶ 2QFH WKLV FRPPRGLW\ LV VROG its value is 
FRQYHUWHG EDFN LQWR PRQH\ 0¶ 7KH ILQDO UHVXOW LV WKDW WKH FDSLWDOLVW UHFHLYHV D
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return on their capital above and beyond that which was first invested (M) as the 
workers have been exploited during the production process and the capitalist 
manages to extract surplus value, realised as money.  
 
The continuation of this cycle is fraught with difficulties as capitalists have to wait 
until the new commodities have been exchanged for money before they can buy 
the fresh labour power and materials necessary to produce more commodities. 
Capitalists offset this problem through the production of a second type of capital, 
known as financial capital, which is provided by a second type of capitalist, known 
as money owners, (Harvey 1982) who advance interest-bearing financial capital to 
industrial capitalists in exchange for a promissory note enabling them to continue 
production (Leyshon and Thrift 1997). 12 The role of the money capitalist is 
performed by wealthy investors, or banks that have pooled the savings of 
businesses and workers, and effectively purchase debt from the industrial 
capitalists. The interest that the money owners receive is derived from the profits of 
the industrial capitalists. In effect, it is a fraction of the surplus value that has been 
extracted from the workers (Marx 1990 [1867]). This system of credit allows 
capitalists to increase the velocity of capital circulation and the metamorphosis of 
commodities into money, which results in increased capital accumulation (Harvey 
1982).  
 
Marx (1990 [1867]) argues that credit-money and bills of exchange act as a 
monetary instrument as they are exchanged for other commodities, even though 
they are not fixed to the circulation of government or metallic money and they do 
not hold value-since no labour and extraction of surplus value has yet taken place. 
This develops a secondary market where the bills circulate, but Marx (1990 [1867]) 
                                                 
12
 A bond or contract where the debtor, in this case the industrial capitalist, promises to repay their debt 
to the money owner, at a specific date with a predefined rate of interest. 
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insists that the value of these instruments are based solely on trust and the belief 
that credit-money will be repaid in the future by commodity money. Marx refers to 
this as fictitious value as the credit money, if issued, should theoretically have 
labour value in the future once the debt has been repaid (Marx 1990 [1867]).  This 
is similar to the corporate bond markets that are part of the contemporary financial 
system, where corporations raise funds for production and repay the debt using 
profits at a later date, which would be repaid from the surplus labour extracted from 
workers. The third type of capital is commercial capital where commodities are 
purchased and resold at a higher price through arbitrage (Leyshon and Thrift 
1997). This also occurs with money capitalists, when they sell the bills of fictitious 
capital to other money capitalists at a discount. 
 
'DYLG+DUYH\¶V(1982) extensive work on Marx attempts to develop his unfinished 
thesis on credit money further, arguing that although credit money acts as a 
WHPSRUDU\ IL[ WR FDSLWDOLVP¶V LQWHUQDO FRQWUadictions, it eventually exacerbates 
crises. Despite the importance of credit money, Harvey bemoans the fact that 
Marxist writers have frequently neglected the study of credit and maintains that 
credit and bills of exchange are unlike commodity money as commodity money is 
widely accepted in exchange whereas credit money is not. Harvey (1982) argues 
that credit money is a private debt, where the borrower has to repay the creditor 
directly which limits the circulation of credit money amongst money capitalists. 
Following this argument, it is essential that banks control the production of their 
private credit money to ensure they do not produce and circulate high-risk, low-
quality money as credit. This leads to the development of a hierarchy of banks, 
where central banks regulate the money produced by national banks, whose 
bankers can refuse the convertibility of private credit money, emphasising the role 
of the nation-state in regulating private credit monies. The pinnacle of this 
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hierarchy was held by the US during its period of hegemony over the Bretton 
Woods System (BWS) which helped govern national economies.13  
 
If bills of exchange circulate as money and are used for private payments, the 
monetary value of the bills is not fixed to the collateral of unsold commodities, but 
they are commensurate with the future labour value used to produce the goods. As 
the bonds are duplicates of real capital, they exist as fictitious capital, which 
extends beyond real production, and allows fixed capital to circulate (Harvey 1982). 
Marx suggests the idea of fictitious capital in an attempt to persuade us that future 
UHYHQXHLVQRWµUHDO¶FDSLWDODVWKHYDOXHKDVQRW\HWEHHQSroduced, which distorts 
the supply of credit money and produces financial crises (Harvey 1982).  
 
Fundamentally, Harvey (1982) sought to view 0DU[¶VZRUNthrough a spatial lens to 
XQGHUVWDQGKRZFDSLWDOLVP¶VVRFLDOUHODWLRQVKDYHEHHQDGRSWHGPRUHUDSLGO\DQG
deeply in particular spaces. For example, the expansion of credit money has been 
driven by its geographical mobility, allowing money capitalists to seek out superior 
returns in different locations and markets, which has been enhanced by the pooling 
of deposits in banks, which employ a special social class - the money capitalists - 
who are adept at managing fictitious capital and credit money. This leads Harvey to 
conclude that the act of exchange unites particular places through social relations 
which allows the flow of universal value. However, exchange can only occur if 
capital and money are free to circulate within different spaces, achieved by 
transport networks, which leads to spatial integration (Harvey 1982). In the context 
of contemporary capitalism, Harvey (1982) contends that credit money is the most 
mobile of monies due to its ability to pass between spaces through electronic 
communications, which reduces physical barriers. Despite this, Harvey continues 
to place emphasis on the role of the nation-states that are instrumental in 
                                                 
13
 The BWS will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
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regulating the flows of credit money and stresses that capitalism can only expand if 
the law, property rights and the transport infrastructure of a nation-state are 
FRPSDWLEOHZLWKFDSLWDOLVP¶VORJLFV 
 
These narratives of political economy were the first to situate money within a 
broader understanding of society and capitalist production, but there are several 
issues that undermine their applicability to adequately examine the operation of the 
contemporary financial system.  The most prominent issue surrounds the labour 
theory of value, where value is only derived from the labour exerted in material 
production (Dodd 1994) 7KLV HPHUJHV IURP 0DU[¶V GHVLUH WR HOXFLGDWH WKH
exploitation of industrial workers under capitalist accumulation, but in using this 
theorisation he inadvertently ensured that it would become difficult to reconcile his 
WKHRULHVRIODERXUZLWKWRGD\¶VFRQWHPSRUDU\HFRQRPLFJHRJUDSKLHV7KLVGLIILFXOW\
emerges from the prevalence of the tertiary and quaternary sectors of advanced 
capitalist economies (Williams 1997)  where service products would potentially be 
viewed as having no labour value, leading both Harvey (1982) and Boss (1990) to 
ponder how Marx would have viewed the burgeoning role of banks, the service 
sector and consumer finance under the latest regime of accumulation.  
 
Sayer and Walker (1992) attempt to resolve this problem, by arguing that many 
economic activities have been mislabelled as services. They assert that applied 
technical knowledge, research and development and project management, 
activities that are frequently classed as services, are in fact integral elements of the 
productive labour process as although they are not acts of material production, 
these activities have an important affect in fashioning raw materials into new 
objects, imbued with use-values. This leads Sayer and Walker (1992) to suggest 
that bankers in the financial services industry also contribute to the productive 
labour process as they arrange the finance that frequently facilitates the material 
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production of goods. Sayer and Walker attempt to address the weaknesses of the 
labour theory of value by widening the social division of labour to encompass 
technical and managerial activities with direct material production.  
 
However, this defence only glosses over some of the deeper theoretical issues that 
plague the labour theory of value. For example, Doel (2006) reminds us how 
different quantities of two different commodities, while being qualitatively different, 
can be described as being equivalent in value, although it is only when they are 
compared with money that they become equivalent. At this stage of exchange, 
Doel argues that it is difficult to accurately translate the exchange value, and labour 
value, of a commodity into a monetary price.14 'RHO¶V (2006) critique also 
destabilises the distinction between use-value and exchange value, in that the use-
value of a commodity is perversely divided. While consumers purchase a 
commodity because of its particular use-value, capitalists produce the commodity 
in order to produce a profit, giving the commodity a second use-value. Doel argues 
that this second use-value causes labour power to take on a use-value, which he 
suggests removes the distinction between use-value and exchange value. 
 
Leyshon and Thrift (1997) list four additional weaknesses that restricts the 
DSSOLFDELOLW\ RI 0DU[¶V DQDO\VLV WR FRQWHPSRUDU\ UHVHDUFK RQ FDSLWDOLVP )LUVW
Leyshon and Thrift (1997) suggest that the idea of commodity money is not flexible 
enough to comprehend new forms of money like derivatives and futures contracts. 
Second, Marx believed that credit money would aid the downfall of capitalism. 
$OWKRXJKFDSLWDOLVPKDVIUHTXHQWO\VWXPEOHGVLQFH0DU[¶VWLPHLWKDVQRW\HWEHHQ
replaced by an alternative, and the use of credit under capitalism has grown. 
                                                 
14
 7KHGLVFUHSDQFLHVLQHIIHFWLYHO\WUDQVODWLQJYDOXHVWRSULFHVDOVRKLJKOLJKWVKRZ0DU[¶VODERXUWKHRU\
of value is insensitive to price changes emerging from the pressures of supply and demand. Although 
Marx borrowed the concept of exchange value from Smith (1976[1776]), Smith was aware that supply 
and demand detached prices from the labour theory of value. 
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Leyshon and Thrift (1997) assert how the international credit markets have 
expanded dramatically and that speculation has increased since the 1980s.15 
Third, Marx, Ricardo and Smith minimised the role of state regulation in their 
narratives, but Leyshon and Thrift (1997) note how state regulation plays a 
constant and powerful role in the contemporary financial system by developing 
UXOHVWKDWDUHGHVLJQHGWRHQDEOHWKHRSHUDWLRQRIµIUHH-PDUNHWV¶. The final criticism 
of pROLWLFDOHFRQRP\¶VWKHRU\RIPRQH\LVWKDW0DU[¶VLQSDUWLFXODU failed to account 
for the cultural dimensions of money and the social institutions of trust that permit 
the circulation of money and credit within society. The chapter will now turn to 
examine a series of theories that begin to explore the cultures of money. 
 
2.2.2. Anthropological and sociological accounts of money 
 
Subsequent work on the philosophies of money and finance departed from the 
labour theory of value, central to the political economy theories of Smith, Ricardo 
and Marx. These new accounts, discussed below, began to focus more frequently 
on the role of the state, individuals and other actors in the production of money and 
value. One such narrative is the sociological analysis of the economy by Albert 
Weber at the turn of the 1800s,  which began to uncover the relationships between 
economic actors which underlined the role of the state in the production and 
regulation of money, neglected in the earlier accounts of Smith and Marx 
(Swedburg 2005). Although Weber did not intend to develop an in-depth and 
detailed theory of money, he felt that economic sociology could be used to analyse 
PRQH\¶VUROHLQHFRQRPLFWKHRU\ (Swedburg 2005). In contrast to the earlier work 
of Smith, Ricardo and Marx,  who all consider commodity money and credit to be 
produced through labour, Weber situates the state at the centre of monetary 
                                                 
15
 The credit crunch, initiated through the devaluation of fictitious capital via sub-prime securitisation, 
may not have destroyed capitalism (yet), but it has been left badly shaken.   
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production, where he considers money to be a legal means of payment (Weber 
1968), similar to the work of Harvey (1982), and in doing so, embeds the circulation 
of money within the space of the state. Money, as a means  of payment, is 
produced when a state mobilises its power to assume a monopoly in the 
prodXFWLRQDQG UHJXODWLRQRIPRQH\ ³%\SDVVLQJDVXLWDEOH ODZDVWDWHFDQ WXUQ
DQ\REMHFW LQWRD µOHJDOPHDQVRISD\PHQW¶DQGDQ\FKDUWDOREMHFW LQWR µPRQH\¶ LQ
WKHVHQVHRIDPHDQVRISD\PHQW´:HEHU-168).16 
 
Whether or not a state is able to successfully protect the integrity of its money, is 
borne out of its aptitude to exercise administrative control over money (Weber 
1968) which is sanctioned through its production and management, or the 
detection and destruction of counterfeit money. Political economists argued that 
commodity money existed to facilitate the ease of trade between producers and 
capitalists, but Weber distinguishes the exchange function of state money from the 
JHQHUDO HFRQRP\ DQG DUJXHV WKDW WKH SULPDU\ DLP RI VWDWH PRQH\¶V H[FKDQJH
function is to enable the state to tax its population, to accumulate wealth and to 
fund wars (Weber 1968). The provision of a state money with a universally 
acceptable exchange value is necessary to collect taxes in the same medium and 
value, but also to ensure the state money circulates as the dominant monetary 
instrument within the economy. Consequently, the state coerces the population into 
circulating its own government-controlled money to ensure that value can be 
accumulated for the state. Gold, or paper money fixed to gold, is important to 
:HEHU¶V DQDO\VLV EHFDXVH JROG LV VFDUFe, and therefore valuable, but he argues 
WKDWPRQH\¶VYDOXHLVRQO\UHDOLVHGWKURXJKLWVUHODWLRQZLWKRWKHUGHILQLWLYHW\SHVRI
commodity. As such, money has no intrinsic value of its own, as with commodity 
money, and so money only gains value when it acts as a means of exchange, 
reflecting the value of the goods being exchanged.  
                                                 
16
 $µFKDUWDOREMHFW¶LVDQREMHFWFUHDWHGRUVXSSRUWHGE\DVWDWH 
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Like Weber, Simmel (2003[1907]) rejects the labour theory of value in his analysis 
of the relationships between money and individuals. Simmel (2003[1907]), 
GLVDJUHHV ZLWK 0DU[¶V WKHVLV WKDW ODERXU LV WKH XOWLPDWH PHDVXUH RI YDOXH LQ
commodities and Simmel argues that if labour was the definitive measure of value, 
then commodities would be priced purely in hours of labour time, not money. 
Simmel continues to problematize the idea of  labour power, where all labour time 
is equal, as he believes that the brain articulates a central role in production as it 
FRRUGLQDWHV WKH ERG\¶V PXVFOHV LQ ZKDW KH UHIHUV WR DV WKH UROH RI µPHQWDO
SURGXFWLRQ¶ (Simmel 2003[1907]). Simmel argues that specialised labour requires 
PRUH µPHQWDO SURGXFWLRQ¶ OHDGLQJ KLP WR FRQFOXGH WKDW D VNLOOHG ZRUNHU ZRXOG
produce more value in the production of one complex object in contrast to an 
unskilled worker producing a different, larger quantity of products, but with less skill 
and expertise which destabilises the theory of a unified labour value as being a 
tenabOHDUJXPHQW6LPPHO¶VYLHZKDVWRDGHJUHH been supported and replicated, 
by contemporary research on local currency systems (LCSs), especially time dollar 
schemes. Such schemes have failed to attract professional members as they are 
unwilling to exchange their services with unskilled members of these localised 
economies as they perceive their time to be more valuable (Lee et al. 2004).17 
Simmel replaces the labour theory of value with utility value, common to the earlier 
political economy narratives, and scarcity value which makes objects more 
                                                 
17
 LCSs are localised economic systems that are forged by social groups and involve the production of 
goods and services. They are self-regulating, issuing and administrating their own currencies (Lee, et 
al. 2004). These alternative economic systems are detached from the state and have been set up in 
areas of depravation by their members to enable them to produce and consume services and goods 
outside of the formal economy. Members offer goods and services to each other and are paid in the 
local currency, once a price has been negotiated with the buyer. Members amass the currency by 
undertaking work for other individuals in the system, which can then be spent on services offered by 
other members. With time dollar LCSs, the value of the skills used in the production of goods and 
services are equalised as the goods or services are perceived to be worth the amount of time required 
to produce them, regardless of the skills required (Lee, et al. 2004).  . For example, five hours of baby 
sitting would be rewarded with five time dollars, which could be used to purchase five hours of 
gardening. 
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valuable to individuals.18 According to Simmel (2003[1907]), humans order objects 
hierarchically where a society will perceive some object to be worth more than 
others and where objects derive their value through psychological and 
metaphysical qualities that individuals identify in an object (Leyshon and Thrift 
1997). 
 
Simmel views exchange as a process where an individual balances µVDFULILFHDQG
JDLQ¶ZKHUHWKHYDOXes of an object are partially sacrificed to gain from the values 
of another object in the transaction. Money acts as a measure of value for Simmel 
(2003[1907]), where a specific quantity of money becomes equal to the object 
being exchanged with a buyer being µ«ZLOOLQJ WRVDFULILFH WKLVPRQH\«RQO\ LIZH
obtain DUHDVRQDEOHHTXLYDOHQW¶(Simmel 2003[1907]:141). As such, money has no 
inherent value itself, and it is only considered valuable because of its role as an 
H[FKDQJH PHGLXP 7KLV PDNHV WUXVW DQG VRFLDO UHODWLRQV LPSRUWDQW WR 6LPPHO¶V
theory of money, as they legitimise money, which is important since it consists of a 
symbolic medium of exchange,  and is used to express the perceived value of an 
object. If money suffers a loss in confidence it can no longer reflect the values of 
objects which can cause monetary systems to collapse (Lewis and Weigert 1985). 
Unlike Marx, Simmel does not explore the role of credit money in any depth, but he 
does recognise that credit money is reliant on trust, where it represents the values 
of objects in the future, which emphasises the importance of the social relations 
that underwrite money (Leyshon and Thrift 1997).  
 
Research conducted by economic anthropologists has also provided rich insights 
into money, by focussing on the monetary systems of different societies. Early 
work conducted by European and North American academics in the 1900s, 
                                                 
18
  Simmel rejects the idea of labour power being the sole value of a commodity and subsequently 
refers to objects instead of commodities. 
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focussed on so-FDOOHG µSULPLWLYH WULEHV¶ LQ 6RXWK$PHULFD DQG LQ $IULFD WR LGHQWLI\
and examine the different types of indigenous money and the social networks in 
which they operate. Anthropologists sought to embrace the social and contextual 
experience of money in line with the culturally inflected work of Karl Polanyi, in 
contrast to orthodox economics, which ignores the significance of money and its 
social relations, in favour of abstract economic terms (Dalton 1965). Davies (2002) 
contextualises these studies by discussing how money emerged out of the 
inadequacies of barter exchange which was an inconvenient and inefficient method 
of enacting trade, and highlights how different cultures around the world use 
common commodities as a standard of uniformity to make payments.  
 
µ3ULPLWLYH PRQLHV¶ XVH D YDULHW\ RI GLYHUVH REMHFWV IRU SD\PHQW that include(d), 
woodpecker scalps, sea shells, goats and dog teeth (Dalton 1965); with more 
contemporary examples including local currencies produced and administered in 
LCSs. On the one hand, Maurer (2006) shows how primitive money differs to 
modern monies used by western states, where state money is used as payment in 
commercial activity as well as for gift payments and the redistribution of wealth. On 
the other hand, primitive monetary systems have different monies for conducting 
commerce and trade, with alternative monies for non-commercial activities. For 
example, one money may be used to purchase food, whilst other another currency 
may be used by the same community in symbolic social events such as bride 
money exchanged between families in marriage (Maurer 2002). Primitive monies 
studied by early economic anthropologists were organised so that particular 
monies could only be used by specific members of a tribe, as discovered by 
$UPVWURQJ¶VZRUNRQ5RVVHO,VODQG(Armstrong 1924). Anthropologists later turned 
their attention to the introduction of state-based colonial money and its effects on 
homogenising monies in circulation amongst subsistence economies which altered 
the relations within the societies as the idea of suffered deferred payment and 
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credit was introduced (Ofonagoro 1979; Maurer 2006). Leyshon and Thrift (1997) 
conceptualise this as a µfluid¶ geography of premodern money which reveals a 
myriad of monetary systems across space and time, reflecting historically different 
social systems and cultures. Subsequently, as societies have become more 
interconnected, different monetary systems have become amalgamated or 
completely displaced. For example, the Roman Empire distributed its currency 
through Europe through the construction of a network of official mints to produce 
money to pay its soldiers (Davies 2002) which expanded the geographical 
coverage of Roman money, which began to hRPRJHQLVH (XURSH¶V PRQHWDU\
spaces (Leyshon and Thrift 1997). 
 
Gilbert (2005) advocates the investigation of monies through an anthropological 
lens as to do so exposes the power and authority that is necessary for the 
successful circulation and operation of money, although she bemoans that this 
same approach has not been applied to modern monies. Consequently, Gilbert 
(2005) has attempted to analyse how state money is invested with social 
meanings, inscriptions and iconographies which naturalize the money object 
through banal representations, representations that fall into three categories. First, 
the history of an objeFW IRU H[DPSOH D %ULWLVK EDQN QRWH¶V OHJLWLPDF\ PD\ EH
represented, in part, by a decree where it can be accepted for payment as it is 
issued by the Bank of England. The second category is the function of an object, 
VXFK DV D EDQN QRWH¶V YDOXH DQG WKH DVVociated purchasing power that it 
commands. The third category is the notes identity; including serial numbers that 
are festooned with images, social and political seals and portraits, to exude trust. 
Although this provides an understanding as to how states ratify the quality of their 
money through trust it does not reveal how the value that the money represents 
can be comprehended. Gilbert (2005) finds the answer to this question in the 
earlier work of Baudrillard who explores the value of the images and symbols of 
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money. While Marx vehemently argued that the value of a commodity is derived 
though the labour power embedded in it during  production, Baudrillard (1981) 
proclaims that the most importaQWVWDJHRIDQREMHFW¶VOLIHLVLWVFRQVXPSWLRQZKHUH
an object is invested with social meanings and codes. Baudrillard (1981) suggests 
that the importance of material objects are displaced by semio-linguistics where 
language, signs and meanings express the value of an object, which implies that 
value is produced through language, and that different societies in particular 
locations will attribute different values to objects. Under this argument the value of 
a quantity of money is commensurate with the value of an object as money has no 
value itself (Baudrillard 1981). 
 
Gilbert (2005) examines how Rotman (1987) EXLOGVRQ%DXGULOODUG¶V WKHVLV LQDQ
DQDO\VLV RI ZKDW KH FDOOV µ[HQRPRQH\¶ 5RWPDQ WUDFHV WKH FKDQJLQJ JXLVHV RI
money, over time, as the value of gold commodity money came to be represented 
E\ SDSHU PRQH\ 5RWPDQ DUJXHV WKDW WKH VLJQLILFDQFH RI SDSHU PRQH\¶V
relationship with gold became disembedded in day-to-day circulation, to the point 
ZKHUH SDSHU PRQH\¶V YDOXH EHFDPH VLJQLILHG SXUHO\ WKURXJK signs and images. 
This is similar to the work of Goux (1990) ZKREXLOGVRQ0DU[¶VLGHDRIWKHPRQH\
commodity and believes that the general equivalent and labour value of commodity 
money is merely symbolic, where the object of money is to represent,  value rather 
than to have value. This body of work on the signs and meanings of value 
suggests that money is undergoing a process of dematerialisation where the value 
of commodity money, deriving from the labour value exerted on its materiality, has 
been replaced though a value of representation mediated through paper money, or 
electronic pulses, where the value is purely symbolic. Maurer (2006) argues that 
money is now generally seen as a sign that is humanly constructed and is culturally 
formed through conventions and social interactions (Maurer 2006). If contemporary 
accounts of money perceive it as having an imaginary value, this raises the 
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question as to how money is circulated and produced within networks of social 
relations that give value to these symbolic monies, where trust is essential in 
ensuring that the symbolic value in money is validated and regulated.  
 
Dodd (1994) has suggested that the most effective way to understand money and 
the social relationships through which it is construed is through the lens of a 
monetary network, where the resilience of the monetary network is contingent on 
information and trust which operate across space. Dodd (1994) states that 
monetary networks have five common properties, which has been highlighted by 
research that has disentangled the operation and infrastructure of LCSs and their 
modes of self-regulation (Lee et al. 2004). First, monetary networks must have a 
VWDQGDUGLVHGDFFRXQWDQF\V\VWHPWKDWDOORZVµPRQH\¶LQWKHQHWZRUNWRIXQFWLRQDV
a medium of exchange, a unit of account and a store of value. Second, the money 
must be regulated so that it can continue to perform these functions. Third, the 
system must have reflexivity so that consumers can assume that the money will be 
redeemable in the future. Fourth, the network must have sociality to allow 
information about value and exchange to circulate through the network. Finally, 
these monetary networks operate through geographical frames of meaning and 
significance (Lee et al. 2004).  Dodd (1994) argues that the information in these 
networks is instrumental in generating the trust that permits the successful 
circulation of money through distinct habits, routines and risk analysis which 
enables money to endure across particular spaces and times. The information that 
flows through these networks can be used to understand the social and cultural 
inflections which nurture the trust that allows the network to continue to operate.  
 
Leyshon and Thrift (1997) discuss how it is now widely agreed that money is 
formulated through monetary networks that mediate trust, which has become 
arguably more important as financial innovatioQVKDYHOHGWRWKHµGHPDWHULDOLVDWLRQ¶
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of monetary instruments. The mediums of money have progressively taken the 
form of electronic impulses, governed and authenticated by new structures of 
governance that are mediated through fluid, unstable networks of diverse actors. 
Leyshon and Thrift (1997) argue that these assemblages can be conceptualised as 
Actor-Networks, following ANT has been used extensively in sociology, 
anthropology, the philosophy of science, and economic geography to shed light on 
how new diverse forms of money have been created and how they are socially 
constructed.  
 
Actor-networks can be defined as assemblages of elements, or actors, which can 
include people as well as non-human actors such as texts, computers, software 
and money that are bought together through a structure of power relations. Actor-
networks are never stable and the actors are constantly redefining themselves 
through intermediaries, which are materials that are enrolled by powerful actors in 
order to maintain the stability of the network.  The ability for an actor-network to be 
maintained is dependent on their ability to assemble other actors and 
intermediaries that enable a network to endure across space and time. Leyshon 
and Pollard (2000) review how these networks undergo what Callon (1991) calls 
socio-technical change which occurs through a sequence of processes known as 
problematization, translation, enrolment and stabilisation. Problematization occurs 
when a network is forced to reinvent itself through social and technological 
innovations. Translation occurs when the network attempts to realign its current 
actors and to align new actors with the network. Enrolment occurs when the actors 
are configured into a new socio-technical network, which if they are held coherently 
become stabilised (Leyshon and Pollard 2000). These stages can be used to 
understand the development of money as an actor-network, to raise awareness of 
the actors that facilitate the development and circulation of new money. 
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Davies (2006) accuses neoclassical economics of under-socialising the economy 
through its abstract, quantitative epistemology and comments on how ANT can be 
used to successfully reveal the wider social influences that affect financial markets 
which embeds narratives of the economic within society. Pryke and du Gay (2007) 
agree that this shift towards viewing the role of culture and social relations within 
finance seeks to captures the economic and organisational life of objects, people, 
markets, firms and consumers, which are frequently informed by debates in ANT. 
Mackenzie (2005) echoes this sentiment as contemporary studies that draw upon 
ANT have contributed to understandings of monetary networks and the impact of 
technology and social relations on the production and circulation of money. 
According to Amin and Thrift (2004:xxiii) µ2QH RI WKH PRVW H[SDQVLYH DVSHFWV RI
cultural economy has turned out to be the study of money in all its forms through 
detailed ethnRJUDSKLFUHVHDUFK¶ 
 
Leyshon and Thrift (1997) identify four overlapping actor-networks that govern the 
production and circulation of money. The first is the nation-state which regulates 
money and finance and has an effect on how money is designed as it must follow 
specific rules. The second network is the media, who disseminate information, 
through the medium of television, and publishing, which influences how money is 
accepted and exchanged. The third is the elite class of money capitalists who own 
or manipulate huge sums of money. The money capitalists are heavily reliant on 
trust and reciprocity which is needed to foster the creditability of money and 
monetary instruments within the financial system. The fourth network has been the 
growth of the objects that can be viewed as immutable mobiles (Law 1994), where 
elements of a network circulate without being altered which has increased the 
ability of financiers to access complex information, especially through the 
development of intelligent machines and software that make decisions. 
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Research that seeks to understand the relationships between these monetary 
networks that support the development and circulation of money has come to focus 
RQWKHSURGXFWLRQRIQHZPRQHWDU\LQVWUXPHQWV'DYLHV¶(2006) work, for example,  
highlights the calculative processes that are performed in setting the prices of 
particular asset classes ZKLFK SURYLGHVDPDUNHG FRQWUDVW WR 0DU[¶VYLHZ RI WKH
labour theory of value. Rather than value being produced through human labour on 
material commodities, Davies (2006) outlines how capitalists now produce value 
and circulate money with the aid of actor-networks. The discursive knowledges 
developed and circulated by these professions dictate how money circulates 
through the economy (Davies 2006). 
 
One specific type of money that has been of particular interest to academics is the 
emergence of derivatives, where the value of these financial products is derived 
from the risk and uncertainty that surround, interest rates, commodities, equities 
and indices that are engineered into a derivative. Allen and Pryke (2000) argue that 
derivatives - and their value - are construed through a series of calculative 
SUDFWLFHV ZKLFK WKH\ DUJXH SURGXFH DQ LGHD RI PRQH\ ZKLFK µ«H[LVWV DV D
technologically chargHGIRUPRIPRQH\VLJQ¶(Allen and Pryke 1994:269). The idea 
that money is socially produced through the measurement of risks, leads Bryan 
and Rafferty (2007) to suggest that the value that emerged from new financial 
products, such as derivatives, can be found in the future social claims over 
different assets that are packaged within derivatives. Drawing on the work of 
Rotman (1987), they see the value of derivatives as being symbolic, for these 
instruments do not have value in, and of themselves, DV0DU[¶VFRPPRGLW\PRQH\
does, and argue that it is the qualitative differences in the nature of the assets that 
underpin derivatives whether they are commodities or currencies are annihilated 
through the derivative, making them a new unit of account and a store of value, 
based on the (un)expected price movements of the underlying assets. As will be 
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discussed in more detail later, the construction of new financial products , whose 
value is based on other assets, can be used to understand how RMBS bonds are 
produced. The individual mortgage assets, on which RMBS bonds are based, are 
annihilated through calculative practices to produce new financial instruments that 
embody particular risks, which in the case of RMBS notes are the credit risks 
behind each individual mortgage, that are frequently engineered to produce RMBS 
notes bearing different levels of default risk. 
 
Both Mackenzie (2005) and Callon (1998), have investigated the social and 
technical conditions that make markets work, where Callon introduces the term 
agencement to understand how agency and the ability to act is not confined to 
individuals; but through assemblages of people, tools, equipment, technical 
devices. This development has seen the emergence of research that considers the 
SHUIRUPDQFH RI WKH µHFRQRPLF¶ WKURXJK D FXOWXUDO HFRQRP\ )RU H[DPSOH .QRUU-
Cetina and %UXHJJHU¶V (2002) ethnographical research on foreign exchange 
markets focuses on the relationships formed between traders and non-human 
actors, such as screens, that provide traders with the necessary glimpses into the 
financial markets, for them to ply their trade. This thesis argues that it is important 
to understand how capitalists construe value through the use of technical devices 
and human knowledge, and that the discourses offered by anthropologists are 
useful in drawing attention to how these devices are used to produce the semiotic  
value numbers that represent the value of RMBS bonds. Having reviewed the 
diverse range of theories that have emerged from the social sciences and the 
humanities on money and credit, I will now turn to review the work on 
financialisation. 
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2.3. The liquidity of financialisation: flows of money and tides of change 
Since the demise of the Bretton Woods System (BWS) in the 1970s, Anglo-
American, and increasingly European economies (Jurgens et al. 2000; 
Stockhammer 2004), have turned towards financial services to generate wealth. 
Langley (2008) observes that the last two decades have witnessed the deepening 
of financial power and financial markets into everyday life within Anglo-American 
states, as the affluence of financiers and financial institutions has grown. Social 
scientists from a diverse range of disciplinary backgrounds have begun to mobilise 
the term financialisation and use it in two particular ways: First, financialisation has 
been used to describe changes in the economy and society where finance is 
becoming increasingly more powerful. Second, financialisation can be viewed as a 
series of processes that are reconfiguring the relationship between households, 
corporations and financial markets. The diverse background of academics writing 
about financialisation has granted it with a complicated history as its origins are 
situated in a set of diverse and contested narratives. For example, Blackburn 
(2006) sees financialisation as the growth of financial power, while Krippner (2005) 
sees it as a shift where economies come to rely increasingly on accumulation 
through financial services, not trade and commodity production. Financialisation 
can be viewed as an umbrella term that covers several intellectual theories. French 
et al, (forthcoming), for example, identify three distinctive schools; a critical social 
accountancy approach; regulation theory; and a socio-cultural school. I seek to 
review each of these three schools in turn, where the former two are categorised 
as a political economy of financialisation and the later as a series of socio-cultural 
narratives. In so doing, I agree with Erturk and Solari (2007), in that securitisation 
can be viewed as a process of financialisation that integrates high-finance with 
everyday life, but also as a method of generating returns that the financial system 
has come to rely on, which proponents of financialisation see as a transition to a 
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finance-led growth regime. The chapter will now turn to review three prominent and 
contemporary schools of financialisation. 
2.3.1. A political economy of financialisation 
 
The most established school that has contributed to the debate on financialisation 
is the French Régulation School (RS). During the 1980s and 1990s Regulation 
Theory (RT) emerged as a critique of both neoclassical economics and orthodox 
Marxism. On the one hand, RT criticises  neoclassical economics for its scientific 
epistemology which fails to account for non-economic and social phenomena, but 
DOVRIRUWKHHPSKDVLVLWSODFHVRQDSULQFLSOHFDOOHGµJHQHUDOHTXLOLEULXP¶ZKHUHD
community is seen as being an autonomous collective where each actor acts 
rationally, but in unity, a theory which Aglietta (1979) believes is unrealistic. On the 
other hand, as a post-Marxist theory, RT draws on the heritage of Marxism and 
Kantian dialectics to interpret economic systems as the coexistence and resolution 
of two contradictory binaries: reproduction and rupture. RT also draws upon 
0DU[LVP¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO IRUPV WR understand how temporalities are stabilised to 
reproduce the economy through a series of relationships articulated within the 
system (Boyer 1990; 2002; Nadel 2002) DQG UHSODFHV 0DU[LVP¶V EDVH-
superstructure frame with two mechanisms called the regime of accumulation and 
the mode of social regulation (MSR) (Aglietta 1979; Boyer 1990). The maintenance 
of the regime of accumulation is supported through the MSR which is a group of 
state and private institutions that encompass habits, laws, customs and regulatory 
institutions which integrate, or coerce, individuals into acting in the interest of 
maintaining the regime of accumulation (Boyer 2002). The significance of the MSR, 
in contrast to general equilibrium theory, is that it allows the economic to be viewed 
through a social lens, allowing WKHUHIXWDWLRQRIJHQHUDOHTXLOLEULXP¶VDEVWUDFWODZV
of universal claims of rationality by economic actors. This enables RT to provide 
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insight into understanding the historical and social relations which organise the 
economic and non-economic into a coherent mode of production.  
 
Aglietta (1979) VWUHVVHVKRZ57¶VVRFLDOVHQVLWLYLW\LVLPSRUWDQWDVLWHQDEOHVVRFLDO
components in the MSR to be identified which can be used to understand the 
nature of current crises and the ways in which they may be overcome. Grahl and 
Teague (2000)  observe how RT is fluid as it has changed its terminology over time 
to accommodate new complex institutions in the MSR.  RT has been use to 
analyse the crisis of Fordism, the failure of which is attributed to the rigidity of its 
MSR which was fixed through a deep division of labour, Taylorist management 
practices and the welfare state. The initial response to the crisis was to stimulate 
competition in labour markets and increase the flexibility of production through a 
new regime of accumulation described as post-Fordism, which was loosely 
modelled on Japanese lean production and a wage relation which would utilise 
new technology to overcome the rigidity of a Taylorist labour system (Grahl and 
Teague 2000). 
 
Boyer (2000) has suggested a new finance-led regime where consumers who 
previously consumed the fruits of their own labour now own financial assets which 
earns them profits through participating in the financial markets, which become 
subject to new imperatives of profit and innovation. Aglietta and Breton (2001) 
understand that this new finance-led regime would focus on the development of 
shareholder value, aided through the expansion of ICT and mobile capital, which 
ZLOO SURYLGH LQYHVWRUV ZLWK WKH DELOLW\ WR PRQLWRU LQGLYLGXDO ILUPV¶ HFRQRPLF
performance. There is evidence to suggest that the MSR and regime of 
accumulation have begun to move towards a finance led-regime as the second half 
of the 1990s saw an increase in capital mobility, corporate governance through 
improved accountancy and transparency, labour marke
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optimism and a booming finance market. Aglietta and Breton (2001) do not believe 
that these changes should be seen as the development of a new economy but that 
these transformations should be viewed as the production of new institutional 
forms that will produce a new, if temporary, phase of growth. French et al, 
(forthcoming) suggest that bond-rating agencies, which assign metrics to the risk of 
securities, act as a new set of institutional forms as they attempt to overcome 
information asymmetries which helps investors avert losses on their investments 
(Sinclair 1994; 2005) maintaining the regime of accumulation. Boyer (2000) shares 
this view arguing that a finance-led mode of accumulation is not sufficiently stable 
to survive, although Aglietta and Breton (2001) argue that a move towards a 
finance-led regime, whether viable or not, will affect the household, as labour 
flexibility is required to drive high returns for firms, generating a demand for flexible 
employment which could create volatile consumption, requiring households to 
increasingly rely on credit. Households will also have to engage with financial 
markets through equity investments and pensions to reap the rewards from this 
finance-led regime. Boyer (2000) argues that the geographical scope for finance-
led regimes is limited, and suggests that only the economies of US, Canada and 
the UK are compatible with a finance-led growth regime, although there is a 
possibility for hybrid systems to emerge. For example, Germany¶V 065 LV
transforming the economy into a structure compatible with financialisation (Jurgens 
et al. 2000). 
 
The RS is not the only school that has undertaken research on financialisation. 
Although the critical social accountants (CSAs) school emerged later than the RS, 
in the 1990s, it can be argued that writers from this tradition initiated the current 
debate on financialisation by making explicit reference to the term financialisation 
through their attempts to uncover new pressures and politics that have been 
applied to firms to increase shareholder value (Froud et al. 2000; Froud et al. 2002; 
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Erturk and Solari 2007; Froud et al. 2007). Froud, Williams and collagues, based 
mainly in Britain, are located in the disciplines of accountancy and business 
management. Earlier research completed by the CSAs investigated the changing 
relationship between corporate governance with the pooling of pension fund capital 
as investments controlled by pension and savings funds has began to dictate the 
behaviour of firms through the finance markets (Froud et al. 1998; Froud et al. 
2002). For example, Hawley and Williams (1997) discuss how there have been 
several shifts in equity management, the most recent of which has entered a phase 
of centralised concentration in the hands of a few institutional investors, which they 
FRQVLGHUFRQVWLWXWH µILGXFLDU\FDSLWDOLVP¶EDVHGRQ WKH WUXVW WKDW LQYHVWRUVKROG LQ
the fund managers to increase the value of their portfolios. Institutional investors 
XVH VKDUHKROGHUV¶ YRWLQJ ULJKWV GHULYHG IURP WKHLU SURSHUW\ RZQHUVKLS WR YHWR
management policies which may jeopardise shareholder wealth. This shift 
concerns Hawley and Williams (1997) as a limited number of institutional investors 
FROOHFWLYHO\ZLHOGSRZHURYHUVRPHRIWKHZRUOG¶V ODUJHVWFRPSDQLHVRIWHQIRUFLQJ
companies to reduce the size of their labour force, reducing consumer quality while 
externalising environmental costs, all in the pursuit of greater profits.  
 
Williams (2000) observes that the term shareholder value emerged in the 1980s 
from US consultants who sought to sell value-based management to investors, 
which began to have material effects on corporate management strategies during 
the 1990s. The premise of shareholder value was to overcome management 
problems, as business consultants came to the conclusion that corporate 
managers did not maximise returns for investors; a result of reinvesting their profits 
instead of distributing them to shareholders, a corporate strategy that had been 
widespread up to the 1970s. Williams (2000) believes that shareholder value 
needs to be understood in the context of a late-capitalist regime where the 
production of value is heavily dependent on the investment of savings and pension 
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funds in finance markets, where Williams argues that financialisation is not a mode 
of accumulation, but rather, a new form of competition.  Although financialisation 
has introduced new pressures on managers which has generated value through 
financial markets, Froud et al, (2002:131-32) argue only fifty per cent of US and UK 
firms are corporatized and only forty per cent of households can afford to invest in 
the finance markets so it is an exaggeration to view the US DQG8.¶VHFRQRPLHVDV
being wholly financialised, in that they are pursuing a finance-led regime of 
accumulation. Froud et al, (2000) suggest that the geographical spread of 
financialisation into other national economies is not inevitable as there are three 
pre-conditions that need to be met. First, there needs to be the existence of value-
seeking investors, domestic or external. Second, the economy or business needs 
to have the ability to generate investment. Third, the management needs to be 
willing to shed labour costs, and initiate perpetual reorganisation to increase yearly 
returns, for example, in a downturn a company may sell its fixed assets to a third 
party for a return before leasing the assets back. 
 
8QOLNHWKH5HJXODWLRQ6FKRRO¶VIRFXVRQWKHPDFURHFRQRP\DQGQDWLRQ-states, the 
CSAs seek to investigate financialisation through a series of detailed case studies 
of the UK and Us, at the micro and meso scales. This leads the CSAs to criticise 
57¶V DFFRXQWV IRU DWWULEXWLQJ VWUXFWXUDO VWDELOLW\ WR FDSLWDOLVP ZKLFK WKH\
understand to be an incoherent project, leading  Folkman et al.(2007:339) to quote 
Fernand Braudel, who observed that capitalism is always sick, but never dies. 
Although the CSAs  see financialisation as emerging from the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system in the 1970s they focus on particular scales and spaces 
which are affected by financialisation, which they see to be reconfiguring capitalism 
in the direction of a finance-led, socio-technical experiment (Froud et al. 2007:340). 
The CSA School also criticise the RS for limiting their analysis to national 
economic systems which obscures the roles of key actors that are involved in 
  
 
 50 
perpetuating financialisation. This becomes more problematic as the CSAs 
contend that international political economy narratives that focus on 
neoliberalization have paid too much attention to US institutions like the IMF, and 
argue for a more nuanced approach that emphasises the role of specific financial 
institutions such as bond-rating agencies within a geographical context, as different 
actors operate differently in different national economies. Subsequently, the CSAs 
have focussed their research on specific actors that they argue are enabling the 
production of a finance-led regime. For example, the CSAs have analysed the 
production of consultancy metrics (Froud et al. 2000) which enable investors to 
DVVHVVDFRPSDQ\¶VSURILWDELOLW\DQGWRTXDQWLI\LWVSHUIRUPDQFHZKLOH)URXG et al, 
(2002) investigate the effect of restructuring in the automobile industry after 
managers reorganise their firms to comply with financialisation. Folkman et al, 
(2007) illuminate the growth of fee-earning intermediaries such as lawyers, 
investment bankers and hedge fund managers who are involved in restructuring 
corporations to make them comply with the demands of financialisation. Froud et 
al, (2000) criticise financialisation as it urges firms to increase their profits, to pay 
dividends, but in doing so they jeopardise the future integrity of the firm, as training 
and research and development are reduced. The CSAs conclude that 
financialisation is governed by myopic consultancy metrics that promote 
speculative, short-term investments and suggest that the increases in shareholder 
value is often due to the increase in middle-class savings being funnelled into 
shares, not due to successful management strategies.  
 
The later CSA narratives have moved beyond shareholder value, to develop the 
concept of µFRXSRQSRROFDSLWDOLVP¶(Froud et al. 2002), which replaces the closed 
system of financialisation, with a narrative where financial markets regulate both 
firm and household behaviour - making financial markets the engine of 
financialisation. Coupon pool capitalism reveals a new space permeated by 
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financialisation - middle class households- who save towards deferred payment 
schemes through institutional investors, which places an emphasis on how 
househoOG LQYHVWPHQWV DUH SRROHG DQG KRZ ILQDQFLDOLVDWLRQ¶V SROLWLFV GLFWDWH
household saving strategies to maximise returns and savings growth. Under 
coupon pool capitalism the financial market becomes a space that actively governs 
institutional investors, firms and households through the politics of financialisation, 
pressurising them to maximise returns. Froud et al, (2002) argue that this is 
significant as it continues to illustrate how the logics, flows, rules and linkages of 
financialisation occur in specific spaces, for example, the national scale, but also 
within households. Froud et al, (2002) use this juncture to criticise the RS which 
predicts that a downturn in wages can be counterbalanced by the growth of capital 
market income as they assert that not enough people own shares to supplement 
and maintain their incomes through finance-led accumulation and that this varies 
between nation-states.  
 
This leads Froud, et al, (2002) WR VXJJHVW WKDW ILQDQFLDOLVDWLRQ¶V ORJLFV ZLOO
exacerbate inequality as only the middle classes and wealthy CEOs paid in 
company stock are able to reap the benefits from financialisation. However, 
ILQDQFLDOLVDWLRQ¶V DELOLW\ WR H[SDQG LQHTXDOLW\ LV GHSHQGHnt on its ability to realise 
itself as a project, something CSAs doubt as managers and institutions already 
struggle to create the minimum 13 per cent return on capital employed, demanded 
by investors (Williams, 2000). The discourses of financialisation offered by the CSA 
School are more attentive to space, in comparison to the RS, by illuminating the 
particular spaces which financialisation has permeated such as the firm, and the 
household. These spaces of financialisation, viewed through a political economy 
lens, are more attentive to the micro-scale institutions that support a finance-led 
economy. The sensitivity of the CSA literature to these actors begins to converge 
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with the socio-cultural spaces inhabited by individual consumers which are 
highlighted and discussed in the next set of narratives. 
 
2.3.2. Financialisation and the cultural-economy 
A third body of work has emerged that addresses how financialisation is becoming 
embedded into everyday life. These sociological accounts focus on the micro and 
meso scales, like the CSA narratives, but this research has also mapped out how 
financialisation is being projected onto the individual. Unlike the RS or CSAs, the 
research emanating from this school has not been completed by a coherent cluster 
of academics, but these researchers are united through their common approach as 
to how financialisation has begun to govern the everyday life of consumers. This 
approach is illustrated by Martin (2002) who sees financialisation as a 
phenomenon that has led to the embedding of the financial world into people¶V
everyday life as they are forced to manage financial risks that used to be the 
preserve of the professional. Martin (2002) maintains that a shift from the 
Keynesian welfare state towards a liberal economic market has accelerated the 
exposure of consumers to financial markets as workers have been forced to 
organise their own insurance and pension plans linked the finance markets. Dore 
(2000) asserts that the ability of financialisation to spread into society has been 
made possible by the transformation of the owner-manager capitalist into an 
organisation builder-manager employed by a fragmented mass of stockholders, 
where executives are paid in shares to enhance their performance. This 
development has been assisted by the emergence of an expertise bearing elite 
including business school professors, managerial consultants and accounting 
managers that have acted as a new MSR to promote a neoliberal agenda where 
financialisation is seen as a healthy mode of accumulation which is democratic and 
rewards those who manage money effectively (Dore 2000).  
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Research by Paul Langley has moved beyond the spaces of the corporation and 
household to consider the individual. Langley discusses how the UK and US 
governments are seeking to reduce state involvement in pension provision as 
Defined Benefit (DB) pensions - coordinated by employers and guaranteed by the 
state - are being replaced with Defined Contribution (DC) pensions that are 
organised by the individual and not guaranteed by the state. Langley (Langley 
2006; 2007) argues that while neoliberal governments supposedly respect the 
freedom of individuals to be autonomous, they paradoxically promote the required 
disciplinary technologies that their citizens need to survive in this autonomous 
environment. Governments have attempted to equip individuals with the ability to 
regulate their bodies and thoughtV E\SURPRWLQJ ILQDQFLDO OLWHUDF\ DV WKH ³FDUHRI
the self increasingly involves a portfolio of financial market assets that, carefully 
selected by the individual through the calculated engagement with risk, holds out 
the prospect of pleasure through returQV´(Langley 2007:74). 
Ewald (1991) has explored insurance as a technology, and developed the idea of 
µa personalised actuarialism¶ where consumers become responsible for their own  
planning. Langley (2006) combines the idea of personalised actuarialism and 
Foucauldian governmentality to understand investment as a technology of the self, 
where the state preaches the act of self discipline, rationality, prudence and 
planning. Like the regulation theorists and CSAs, Langley is sceptical of 
ILQDQFLDOLVDWLRQ¶V DELOLW\ WR UHDOLVH LWVHOI DV D UHJLPH 'HVSLWH WKH JURZWK RI 8.
mutual funds in the 1990s bull-market, 2002 saw the UK income-to-savings ratio 
reach a record low of 4.8 per cent (2006; Langley 2007:79), which can be 
attributed to a lack of trust that UK consumers hold for the investment management 
sector, cultivated through poor market performance and miss-selling. This absence 
of consumer participation in the financial markets will constrain the advance of 
financialisation, an important precondition which has been overlooked by policy 
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makers. The ability of workers to save is also hindered by a gross contradiction 
within the finance-led accumulation regime, as the savings of workers are invested 
in companies who are under pressure to maximise shareholder value at the 
H[SHQVHRIZRUNHUV¶ZDJHVDQGMREVHFXULW\SODFLQJWKHPLQDSRVLWion where they 
are unable to save sufficient money to invest (Langley 2007). 
Harmes (2001) explores how governments and the financial sector have attempted 
to educate consumers and embed them within a widespread investment culture to 
aid their ability to self-govern their financial security which simultaneously aids the 
dominance of financial capital. Harmes (2001) argues that the ability of consumers 
to manage their financial needs is necessary if the state is to jettison responsibility 
for the protection of its citizens. This has been provided, in part, by financial 
supermarkets like Fidelity International, that offer access to a selection of mutual 
funds providing consumers with the ability to make their own investments, but also 
by educating consumers through investment seminars, books and school 
education. This has been viewed by some consumers as being part of a desirable, 
cosmopolitan lifestyle that has come to represent a veneer of social mobility and 
prestige through owning the means of production (Harmes 2001). However, in 
reality, education and the opportunity to invest offers no guarantee as to the ability 
of consumers to successfully manage and save for a comfortable retirement. This 
cultural-economy view of financialisation also highlights certain contradictions 
which jeopardise the financial security of worker-investor experiences which 
SUREOHPDWL]HV%R\HU¶V(2000) finance-led regime, which Langley sees as being too 
coherent and unproblematic (Langley 2004).  
The development of securitisation in the UK can be understood through the prism 
of financialisation as it enables banks to generate shareholder value as lenders are 
able to  circulate their capital more quickly producing more mortgages (Leyshon 
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and Thrift 2007). It also enables lenders to produce higher-risk, more profitable 
mortgages that are removed from their balance sheets, generating shareholder 
value while being theoretically shielded from consumer default risk (Dymski 2007). 
Erturk and Solari (2007) believe that as banks have begun to disintermediate they 
have become active agents of financialisation selling a multitude of different 
financial products centred around fee generation. Langley (2008; French et al. 
forthcoming) highlights the power of disintermediation through securitisation to 
insert the role of capital markets into a narrative of financialisation stimulated by 
the development of a booming consumer credit industry in Anglo-American 
economies. Langley (2007) discussed the making of financial subjects, defined 
through prudence and thrift, but Langley (2008) argues that an alternative financial 
subject coexists where consumers manage and manipulate their financial 
obligations through extended borrowing which allows them to experience power 
and freedom by providing them with the ability to purchase objects immediately 
and deferring payment inWR WKH IXWXUH.H\H[DPSOHVRI WKLV LQFOXGH µWKHUHYROYHU¶
who never repays their full monthly balance of their credit card debt, but is also 
MRLQHG E\ DQRWKHU VXEMHFW µWKH UDWH WDUW¶ ZKR HQMR\V WDNLQJ DGYDQWDJH RI µWHDVHU
UDWHV¶ DQG PRYHV EHWZHHQ FUHGLW FDUG SURYLGHUV DYRLGLQJ SD\LQJ IXOO LQWHUHVW RQ
their debt. These subjects also make use of credit referencing information to 
govern their behaviour to ensure they obtain the cheapest possible credit rates 
(Langley 2008). Langley (2008) DUJXHVWKDWWKLVDOWHUQDWHµHQWUHSUHQHXULDOVHOI¶KDV
driven the growth of the consumer credit markets, an expansion made possible 
through the disintermediation and the securitisation of debt, which has integrated 
the self, the home and the high-street more intimately within high finance, a 
consequence of financialisation. 
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2.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to review the diverse theories that have emerged from 
debates on the theories and philosophies of money and contemporary research on 
the theories of financialisation, while being attentive to the spaces in which different 
monies circulate and the spaces (re)shaped by the politics of financialisation. Such 
a review is useful in framing debates and ideas which the thesis will draw upon to 
investigate the geographies of mortgage and of RMBS production. In so doing, the 
thesis has stressed the complex nature of money as a social device and reviews 
how understandings of this object have varied over time as new types of money 
have emerged.  
 
This chapter discussed what can be seen as some of the first holistic accounts of 
money and its role in society, through the writings of Adam Smith (1976 [1776]) 
who places the worker at the heart of the economy, the property rights of which are 
protected by WKHVWDWH)RU6PLWKDQG5LFDUGRWKHZRUNHUV¶ODERXURQDFRPPRGLW\
constitutes its value, but some commodities, are used as a benchmark in 
exchange, known as commodity money, which frequently takes the form of gold. 
Like Smith, Marx considered the value of commodities as being derived from 
labour time, and argues that the pay workers receive is not commensurate with 
their expended labour which leads to their exploitation. Marx sought to critique 
capitalism, but was aware that credit money is vital in permitting capitalists to 
continue production, as new means of production need to be purchased before the 
goods that have already been produced are sold, leading him to develop a theory 
of fictitious value where capitalists will buy debt from those that own the means of 
production, with cash, in exchange for a claim to the future labour exploited from 
workers.  
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David Harvey (1982) builds on the work of Marx, and focuses more explicitly on the 
role of the state and how it ratifies the quality of private credit bills, while attempting 
to view 0DU[¶V ZRUN WKURXJK D VSDWLDO SULVP WR explain why capitalism is more 
successful in some particular spaces, than others. In doing so, Harvey emphasises 
that credit money is widespread as a reflection of its geographical mobility, and its 
ability to liquefy fixed capital, placing it into circulation. This research provides 
useful insights into how credit money is produced, especially with reference to the 
performance of securitisation and the development of RMBS notes, issued by 
lenders to continue their mortgage lending and to increase their accumulation of 
capital.  
 
The chapter then moved beyond the labour theory of value to review the social and 
cultural theorisations of money. Both Weber (1968) and Simmel (2003[1907]) reject 
the labour theory of value, and instead suggest that a quantity of money is in fact 
commensurate with the perceived value of an object or commodity, based on the 
psychological and metaphysical properties that individuals project onto an object. 
Anthropologists have focussed on the uses of particular primitive monies and the 
effect that the introduction of colonial monies have had on indigenous monetary 
systems (Maurer 2006). This social lens has been used to understand how western 
monies are also used and circulated, where signs and language are more 
important than the materiality of money, where symbols develop trust for the 
money, where the value is commensurate with the perceived value of objects 
(Baudrillard 1981). This has heralded a general shift in contemporary accounts to 
see money as being symbolic and debased from the earlier metallic monies which 
had led scholars to focus on the networks that provide money with trust and validity 
(Dodd 1994). This has seen the introduction of ANT in order to interrogate money 
which has been used to emphasise the power relations between actors that enable 
money to circulate, but also the key elements that are used to produce and control 
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new types of money, through calculation, where the value of new monies such as 
derivatives is situated in the myriad of other assets to which these financial 
instruments are linked, which provides a useful perspective to understand how 
monetary instruments, such as RMBS notes, are engineered and valued while 
being detached from human labour. 
 
Finally, the chapter then turned to understand how money flows have been 
transformed through the advent of financialisation that has come to fill the lacuna 
left by the departure of the BWS. The chapter examines the work of the French RS 
which believes that the mode of accumulation in national economies and the 
generation of financial wealth will be generated through a finance-led regime that 
will be supported by a reconfigured MSR that will support the growth of a finance 
led systems. Narratives suggested by the French RS draw attention to new 
institutional forms of governance mediated through actors, such as bond-rating 
agencies that have filled a regulatory lacuna after neoliberal deregulation began in 
Anglo-American economies in the 1970s. On the other hand, the CSAs analyse the 
prevalence of investors seeking out enhanced shareholder value. More specifically, 
institutional investors use their voting power to maximise their short-term returns on 
behalf of middle-class savers and private pension fund holders, while jeopardising 
the future integrity of firms (Froud et al. 2000). One example of financial instability, 
brought about by the politics of financialisation, includes the credit crunch and how 
banks have produced and held high-risk assets, on order to maximise their returns 
for shareholders. 
 
/DQJOH\¶V (2007) work has focused on the a cultural-economy of financialisation 
and the space of the individual to understand how the nation-state has attempted 
to develop a culture of prudent and responsible consumer investors who will 
regulate their bodies and thoughts appropriately - achieved, in part ± through credit 
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scoring, as discussed in Chapter 6. This review of the narratives of money and 
financialisation, originating from the social sciences, will inform and frame the 
empirical work later in the thesis. In particular, the integration of consumers into the 
UHDOP RI µKLJK ILQDQFH¶ WKURXJK WKH SHUIRUPDQFH RI VHFXULWLVDWLRQ will be 
investigated in Chapter 7.  The next chapter will seek to explore the work of 
economic geographers and the geographies of money literature. This research is 
used to highlight the spaces of consumer credit production and the spaces in which 
international capital circulates, mediated through financial centres.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
The geographies of money: spaces of monetary circulation 
 
 
³%H\RQG WKHLU ORQJ KLVWRU\ DV FHQWUHV IRU LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUDGH DQG
banking, these cities now function in four new ways: first, as highly 
concentrated command points in the organisation of the world 
HFRQRP\ VHFRQG DV NH\ ORFDWLRQV IRU ILQDQFH«WKLUG DV VLWHV RI
SURGXFWLRQ«DQG IRurth, as markets for the products and innovations 
SURGXFHG´(Sassen 1991:3). 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The imagery currently used to advertise WKHVHUYLFHVRIµJOREDO¶EDQNV- epitomised 
E\+6%&DQGLWVFODLPWREHµWKHZRUOG¶VORFDOEDQN¶- frequently conjures visions of 
financial institutions that operate across the world, XQLPSHGHG $OWKRXJK +6%&¶V
slogan makes the concession that the organisDWLRQ LV VHQVLWLYH WR µORFDO¶ VSDFHV
WKH EDQN¶V DGYHUWLVHPHQWV VXJJHVW WKDW LWV LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHDFK UHPains 
uninterrupted by borders and distance as it circulates capital around the globe. The 
reality is that money flows unevenly, embodying value in a variety of different 
guises, whether as different types of currency, or as bonds, derivatives and 
exchange traded funds. It is vital to recognise that each different type of money is 
subject to particular social relations and rules of exchange that are forged by 
international financial elites and the regulators operating within each nation-state. 
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This thesis stresses that although flows of money produce particular geographies, 
for example, financial inclusion and exclusion (Leyshon and Thrift 1993), such 
geographies are themselves the product of a mosaic of financial elites, regulation 
and technology that are embedded in specific spaces (Martin 1999).  
  
The broad literature surrounding the geographies of money has only recently come 
of age. Both Leyshon (1995) and Martin (1999) have bemoaned how initially there 
was little interest in the geographies of money, despite the fact that money and 
finance are integral to understanding capitalism. Martin (1999) reports how earlier 
scholarly work in economic geography focussed primarily on the industrial 
landscape, industrial development and fixed points of material production. 
However, by the 1970s work by US economic historians had began to highlight the 
regional banking structures implicated in regulation and finance, which embraced 
PRQH\¶V VSDWLDOLW\ (Martin 1999). Eventually geographers, notably Harvey (1974) 
and Conzen (1977), began to focus their attention on the role of finance in the 
production of urban landscapes. Despite this initial foray, Martin (1999) considered 
the sub-discipline to be underdeveloped as late as the early 1980s and it was not 
until the mid-1990s that this lacuna in knowledge began to be properly addressed. 
A new wave of research began to emerge on retail banking (Leyshon and Thrift 
1993; Pollard 1996; Martin and Turner 2000), investment banking (Pryke 1994), 
financial centres (Pryke 1991; Thrift 1994; Sassen 2001), international finance 
systems (Leyshon 1994; Budd 1999), and later, local trading currencies that 
operate outside the control of the state (Williams and Windebank 2002; Lee et al. 
2004; North 2005), as well as Islamic finance (Pollard and Samers 2007). The 
geographies of money literature began to flourish, examining different scales, 
ranging from the body to the global, as well as an exploration of the network 
approaches used to understand the relationship between money and space. 
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This chapter has two aims. First, the chapter seeks to review the geographies of 
money. Second, the chapter aims to highlight the particular networks and 
institutions that dictate the spatial flows of capital, identified through this literature. 
This chapter does not intend to review the entirety of the geographies of money 
literature, it is far too extensive to review here, but instead, will target the strands of 
the sub-discipline that engage with retail banking and international flows of capital. 
It is also important to insert a caveat here. The chapter reviews several bodies of 
work within the geography of money literature, and presents an ordered narrative. 
It is not intended to imply that the discourses, ideas and debates emerged in a 
coherent, fashion. In fact, the genealogy of these narratives are ideologically and 
chronologically complex and they frequently overlap. This review is important to the 
thesis for the following two reasons. First, it provides a theoretical and spatial 
context to the geographies involved in mortgage production, and the engineering of 
securitisations within the UK. Second, the review will provide a context for the 
development of an international finance system that enabled the credit crunch to 
spread from the US into advanced capitalist economies around the world. This 
chapter will review the literature in a historical context to unravel the development 
of a contemporary geography of money and finance. The remainder of the chapter 
is as follows. Section two will focus on the development of an international political 
economy though government (de)regulation that promoted the circulation of 
monies, and enabled flows of money through mortgage-backed investments. 
Section three will centre on the role of financial centres in coordinating international 
circuits of capital by distributing fractions of capital amongst capitalists, which 
include the issuance of RMBS notes. Section four will highlight the role articulated 
by regional financial centres that produce the mortgage assets which are later 
securitised. The final section will conclude the chapter. 
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3.2. Making (and breaking) a geopolitical economy  
 
Earlier research on the geography of money emanated from the sub-discipline of 
International Political Economy where academics began to explore the 
development and demise of an international financial system. The creation of an 
organised, international financial system is significant as it formed the architecture 
of a financial system which would later become integral to the development of the 
securitisation market and movement of mortgage-backed securities. Pryke (1991) 
and Strange (1994) suggested that this financial system should be understood as a 
µJHRSROLWLFDO HFRQRP\¶ DV WKH WHUP ERWKVWUHVVHVDQGHQFRPSDVVHV WKH SRZHUIXO
relationships between money, power and space. In other words, the political action 
and power of governments actively shapes the spaces through which money can 
flow, while money itself may alter the space(s) in which it flows. More particularly, 
Strange (1994) argues that the international political economy (IPE) exists through 
two layers of relations. First, a security structure ensures the security of states and 
their economies. Second, a knowledge structure underpins the ideas, knowledge 
and communication that enable economies to function. The research on this 
international, geopolitical economy centred on what came to be known as the 
Bretton Woods System (BWS), a financial system that was designed towards the 
end of the second world war, with the aim of stabilising the world economy, to 
facilitate reconstruction. 
 
The system was named after a conference held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire 
in 1944 which was hosted by the US government. Representatives from 44 nations 
attended, although the US was to be the main power behind the system, as it 
boasted a strong economic position and was willing to use its vast financial 
resources to support this monetary system (Woods 2006). The BWS was an 
ambitious attempt to develop an economic system that would allow member 
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nation-states to exercise economic sovereignty while enabling international stability 
to coexist. The BWS attempted to achieve financial stability by tightly regulating the 
international flow of money, coordinated through the maintenance of fixed currency 
exchange rates and the management of the balance of payment deficits between 
economies (Leyshon and Tickell 1994). The system was sustained by three 
institutions; the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which promoted 
free trade; the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
which provided financial assistance for post-war reconstruction and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) that essentially provided a credit facility to 
nations that experienced problems in maintaining their balance of payment deficits. 
The money made available by the IMF would remove the temptation for 
governments to devalue their currency, to stimulate international trade, which in 
turn stabilised exchange rates and the international economy (Strange, 1994). The 
monetary standard for this system was the US dollar, fixed to JROGDVDQµDQFKRU¶RI
value, which acted as an international medium of exchange.  
 
The discipline that governed the geographical flow of money soon began its 
deterioration, as early as 1947, when the US launched the Marshall Aid plan to 
fund the rebuilding of Europe and inhibit the spread of communism, which 
undermined the BWS, as the influx of dollars into Europe contributed to the 
creation of the Eurodollar markets which opened in London during the 1960s. The 
money from the BWS and the Marshall Aid plan was denominated in US dollars 
which led to the accumulation of substantial dollar deposits in European banks 
(Smith 1982). European bankers began to lend the money to borrowers in the US 
at lower rates than they could be borrowed from US financiers, which was possible 
as the US dollars were unregulated and untaxed, since they were held outside the 
jurisdiction of the US. The Eurodollar money was recycled back into the US which 
subverted the BWS controls and began to destabilise exchange rates (Strange, 
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1994). By 1971 the Euromarkets were awash with further dollar deposits as a 
result of the OPEC oil price rises, as oil producing nations began to funnel their 
substantial profits, from oil sales in the US, into the Euromarkets which exerted 
further stress on the exchange rates set by the BWS. 19 The instability of the 
exchange rates forced the US to suspend the convertibility of gold to dollars, which 
disrupted the controls on which the system was based (Strange 1997; Woods 
2006), which deteriorated further due to reduced savings in the US and increased 
government spending attributed to the Vietnam War. It can be argued that the 
BWS never became the coherent financial system that was planned (Agnew and 
Corbridge 1989; Gill 1992; Corbridge 1994), and was nothing more than an attempt 
by the US to derive economic and political superiority against rising Soviet 
influence. Leyshon (1995) argues that the disintegration of the BWS granted 
nation-states the ability to exercise greater autonomy over their economic polices 
which produced a series of diverse national economies. It became clear that a 
post-BWS would not stifle these national variations which secured the future of an 
international financial system that consisted of a collective of hybrid economic 
spaces.  
 
Corbridge (1994) and Radice (1984) DWWHPSW WR GLVFUHGLW WKH LGHD RI %:6¶V 
hegemony and suggest, that in practice, the BWS did not run through state blocks 
of power, but though city-regions as flows of power that controlled the global 
economy through a post-hegemonic (dis)order.  Academics began to depart from 
this hegemonic notion of a geopolitical economy, and instead looked towards the 
source of economic power within states and regions through a literature known as 
geoeconomics (Albert 1993; Storper 1993; Amin and Thrift 1994; Leyshon 1994; 
Hutton 1995).  As academics working on the geography of money moved their 
                                                 
19
 These dollar deposits were used to fund syndicated sovereign debt from which the developing world 
debt crisis would emerge. 
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attention to city-regions and their coordination of capital flows, it became clear that 
the power behind these city-regions was exercised through powerful financial elites 
which transcend these regional and national scales through a transnational 
network (Leyshon and Tickell, 1994). Utilising a neo-Gramscian version of 
hegemony, Van der Pijl (1984) argues that the US organised an Atlantic ruling 
class that sought to align national interests under an umbrella of US hegemony. 
Agnew and Corbridge (1989) maintain that the proliferation of transnational 
corporations and free trade emerged from the ashes of the BWS and was 
perpetuated through elites in finance and politics operating through political and 
financial centres. One effect of the failure of the BWS was the emergence of a new 
series of financial networks, no longer coordinated by governments, but through 
prominent financial centres, for example London - home to the Euromarkets. The 
fall of the BWS had enhanced the role of financial networks and powerful city-
regions in coordinating the global economy, which would later include mortgage-
backed instruments. 
 
3.3. Financial centres: (re)assembling the pieces 
 
Miller (1998) and McMichael (1998) argue that the key institutions of the BWS, the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreements on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD), became more powerful after its collapse, but without the firm regulation of 
the BWS, the international finance markets began to flourish. Although the early 
geographies of money literature had shed light on the development of the BWS it 
had only just begun to pay attention to the role of particular city-regions as financial 
centres. Financial centres such as London had previously been instrumental in 
financing trade and development within its domestic market, but also on an 
international scale, facilitating trade with its colonies and other imperial powers 
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(Michie 1986; Thompson 1997; Cain and Hopkins 2002). Although London had 
been a financial hub since medieval times (Thompson 1997), it was not until 1773 
when the London Stock Exchange (LSE)  began to operate (Michie 1986). The 
LSE was originally established to trade government securities, but it later began 
trading foreign securities, along with joint stock companies and bonds to fund 
infrastructure both at home and abroad. During the Edwardian era, half of the 
/6(¶VDFWLYLty was accounted for by foreign securities (Thompson 1997). Although 
London began serving the British empire as an early port (Thompson 1997), it was 
a legacy which would see it develop into a merchant banking centre to settle trade, 
with financing provided by Barings, Warburg and Hambros. During this time, it was 
commonplace for imperial nations and colonies to develop financial centres 
including; Paris (Gueslin 1992), Berlin, (Tilly 1992), Tokyo, Osaka, Shanghai, and 
Melbourne (Jones 1992), while the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was 
established in 1792 to organise the trading of US government debt (Michie 1986). 
Porteous (1999) argues that these historical legacies become embedded in 
financial centres and influence their future success. Hence, these pre-existing 
financial networks dating back to colonial expansion would shape the (dis)order of 
the post-BWS.  
 
A new international finance system (NIFS) (Leyshon and Thrift 1997) coordinated 
by new financial centres had emerged and economic geographers began to trace 
the geographies of money and how these centres controlled the post-BWS 
international finance system, against a landscape of deregulated national 
economies. The NIFS differed from the BWS as each nation-state controlled its 
monetary policy and set its own interest rates, while the market set exchange 
rates. Investors became more powerful under the NIFS as they began investing in 
corporations directly through bond markets - as opposed to lending through 
commercial banks - while financial centres became more technologically advanced 
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which also led to the development of new financial instruments and markets (Budd 
1999). The NYSE experienced a wave of deregulation in 1975 (Budd 1999) which 
was soon followed by other nation-states (Budd 1999), who began a process of 
FRPSHWLWLYH GHUHJXODWLRQ LQ WKH IHDU WKDW WKH\ ZRXOG ORVH RXW WR WKH 1<6(¶V
competitiveness. For the City of London, deregulation initiated a rapid 
reorganisation of the City, an event later known as the µ%LJ%DQJ¶ZKLFKRFFXUUHG
on the 27th of October 1986 (Leyshon and Thrift 1997; Budd 1999), while the Paris 
bourse later underwent Le Petit Bang on the 30th of June 1987. Previously, London 
had been viewed as an expensive centre to conduct business, which was hindered 
by inefficient exchanges and fixed rate commission systems, a characteristic that 
was soon overturned. 
 
$QRWKHUEDUULHU WR/RQGRQ¶VVXFFHVVZDV WKHVRFLDOPDQLIHVWDWLRQRI LWVSULYDWLVHG
credit markets (Thrift 1994) which were anchored to exclusive cultures of trust 
propagated between male bankers of a specific social strata. This has come to be 
NQRZQ DV µJHQWOHPDQO\ FDSLWDOLVP¶ (Leyshon and Thrift 1997; Cain and Hopkins 
2002) which consisted of a series of fixed social codes and spaces that the City 
functioned through. This social structure was soon challenged as the financial 
markets became progressively more innovative and volatile, but also as American 
business practices were increasingly adopted by British banks (Thrift 1994).  On 
the 27th of October 1986, the LSE began the operation of an electronic trading 
system, which would be run in tandem with the open cry trading floor (Clemons 
and Weber 1989). Traders began to use the Stock Exchange Automatic Quotation 
System (SEAQ) above the trading floor, and within a week of opening, two thirds of 
WKH([FKDQJH¶VWUDGLQJKDGPRYHGXSVWDLUVWRWKHQHZHOHFWURQLFV\VWHP (Clemons 
and Weber 1989:235). The automated system simultaneously reduced settlement 
costs and increased access to the market which achieved more accurate pricing 
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for the securities, but began to undermine the social system that had developed in 
tandem with the financial centre.  
 
7KHVSDWLDOFRQILJXUDWLRQRIEDQNLQJLQ/RQGRQKDGFHQWUHGRQWKH&LW\RI/RQGRQ¶V
Square Mile and the Bank of England, a pattern which had previously been 
enforced through a series of spatial codes. For example, the Bank of England 
required foreign banks to be located within the Square Mile so it could easily 
oversee their activities - a rule that was not relaxed until as late as 1985 (Leyshon 
and Thrift 1997). This spatiality was disrupted by an influx of foreign banks into 
London who realised that the strong demand for the limited office space in the City 
could not be met (Pryke 1991). The geography of financial services began to shift 
DQG ILQDQFLDO ILUPV EHJDQ WR ORFDWH LQ /RQGRQ¶V :HVW (QG DQG &DQDU\ :KDUI ,W
appeared that deregulation and technological change were beginning to weaken 
the bonds of gentlemanly capitalism that had previously consolidated the spatial 
form of the City. 
 
The apparent disintegration of social bonds, due to the increased use of 
information technology, raised important questions as to why financial centres 
continued to exist, as it appeared that the necessity of spatial proximity had been 
UHGXFHG E\ LQIRUPDWLRQ WHFKQRORJ\ 7KH PRVW H[WUHPH H[DPSOH ZDV 2¶%ULHQ¶V
(1992) VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW JHRJUDSK\¶V GD\V ZHUH QXPEHUHG DV WKH XSWDke of 
telecommunications would render space increasingly unimportant.  Thrift (1994) 
and Porteous (1999) responded WR2¶%ULHQ¶VWKHVLVDQGEHJDQWRDVNZK\ILQDQFLDO
centres continued to exist, if technology was rendering space obsolete. According 
to Sassen (2001), firms pay high costs to reside in financial centres which meant 
that a strong raison d'être must exist to explain these agglomerations. The 
geographies of money literature, having initially focused on an international 
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financial system, moved its focus to national economies coordinated through city-
regions.  
 
Thrift (1994) maintains that despite the apparent displacement of gentlemanly 
capitalism by a more diverse and socially mobile labour market - combined with 
new technologies that automated the markets - social relations are still imperative 
to the operation of financial centres, as face-to-face-interactions can only be 
conducted in close proximity (Amin and Thrift 1992). Focussing on finance in the 
City of London, Allen and Pryke (1994) discuss how the spaces of finance have 
been redefined through a combination of symbols, codes and noise to produce a 
K\EULGODQGVFDSHRIH[FOXVLYLW\RULHQWDWHGDURXQGJHQWOHPDQOLQHVVDQGµFOXELQHVV¶
that have come to coexist with new financial technologies (Allen and Pryke, 1994). 
Leyshon and Thrift (1997) argue that the idea that social networks have been 
undermined by technological innovations, could not be further than the truth, as the 
need for face-to-face interaction has increased to allow analysts to interpret the 
substantial volumes of ambiguous data. 
 
The sustainability of these financial agglomerations is reinforced by businesses 
that need to develop relationships to cultivate trust, give credence to information 
and to perform analysis (Goddard 1973; Beaverstock et al. 1999) which Goe, et al, 
(2000) insist promotes clustering. Sassen (2001) suggests that the relevance of 
territoriality to the NIFS is maintained by two types of information, standardised and 
non standardised data. While standardised data and pricing is available over 
computer networks, non-standardised information remains ambiguous and requires 
expert interpretation, evaluation and judgement, experience that can only by 
obtained through social networks (Sassen 2001). Finance centres are important as 
they provide spaces where the instantaneous flows of information and opinions can 
be processed by financiers and dealers, which is important as volatile markets 
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evolve quickly and analysts must be in close proximity so that they can interpret 
and act on decisions emerging from new data (Thrift 1994). Further research has 
placed the onus of finance on everyday actions through talking, trading and 
watching (Sidaway and Bryson 2002), but despite the introduction of new scientific, 
quantitative ecologies, investment management for many financiers continues to 
remain more of an art than a science (Sidaway and Bryson, 2002). Sidaway and 
Bryson (2002) emphasise that although advances in telecommunications enable 
analysts to access large volumes of financial information, proximity between 
investors and debtors remains important as investors still meet other bankers to 
discuss investment opportunities. Agnes (2000) contends that  a significant flow of 
market information is informal, derived through complex webs of information from 
specific contexts and venues by individual employees, not coordinated, or 
company organised strategy. These flows of information are complex as they 
emerge from multiple sources including rivals which represent an unstable, 
contradictory cooperation-competition relationship that has to be carefully 
managed. Agnes (2000) outlines how these complicated exchanges often occur in 
relaxed social settings, such as City restaurants, bars and private members clubs 
which highlight the role of culture in stabilising financial centres. 
 
Proximity is also important in the development of new financial instruments as they 
are produced at the boundaries of firms and are frequently bespoke (Schoenberger 
1991), requiring producers and their clients  to reside in close proximity to develop 
these products. The proximity of specialists also aids product innovation when 
financial institutions are agglomerated. Thrift (1994) concludes that social and 
cultural performances are important in explaining the persistence of financial 
centres that are integral to maintaining the reproduction of the international finance 
system. The need to find new business also requires proximity, and companies are 
able to compare their performance against competing firms (Thrift, 1994). Proximity 
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for developing and negotiating new deals is important to be close to corporate 
finance clients which is important due to the implications of contract and property 
law on borrowing money (Hartmann 1995). 
 
Although economic geographers have identified spatial agglomerations of financial 
firms within financial centres such as the City of London, Clark (2002) warns the 
clustering of financial and advanced producer firms should not be taken for 
granted. The City of London is not immune to problems emerging from high costs 
and poor transportation infrastructure that can make London appear as a less 
attractive location for firms to operate from, reminding us that these agglomerations 
are maintained by face-to-face interaction (Clark 2002). Nevertheless, the 
geographies of money literature began to focus on the production of specific 
monetary instruments and the coordination of capital flows within financial centres, 
such as the work of Pryke and Allen (2000) on derivatives, Agnes (2000) on 
swaps, and Hall (2007) on corporate finance. More importantly for this thesis, a 
small body of work has been developed on securitisation. Pryke (1994) and Pryke 
and Whitehead (1994) H[SORUHG WKH 8.¶V HDUO\ 50%6 PDUNHW DV DQ LQYHVWPHQW
vehicle that was used to switch capital from an over accumulating primary circuit of 
capital (the manufacturing sector) into the secondary circuit of capital (the built 
environment). Pryke (1994) identifies London as a key hub of the NIFS and 
GLVFXVVHVKRZVHFXULWLVDWLRQXVHVLQWHUQDWLRQDOFDSLWDOWRFRQVWUXFWWKH8.¶VXUEDQ
landscape. These discourses on securitisation highlight how consumers and 
capital have become directly linked to the international financial system through 
global financial centres such as London and New York.  
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3.4. Restructuring space: retail banking and (de)centralisation 
 
So far, this review of the geographies of money literature has focussed on the 
µJOREDO¶ VFDOH RI WKH %:6 DQG global cities, embedded within particular localities 
that coordinated the flows of capital through nation-states. I will now switch focus to 
examine the regional scale, descending the urban hierarchy to explore the roles of 
smaller cities which also coordinate flows of capital and influence the geographies 
of money. It is necessary here to critique the global and world cities literature, for 
example Sassen (2001), Knox (1995) and Friedman (1995), have frequently 
highlighted the prominence of global cities such as London, New York and Tokyo 
in controlling the monetary flows of the international finance system. In doing so, 
these so-called global cities have been placed at the top of an urban hierarchy at 
the expense of smaller cities rendering them invisible to world city research. 
Robinson (2006) bemoans this preoccupation with the dynamism and style typical 
of larger cities and argues that this obsession ignores the role of smaller cities 
embedded in peripheral regions. Amin and Graham (1997) have stressed that 
although large cities act as key command and control centres for the economy, as 
reviewed earlier, many of these world cities have become subject to 
decentralisation, a direct consequence of automation and improvements in 
telecommunications. This leads Amin and Graham (1997) to stress that specialist 
knowledge and epistemic communities exist outside of London, a notion that has 
been supported by French (2002) and Bailey and French (2005), who have 
illustrated the sustained decentralisation of the financial services industry from 
global financial centres into smaller, peripheral cities.  
 
The decentralisation of the finance industry began in the 1970s once managers in 
the financial sector had begun to automate some of their more mundane, back 
office operations (Leyshon et al. 1989). It was soon realised that these functions 
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could be relocated away from their head offices in London to smaller cities and 
towns in the south east where labour costs were substantially reduced (French and 
Leyshon 2003). The finance sector began to increasingly process standardised 
information away from London as this kind of information did not require the face-
to-face interactions usually required to interpret fast-moving and ambiguous 
information. The financial firms began to decentralise account administration, 
marketing, underwriting and consumer contact centres into bespoke processing 
units (Bailey and French 2005). This decentralisation led to the development of 
new clusters of administration and support centres that would benefit from shared 
labour pools and information spillovers (Bailey and French 2005). As such, 
economic geographers witnessed a shift in the geographies of money as elements 
of the financial sector were (re)centralised and embedded into new regional 
centres outside of London. The decisions and calculation involved in providing a 
consumer with a mortgage occurs in these spaces, which then connect consumers 
with money sourced from the international circuits of capital. 
 
The spatial reconfiguration of bank administration was intensified - particularly for 
the retail banking sector - and was accelerated as a response to a crisis that 
emerged from the development of the Euromarkets (Leyshon and Thrift 1993) and 
subsequent developing world debt crisis. The dollar deposits in European banks 
began to saturate the traditional developing world markets as bankers began to 
recycle Eurodollars through Latin America, Asia and Africa. By the 1980s, declining 
commodity prices and increases in interest rates on high levels of indebtedness 
had hampered the ability of these nation-states to service their debts and were 
forced to undergo a decade of de-development in an attempt to repay their debts. 
Many commercial banks that had invested in these developed countries had failed 
to retain adequate reserves of cash and as their investments turned sour, they 
became insolvent and collapsed (Leyshon and Thrift 1993). The response of the 
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ILQDQFLDOFRPPXQLW\ZDVD µIOLJKW-to-TXDOLW\¶ ZKHUH ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQVHIIHFWLYHO\
barred the developing world from accessing the international capital markets 
(Leyshon and Thrift 1997)2QO\µVDIHU¶HFRQRPLHVQDPHO\1RUWK$PHULFD(XURSH
and South East Asia were permitted to participate in the credit markets which 
culminated in an international geography of financial exclusion (Leyshon and Thrift 
1997)7KLVµIOLJKW-to-TXDOLW\¶PHDQWWKDWEDQNVEHJDQVDWXUDWHWKHLUµVDIHU¶GRPHVWLF
markets with capital - the majority of which was poured into the retail finance sector 
(Leyshon and Thrift, 1993).  
 
This strategy also ended in disaster for many banks when money was funnelled 
into the housing market through consumer mortgages. By the 1990s the UK had 
entered a recession that exposed mortgage lenders to high consumer defaults, 
compounded by a backdrop of bad corporate debt and declining asset prices 
(Leyshon and Thrift 1993) . The economic downturn combined with losses derived 
from repossessions, forced retail banks to re-evaluate their businesses. According 
to the OECD  (1992), 65 per cent of UK retail bankV¶ LQFRPHZDVVXEVXPHGE\
their operating expenses, so to increase their profitability the banks sought to 
reduce their overheads. This resulted in the rationalisation of much of the physical 
bank infrastructure as branch networks were pruned and unprofitable branches 
were shed (Leyshon and Pollard, 2000).  
 
The reorganisation of the British retail sector was heavily influenced by innovations 
that had been pioneered decades earlier in the US, on the west coast.  Pollard 
(1999) has argued that California was instrumental in the development of new 
banking technologies and conventions which are a product of the tight  
governmental regulation, coupled to the highly competitive environment. One of the 
earlier innovations was the development of Magnetic Ink Character Recognition 
(MICR), in San Francisco in the 1950s (Fisher and McKenny 1993), which was 
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used to  rapidly process cheques and deposit slips. The main aim was to reduce 
the costs associated with cheque processing whilst increasing the processing 
speed, a success which led to an endorsement by the American Banking 
$VVRFLDWLRQDQGSURPRWHG LWVVSUHDG WKURXJKRXW WKH860,&5¶VDELOLW\ WR UHDOLVH
savings through economies of scale made it desirable to British banks and it was 
VRRQUHDOLVHG WKDW0,&5¶VFRVW UHGXFWLRQVZHUHRSWLPLVHG IXUWher, when operated 
in a regional processing centre serving a series of different bank branches. Other 
innovations that centralised and industrialised bank administration include the 
introduction of Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) reducing the need for bank staff 
and bank branches which further reduced operating costs for retail banks (Leyshon 
and Thrift 1993; Leyshon and Pollard 2000). US retail banking had begun to 
pioneer the idea of telephone banking where customers would conduct their 
business by telephone - not in person - which appeared to offer the opportunity to 
eliminate bank branches. American retail banks also began to use geo-
demographic systems for marketing and to sell financial services to specific groups 
of customers, which enabled them to collect information on their customers through 
third parties, not in person through bank branches situated within the community 
(Pollard, 1999). These innovations increased the speed of processing and reduced 
costs leading to the industrialisation of banking, which was frequently exercised in 
FLWLHVRXWVLGHRIµWUDGLWLRQDO¶ILQDQFLDOFHQWUHV20.  
 
Leyshon and Pollard (2000) estimate that it was a further five to ten years before 
these new innovations crossed the Atlantic into Britain. The UK retail finance sector 
began to readily adopt these new automated technologies that assisted in the 
deskilling of  bank branch staff which would further reduce costs (Leyshon and 
Thrift 1999). Arguably, the most relevant technology adopted by the UK consumer 
                                                 
20
 As retail banking became automated, it also became standardised , as with mass production in 
manufacturing,  leading Leyshon and Pollard (2000) to refer to the introduction of these technologies 
DVWKHµLQGXVWULDOLVDWLRQ¶RIEDQNLQJWKURXJKPDVV-produced, standardised products. 
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finance market is a computerised process called credit scoring. Hand and Henley 
(1997) define credit scoring as a technology that utilises statistical methods to 
FODVVLI\FUHGLWDSSOLFDQWVLQWRµJRRG¶DQGµEDG¶ULVNFXVWRPHUVZKHUHWKHODWWHUDUH
denied credit as they are seen to bear an unacceptable level of risk. These models 
use the data and performance of previous customers to predict the future 
propensity of new potential customers to repay their debts (Hand 2005). The 
characteristics of consumers that previously defaulted on their debts, such as 
particular age groups and occupations (Leyshon and Thrift 1999) are recognised, 
as are the characteristics of consumers who successfully repaid their debts. 
Characteristics associated with an ability to repay are given a high number of 
points, whilst a lower number of points are attributed to characteristics associated 
ZLWKULVNLHUFRQVXPHUV7KHDSSOLFDQW¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDUHWKHQZHLJKWHGDQGLIWKH
sum of points passes a predefined threshold they are granted credit. Leyshon and 
Thrift (1999) discuss the widespread adoption of credit-scoring software  that 
HQDEOHVUHWDLOEDQNVWRGLVFULPLQDWHEHWZHHQSRWHQWLDO µJRRG¶DQGµEDG¶FXVWRPHUV
DQG UHYLHZ KRZ FUHGLW VFRULQJ KDV HQDEOHG EDQNV WR µFKHUU\-SLFN¶ WKH PRVW
profitable, low risk customers, which they argue can be seen as new forms of 
surveillance and governmentality.  
 
The roots of credit-scoring, albeit in a manual form, can be traced to the US in the 
1930s. Early forms of credit scoring were initially used by mail order companies 
who naturally did not have access to their potential customers through high-street 
stores (Marron 2007) and relied heavily on postcode data to discriminate between 
µJRRG¶ DQG µEDG¶ FRQVXPHUV ,I D VSHFLILF SRVWFRGH KDG D KLJK OHYHO RI GHIDXOWV
applicants from that area would be denied credit. Marron (2007) reports how this 
technique was later used in department stores, although subjective judgements 
were still integral to the credit granting process. However, it was not until the US 
entered the Second World War that credit scoring became more technical and 
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scientific as male underwriters were enlisted and women - inexperienced in 
underwriting - were given prescriptive tables and strict rules to govern their 
decision-making. It was not until the 1980s that computer processing power 
enabled this practice to be automated (Leyshon and Thrift 1999). Argent (2002) 
argues that the removal of decision-making from bank branches actively reduced 
the levels of bad debts that were attributed to poor decision-making by bank 
managers while the centralised processing allowed lenders to reduce operational 
costs by reaping economies of scale, making this innovation a successful 
adaptation for banks.  
 
As credit scoring used information held in databases at centralised processing 
centres, branches became less important in the collection of consumer information 
which allowed banks to reduce the number of their branches (Leyshon and Thrift 
1994). The introduction of credit scoring produced more consistent decisions, as to 
who should be granted credit which has enabled banks to accurately predict what 
their potential losses could be.  This consistent decision-making process is referred 
WR DV D µIUR]HQ RUJDQLVDWLRQDO GLVFRXUVH¶ E\ %RZNHU and Star (1999) which fixes 
specific codes and rules into everyday life. The emergence and operation of these 
automated systems produced new processing centres located in urban areas 
which exercise decision-making. These regional centres are important as their 
decisions are used to produce mortgages that are later placed into circulation, 
once they have been securitised, through the international financial markets. 
Although RMBS notes are structured in financial centres such as London, their 
stability is reliant on the quality of the underlying mortgages that are issued to 
consumers. It is argued that these regional centres are powerful locations as they 
µGHFLGH¶ZKRLVHOLJLEOHIRUDPRUWJDJHZKLFKLQGLUHFWO\DIIHFWVWKHFUHGLWTXDOLW\RI
UK RMBS notes. This thesis will provide a narrative which is sympathetic to 
5RELQVRQ¶V(2002) DUJXPHQWDQGµGHYHORSPHQWDOLVW OHQV¶E\KLJKOLJKWing the power 
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H[HUFLVHGE\WKHVHSURFHVVLQJFHQWUHV ORFDWHGLQµRUGLQDU\FLWLHV¶$OWKRXJKWKHVH
peripheral spaces have been overshadowed by world city financial centres these 
processing clusters can be perceived as powerful spaces. Subsequently, these 
centres and technologies are integral to understanding the geographical 
restructuring of the UK mortgage markets during the 1990s, and the expansion and 
operation of securitisation within the UK consumer credit market. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the geographies of money literature which began to 
emerge in the 1980s, shedding light on how financial networks, institutions and 
governments control and dictate the spatial flows of capital. This dissertation has 
reviewed the geographies of money literature as it is necessary to obtain an 
understanding of the contemporary international financial system and its evolution. 
The review has paid particular attention to the role of financial centres that direct 
circuits of capital and the smaller regional centres that produce consumer credit. A 
review of these particular discourses is essential as it provides a spatial and 
theoretical context to the research on mortgage production that will be discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, and the processes of securitisation, the subject of Chapter 7.  
 
This chapter suggests that the early geographies of money narratives that focus on 
the BWS are integral to understanding the development of an international financial 
system that would later be compatible with the trading of securitised portfolios of 
mortgages. The BWS literature is significant as it emphasises the intimate 
relationship between money, the state and space (Strange 1994). The demise of 
the BWS, triggered by the sale of dollars in the Euromarkets, produced a 
regulatory vacuum and it is argued that this regulatory lacuna was filled by financial 
centres, such as London. This is important as these centres articulate a significant 
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role in the structured finance industry through the production of mortgage-backed 
investments, as discussed in Chapter 7. The geographies of money literature 
emphasises the importance of face-WR IDFH NQRZOHGJH DQG /RQGRQ¶V  FXOWXUDO
embeddedness which is significant to understand how securitisation transactions 
are developed in investment banks in London, integrating mortgage debt and home 
owners into international circuits of capital. The literature acknowledges the 
technological changes and financial innovations that emerged as part of the NIFS, 
which highlights the development of new financial markets which is useful to 
conceptualise the creation of a European market for securitisation.  
 
The geographies of money literature is also attentive to the influence that regional 
financial centres have on the geographies of money and the international financial 
system. There has been criticism of the disproportionate amount of financial power 
DWWULEXWHG WR µJOREDO FLWLHV¶ by the likes of Robinson (2002), who argues that 
peripheral cities should not be overlooked. This thesis accepts that finance centres 
like London are central to the coordination of financial markets that produce the 
geographies of money. However, the research is acutely aware of the important 
functions exercised in regional financial centres that contribute to direction of 
monetary flows within the international financial system. The thesis draws upon this 
literature in Chapter 5 to highlight a series of regional financial centres that are 
involved in the production of mortgages, but also to understand their powerful role 
in producing the mortgage assets that are later restructured and sold through 
global cities. 
 
The most important retail banking innovation in the context of this current study is 
the development of credit scoring, a technology that is used to discriminate 
EHWZHHQµJRRG¶DQGµEDG¶ULVNFXVWRPHUVDQGLVXVHGWRGHFLGHZKHWKHUDPRUWJDJH
applicant should be offered a mortgage or not. This technology allowed mortgage 
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lenders to reduce their dependence on branch networks allowing the marketing 
and distribution of mortgages over the telephone, internet and through brokers. It 
can be argued that credit scoring has played a significant role in the expansion of 
the UK mortgage market in the late 1990s and early 2000s, by lowering the costs 
of processing, and enabling banks to assess their credit risk more accurately. The  
work reviewed in this Chapter is mobilised later in Chapter 6 to discuss the 
geographical development of credit scoring and the geographies therein. Chapter 6 
will also elaborate on how credit scoring contributes to the production of UK 
mortgages and the credit quality of the assets that underpin RMBS notes. The 
dissertation will now turn to review the methodological techniques that were used 
in the research. This will also include a discussion of the research strategies that 
were developed and an evaluation of how successful the research methods were 
in practice.   
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Hide and seek?: Investigating the financial elites of UK mortgage production 
and securitisation 
 
³(FRQRPLF JHRJUDSK\ OLNH RWKHU EUDQFKHV RI WKH VXEMHFW PXVW EH
treated scientifically: cause and effect must be studied. Thus the facts 
fit together and the structure of the science is built. It promotes clear 
thinking to distinguish between the science and its application. Facts 
DUH UHFRUGHG H[SODQDWLRQV WUDFHG DQG WHQGHQFLHV LQGLFDWHG´ 
(Rudmose Brown 1936:ix). 
 
³¶5HVSRQGHQWV¶ KDYH QRW UHVSRQGHG WRP\ OHWWHUV KDYH QRW UHWXUned 
telephone calls, lost my surveys, cancelled appointments, cut 
interviews short, lost interest in my research, withdrawn from the 
SURMHFWDQGVRRQ«,KDYHEHFRPHDµVKDPHOHVVHFOHFWLF¶DQGDGRSWHG
D PHWKRGRORJLFDOO\ RSSRUWXQLVWLF DSSURDFK WR ILHOGZRUN«Paking the 
best of what you get, rather than the ideal hoped for when planning 
WKHUHVHDUFK´ (England 2001:212). 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
While economic geographers have been receptive to the adoption of new 
methodologies, the sub-GLVFLSOLQH¶VVHOI evaluation of the ways in which it produces 
knowledge have been rather sporadic. Just as the relationship between research 
methods, theory and policy become the subjects of hot debate and scrutiny, these 
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discussions periodically lose their lustre, (Barnes et al. 2007). This is despite the 
fact that the research subjects of economic geography have become increasingly 
more diversified over time. For example, economic geographers turned their 
research away from the statistical analysis of industrial production, popular in the 
1960s and 1970s and began to explore the service sector in the 1980s and the 
diversity and multiplicity of the cultural industries in the 1990s21. During this period, 
the practitioners of economic geography have innovated accordingly, adopting new 
methodological practices from the wider social sciences, techniques that can be 
seen to be more appropriate in H[SORULQJ WKHVH µQHZ¶ JHRJUDSKLHV ZKLFK KDV in 
turn stimulated lively debate concerning the validity of knowledge. 
 
An insight into the changes and shifts in academic sentiment is illustrated by the 
two contrasting views above.  Rudmose-Brown (1936) understood economic 
geography as being constructed through a factual and logical framework, mobilised 
through the privileged, and in his view objective, judgements of  western male 
academics. In contrast, England (2001) KLJKOLJKWVWKHDPELJXLWLHVDQGµPHVVLQHVV¶
of her research, ambiguities that are frequently concealed behind the scientific 
rhetoric employed by Rudmose Brown, for example. The differences between 
England and Rudmose-%URZQ¶VDWWLWXGHVWRUHVHDUFKVHUYHWRLOOXVWUDWHWKHVKLIWVLQ
the philosophical and methodological approaches utilised by economic 
geographers over the history of the discipline.  
 
This chapter aims to discuss the particular methodologies used to produce this 
thesis and will critically evaluate how these techniques were specifically used in the 
context of this research. The chapter will highlight the contemporary debates that 
have shaped the development and adoption of the particular methodologies used 
                                                 
21
 7KLVWKHVLVLVDZDUHWKDWWKHVHµVKLIWV¶LQHFRQRPLFJHRJUDSK\GLGQRWRFFXUDVFOHDQEUHDNVEXW
overlapped, and that some research is still conducted on the industrial sector. 
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by economic geographers and social scientists. In addition, I will explain why 
specific techniques were chosen for the research, before evaluating the success of 
these methodologies, especially in the light of the credit crunch that generated 
additional challenges and unexpected opportunities. The remainder of the chapter 
is divided into four sections. The second section will discuss the turbulent history of 
qualitative research methods in economic geography and the reasons for their 
applicability to this particular project. The third section will briefly discuss the social 
context of this research, while the fourth chapter will examine and evaluate the use 
RI LQWHUYLHZVDV WKH UHVHDUFK¶VSULPDU\PHWKRGRORJLFDO WRRO 7KH ILQDOVHFWLRQZLOO
conclude the chapter. 
 
4.2. Choosing the right tools for the job: Qualitative research methods 
 
Recent attempts to promote debate on the reflexivity of the research methods used 
in contemporary economic geography include Politics and Practice in Economic 
Geography - a collection edited by Tickell et al. (2008)± which addresses the 
issues surrounding the use of particular research methods in the dynamic and 
heterodox field of economic geography. In doing so, the authors illustrate and 
discuss the transitions and adoption of different research methods that have 
subsequently reshaped the field of economic geography. The book reflects on the 
profound effect that Doreen MaVVH\ DQG 5LFKDUG 0HHJDQ¶V ERRN Politics and 
Method, had on the sub-discipline which is used as a starting point to historicise 
the debates that revolved around theory, policy and method in the 1980s. This 
period was especially significant to economic geographers who, at the time, were 
witnessing the onset of deindustrialisation and restructuring that had begun in the 
1970s. This led academics to explore the ways in which new methodologies could 
be used to conduct research that would explain the drastic changes that were 
occurring in North America and Western Europe. This debate was stimulated, in 
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part, E\ 0DVVH\¶V (1984) claim that the statistical outputs produced from 
quantitative research methods, that were widely used by economic geographers at 
the time, were in fact, incapable of understanding and explaining these new 
patterns and the politics of industrial change. 
 
This is significant as deindustrialisation had begun to sweep through North 
America and Western Europe in the late 1970s, and academics had become 
politically critical of these changes. Factories were no-longer seen as data centres 
that compiled production statistics, but spaces of class struggle and decision-
making as economic geographers turned to surveys and interviews to understand 
how they operated. As such, extensive research that identified the typical features 
of different taxonomies of firms were cast aside for intensive in-depth interviews 
and case studies, in an attempt to uncover the processes behind 
deindustrialisation, not merely describing them through statistical datasets. This 
shift leads Barnes, et al (2007) to observe how politics and methods became more 
closely entwined in the 1980s as a result of the intense, but sporadic, debates 
witnessed throughout the decade. Although the momentum that had sustained 
these discussions waned, one outcome that enjoyed greater longevity was the 
widespread adoption of new research methods by economic geographers 
including: interviews; discourse analysis; and ethnography, as the sub-discipline 
XQGHUZHQW D VHULHV RI FXOWXUDO LQVWLWXWLRQDO DQG UHODWLRQDO µWXUQV¶ 7KH LQFUHDsed 
XVH RI WKHVH µQHZ¶ PHWKRGV developed in the wider social sciences - later 
stimulated new debates in the mid-1990s as some geographers began to view 
ZKDWEHFDPHNQRZQDVWKHµTXDOLWDWLYHUHYROXWLRQ¶DVDGDQJHURXVPDQRHXYUHWKDW
could undermine the reputation of economic geography within the social sciences, 
as it was believed that these methods ODFNHGµVFLHQWLILF¶ULJRXUDQGSROLF\UHOHYDQFH
(Barnes et al. 2007).  
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These debates frequently centred on the advantages and disadvantages of using 
either quantitative or qualitative research strategies, although it can now be argued 
that qualitative methods have been broadly accepted by the sub-discipline, through 
the widespread use of the corporate interview. It is useful here to briefly outline the 
key characteristics between quantitative and qualitative research methods to 
understand the issues that produced this rift. Quantitative research methods are 
generally characterised as techniques which process numerical data, or social 
REVHUYDWLRQV WKDW KDYH EHHQ µTXDQWLILHG¶ ZKHUH REVHUYDWLRQV RI WKH VRFLDO ZRUOG
become represented through numerical values. Quantitative social research uses 
statistical procedures and models that were developed in what are known as the 
µQDWXUDOVFLHQFHV¶DQGXVH empirical, observed data to statistically support, or reject 
hypothesises formulated by researchers (Bryman 2004) 22. The use of quantitative 
methods in social science research is appealing to researchers, according to Sayer 
(1984), as its grounding in mathematics supposedly provides it with a precise, 
unambiguous language that provides logical reasoning and certainty which 
satisfies those frustrated by the contestable nature of the social sciences. 
 
Scientific methods are used to establish general laws using large datasets and 
numbers of observations of many individuals.  7KLVGDWDLVXVHGµLQGXFWLYHO\¶ZKHUH
theories are produced using this data, which can be problematic as values can be 
projected onto individual subjects, because of their association with similar 
subjects, even though an individual does not in fact have those values (Pratt 
1978)23&RQYHUVHO\ WKHVH WHVWVFDQEHXVHG µGHGXFWLYHO\¶ ZKHUHK\SRWKHVLVFDQ
be used to reject hypothesises (Pratt 1978).  Advocates of quantitative methods 
believe that analysing social phenomena observed through natural science 
                                                 
22
 The natural sciences include; biology, chemistry, physics, geology, and mathematics. 
23
 One example includes credit scoring where a borrower may be discriminated against because a 
lender believes younger consumers are more likely to default on their repayments, when in fact that 
individual may be credit worthy, but through their association and their age cohort they may find it more 
difficult to obtain credit. 
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methods is the only method able to adequately produce verified knowledge. As 
such, proponents of these methods believe that social research conducted using 
TXDQWLWDWLYHPHWKRGVH[KLELW µVFLHQWLILFTXDOLWLHV¶ WKDWDUHKLHUDUFKLFDOO\VXSHULRU WR 
qualitative methodologies (Bryman 2004). 
 
One of the key criticisms of quantitative research within the social sciences that 
undermines the claim to credibility is that complexities of social life cannot be 
adequately reduced to numerical properties (Bryan and Rafferty 2007). In addition 
the process of quantifying social phenomena is a qualitative subjective procedure 
that problematizes the scientific values attributed to these methods. This criticism 
is compounded because observing social phenomena, and attempting to code 
them with numerical values, does not provide any insight into the attitudes, 
emotions and decision-making processes that influence the behaviour of 
individuals. Undertaking analysis of empirical data through statistical tests may 
have been useful to researchers exploring industrial production, but the use of 
these methods are problematic, as according to Sayer (1982), statistical 
associations, however strong,  do not explain events. As such, the use of 
quantitative methods is unable to provide any further insight into the politics and 
decision-making driving deindustrialisation in the 1970s.  
 
Qualitative research techniques, on the other hand, including corporate interviews, 
participant observation, discourse analysis and participant activism, are not reliant 
on numerical and scientific rhetoric, but focus on the actions of individuals. It can 
be argued that qualitative research methods are more effective at highlighting the 
cultural and social elements of economic phenomena, as these methods offer an 
insight into how and why people act, and how their attitudes and responses shape 
the operation of capitalism (Schoenberger 1991). Qualitative methods emphasise 
elements of the social world that the advocates of quantitative methods would 
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reject, such as the individual responses and opinions of important actors like 
corporate executives, or idiosyncratic case studies on the performance of the 
economic development of a particular region. Despite this criticism, these detailed 
examples provide insight into the operation of capitalism in particular spaces, 
perpetuated by particular individuals. So, although the uptake of qualitative 
research methods in economic geography slowly increased during the 1990s, it 
initiated a series of fierce debates, as geographers became divided into three 
groups. 
 
First, there is a group of economic geographers who are highly critical of what they 
see to be the inappropriate use of qualitative methods. Martin (1999:389) called 
into question the usefulness of qualitative research suggesting that some of its 
practitioners  are theoretically and empirically lazy. For example, Martin and Sunley 
(2001:153) argue that qualitative research lacks the rigorous qualities of 
µVFLHQWLILFDOO\¶LQIRUPHGUHVHDUFK0HDQZKLOH%D[WHUand Eyles (1997) contend that 
the jargonised semantics of qualitatively informed research methods, engenders a 
private understanding of knowledge, as the specialist languages limits how far 
these new knowledges can travel. Markusen (1999), Martin (2001) and Martin and 
Sunley (2001), also raise concerns as to how solely qualitative research studies 
have no policy relevance, which risks geographers being displaced by 
geographical economics. 
 
The protagonists of a second group, who embraced the use of qualitative research 
methods, began to problematize the uncritical application of qualitative techniques 
and engaged in critical debates to promote the use of these research tools. 
Qualitative techniques were promoted as being sympathetic to a knowledge based, 
cultural economy, which was developing in advanced capitalist economies and was 
seen to be eminently useful to geographers who have become increasingly 
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interested in the cultural industries since the 1990s (Schoenberger 1991; James 
2006). James (2006) has questioned the preoccupation of critics who defend the 
XVHRITXDQWLWDWLYHPHWKRGVRQWKHEDVLVRI LWV µULJRXU¶24. James suggests that the 
credence of this argument is misplaced as policy blueprints based on rigorous 
scientific methods are often found to be ineffective in regenerating regions. 
Moreover, James (2006) DUJXHV WKDW FODLPV WR µWUXWK¶ frequently used in 
neoclassical economics, will never be anything more than optimistic works in 
progress. Schoenberger (1991) also questions the superiority of quantitative 
research methods in economic geography. Quantitative methods are perceived to 
have a privileged status, but the transfer of quantitative methods from the natural to 
the social sciences is questionable, as data derived from questionnaires may boast 
scientific qualities, but the relationships established through quantitative methods 
do not necessarily demonstrate causality (Schoenberger 1991).  
 
A third group (for example, Plummer and Sheppard, 2001) recommends that the 
sub-discipline should become more receptive to a pluralistic research approach 
which uses both qualitative and quantitative methods where appropriate. Over the 
past two decades, the debates surrounding the adoption of qualitative methods 
have matured. For example, Schoenberger (1991) observes how early reviews of 
qualitative methods were written in a defensive prose to counter their critics but a 
decade later, this had begun to change. Crang (2002; 2003), for example, reflects 
on how qualitative research methods have finally become part of an acceptable 
suite of research techniques after undergoing a period of reflection and evaluation 
(Barnes 2001). Despite this progress in academics adopting a more reflexive 
approach to their research, Barnes, et al (2007) complain that economic geography 
fails to sustain sufficient debate around research methods and practice, 
VXEVHTXHQWO\ UHQGHULQJ HFRQRPLF JHRJUDSK\¶V UHVHDUFK PHWKRGV RSDTXH 7KLV
                                                 
24
 James is a student of Ron Martin. 
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thesis argues that qualitative methods were the most appropriate techniques to be 
used to conduct the research as they enable the complex social relations, 
processes and practices (Schoenberger 1991; Valentine 1997; Kitchen and Tate 
2000) that constitute contemporary capitalism to be revealed. As qualitative 
research techniques have the ability to capture ambiguous social relations, this 
chapter will now turn to discuss the research questions, and later, how elite 
interviews can be used to explore the social relations mobilised to produce 
mortgage assets and RMBS notes. 
 
4.3. Situating the research: the geographies of securitisation and credit 
scoring 
 
While it is often taken for granted, or indeed forgotten, Schoenberger (1991) 
reminds us how researchers are influenced by their academic environments, both 
past and present, conditioned by the academics that have taught them, and the 
current debates that circulate within formal literatures and social ties. It is also 
important to acknowledge how the products of academic labour are often shaped 
by the political and economic events experienced by researchers (Clark 2007), and 
without stating the obvious, I am no different.  The questions posed in this thesis 
have been partially derived from my educational legacies in economic geography, 
which were and still are, heavily influenced by political economy as well as the 
emergence of culturally inflected academic research emerging from the cultural 
turn in the 1990s.  
 
This research is also set against the shifting economic landscape of the 1990s and 
2000s. The financial landscape changed for consumers, driven partially through 
financialisation, and realised through unsustainable house price inflation and 
growing consumer indebtedness which emerged from a voracious appetite for 
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consumer credit that had become naturalised in the minds of many consumers as 
they forgot the virtues of thrift. Although social and political commentators argued 
WKDW WKH8.¶VFRQVXPHUFUHGit bubble would burst due to its inherent instability, it 
was the external effects of the credit crunch rooted in the US sub-prime crisis that 
triggered a dramatic rise in home repossessions and personal insolvencies. This 
thesis is a product of this social and political environment, which made interested in 
how consumers were able to access large credit lines and how they had become 
inexplicably embedded with high finance through the mortgage markets.  
 
µ)LQGLQJ¶HOLWHVDQGSUDFWLFLQJUHVHDUFK 
 
I will now turn to review how interviews, a qualitative methodology, were used to 
analyse the production of risk management tools, mortgage production and the 
development of RMBS notes. Interviews were selected as this research tool can be 
used to successfully gain insight into the meanings of life in particular social 
settings (Smith 1988) and as such, they have been used successfully and 
extensively in the social sciences (Burgess 1996)6FKRHQEHUJHU¶V(1991) review of 
interviews can be used to highlight why interviews are an appropriate research tool 
for this particular thesis as she reaffirms how the actions of corporate executives 
have marked effects on the world, and how interviews with executives are useful in 
uncovering how these actors initiate change. Furthermore, Smith (1988) highlights 
how interviews are useful as a geographical research tool as they are particularly 
adept at unveiling everyday individual practices that are performed in specific 
temporal and spatial locations which will be useful at uncovering the everyday 
practices used in underwriting mortgages and developing RMBS notes. 
 
Burgess (1996:102) GHILQHV LQWHUYLHZV DV µFRQYHUVDWLRQV ZLWK D SXUSRVH¶  WKDW
provide rich, detailed data that cannot be obtained using other research 
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techniques, whereas Keats (2000) views interviews as being controlled situations 
where questions are asked systematically of others. BurJHVV GUDZV RQ =ZHLJ¶V
(1948) research on the working classes of London to illustrate how interviews can 
be used to collect information on subjects where there is no current data and 
where quantitative data cannot explain social phenomena. Interviews also enable 
WKHUHVHDUFKHUWRH[SORUHWKHUHDVRQVEHKLQGDUHVSRQGHQW¶VDnswers thus allowing 
the researcher to explore the motivations of their participants.  
 
Interviews, in practice, can take the form of; surveys that require short specific 
answers; semi-structured interviews that allow the interviewer to digress from the 
pre-prepared questions and themes developed by the researcher; through to 
unstructured interviews where the research subject is given the freedom to talk at 
length about issues that they think are important to the research (Burgess 1996).  
Following the example of Schoenberger (1991), this thesis made used of 
interviews that were semi-structured, utilising a non-standardised, open-question 
format that is effective in understanding corporate behaviour and the complex 
entangled relationships that exist inside, and outside, of organisations 
(Schoenberger 1991; Valentine 1997; Kitchen and Tate 2000). Subsequently, 
corporate interviews enable the researcher to gain valuable insight into the rich, 
ambiguous decision-making and behaviour that occurs in firms, in particular the 
relationships that occur within, and between, different epistemic elites in the 
production of scorecards, mortgage assets and securitisation within the UK.  
 
Although interviews were used extensively in the research, it is important to 
discuss why participant observation was not used as a research method. Dunn 
(2007) argues that although the corporate interview, frequently used by economic 
geographers,  is useful in revealing how economic decision making is exercised, 
there are additional methodologies that geographers frequently make reference to, 
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but do not use, such as particular ethnography, for example. When undertaking 
ethnonography, researchers immerse themselves in the settings of a particular 
environment to develop a cultural understanding of codes, norms and customs to 
enable them to gain additional insighWLQWRWKHPHDQLQJVEHKLQGSHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRXU
and actions (Bryman 2004). Researchers utilising ethnomethodology in economic 
geography, also known as observational research, have frequently managed to 
successfully negotiate access to an organisation (Mountz 2007) enabling them to 
be close to their research participants to observe their day-to-day practices. 
 
One of the weaknesses of corporate interviews is that the respondents often omit 
problems from their VWRULHV ZKLFK REVFXUH WKH µPHVVLQHVV¶ RI HFRQRPLF OLIH
resulting in the production of a narrative where the storyteller, is a rational actor. 
Ethnomethodology allows this issue to be overcome by observing how day-to-day 
economic life is mediated, highlighting how it is not rational, but problematic and 
contested (Dunn 2007). Evans (1988) highlights the limitations of 
ethnomethodology, as observations are descriptive and interviews are still needed 
to gain greater insight into the meanings of everyday practices. Observant 
participation was considered as a potential research technique as it would have 
enabled an examination of the everyday life of credit risk production and 
securitisation, and the difficulties experienced in its production.  However, while 
participant observation is a useful research technique, it is often difficult to utilise in 
a research project due to several practical issues that curtail its use, which made it 
an impractical method for this project. For example, it is difficult for researchers to 
obtain the permission necessary to maintain a presence in an office with access to 
their employees for long periods of time, an issue that was realised in several 
different ways in the research. 
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First, as the adverse effects of the credit crunch mounted, it became increasingly 
difficult to organise a one hour interview with managers of financial institutions, so 
obtaining access to perform ethnomethodology in these offices was highly unlikely 
and such requests to individuals may have jeopardised my ability to have secured 
an interview with them. Second, as banks were subject to further scrutiny by the 
government and media they became hesitant in revealing information ± this will be 
discussed in more detail later - and I suspected that they were attempting to 
deliberately construct particular narratives to distance me from particular business 
strategies that had became controversial in the media, power that they would have 
struggled to exert over me had I been persistently present. Third, it became clear in 
WKH LQWHUYLHZV WKDW , ZRXOG EH XQDEOH WR YLHZ SDUWLFXODU µREMHFWV¶ VXFK DV
spreadsheets and contracts, to understand the day-to-day relationships between 
them and analysts, as these organisations were legally bound to ensure the 
secrecy of the buyers of their products. While undertaking the research, the issue 
of data protection had become heightened by the media in the wake of several 
scandals of consumer data being lost, and banks tightened their security. As 
consumer data is located around the offices, which would have been the focus of 
an ethnomethodological study, participants were very reluctant to grant me access 
to their offices. At one meeting, before engaging on a tour of an open plan office, 
P\ SDUWLFLSDQW KDG WR HQVXUH WKDW HYHU\RQH¶V GHVNV ZHUH FOHDU RI DQ\ VHQVLWLYH
data, and such a security blanket could not be maintained if I were conducting 
research through ethnomethodology. As such, it was decided to primarily utilise 
corporate interviews. 
 
Having decided to use interviews, it became necessary to select individuals from 
financial service firms to interview, to uncover the individuals involved in the 
production of mortgages and RMBS notes. However, as Smith (1988) observes, 
interviews provide access to rich sources of information, but the collection of 
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interview data is complicated and problematic. Parry (1998) observes how the 
effects of key individuals can be seen through the media, corporate reports and 
everyday life, but that while these resources are available, their locations are often 
obscured and spatially segregated. The relational ties of powerful, corporate 
executives go beyond the institution they are based in, as they are linked, 
electronically and organisationally through what Knorr-Cetina (1983:132-33) refer 
to as a trans-epistemic community, that comprises of a collective of different 
professions in different corporations. This makes it complicated to identify the elites 
involved in mortgage production and securitisation as they are spread across 
different financial organisations. 
 
The research used two strategies to surmount these problems to recruit individuals 
for the research.  First, I used the same methodology used by Parry (1998) who 
scoured corporate reports to locate individuals who worked in what appeared to be 
areas relevant to the research. This information was combined with internet 
searches on corporate websites to locate specific individuals which were used to 
build a database on the details of potential research participants and their 
organisations. This was problematic as each company is structured differently and 
uses different job titles for similar roles, making it difficult to identity which 
individuals would be useful to the research. This was complicated further by the 
fact that each individual has a specific knowledge based on their career 
experience. One strategy to alleviate this problem was to identity the individuals 
who directed specific divisions of each organisation and to ask them for help in the 
research ± ZKHUH WKH\ ZRXOG EHFRPH D µJDWHNHHSHU¶ DQG ZRXOG LQWURGXFHPH WR
individuals that were able to contribute to the research. This strategy was useful, 
as these individuals could direct me to people who would be able to answer the 
questions I would pose, but would also give me access to names and contact 
details not available on the internet, or in corporate reports. The problem with this 
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strategy was that these gatekeepers may not necessarily direct me to the most 
knowledgeable people, while others attempted to bar my access to these 
individuals.  
 
6HFRQGµVQRZEDOOLQJ¶ZDVXVHGZKHUH,DVNHGUHVHDUFKSDUWLFLSDQWVLIWKH\knew 
of anyone who would be willing to help me, within their firm, or other external 
companies. This strategy, while successful in gaining access to these epistemic 
networks, was hindered by three issues which reduced the number of situations 
when it could be used. First, there were legal issues. RMBS originators are legally 
obliged to not disclose who buys their RMBS notes, while lawyers do not wish to 
disclose information on their clients. Second, due to the secrecy surrounding 
investment strategies, investors did not want to discuss who they purchased their 
RMBS bonds from. Third, the success of snowballing is contingent on the 
connections of gatekeepers, which is inherently based on cultural capital. Some 
interviewees did not want to provide details of their contacts; as one interviewee 
explained, how I had the ability to damage his cultural capital within the industry if I 
KDGDVNHGFRQWURYHUVLDORU µFULWLFDO¶TXHVWLRQVRIDSDUWLFLSDQWWKDWKHKDGUHIHUUHG
me to. 
 
An initial network of potential research participants was established using these 
two strategies. Interviewees were sent a letter outlining the details of the thesis, 
and requesting an interview. If a respondent did not reply to a letter after two 
weeks an email was sent, followed by a telephone call a week later. Forty 
interviews were conducted, between December 2006 and December 2007, with a 
combination of, local authorities, trade body spokespeople, credit referencing 
agencies, building societies, centralised lenders, retail banks, investments banks, 
corporate service providers, bond-rating agencies, regulators and investors. The 
length of the interviews varied between 30 minutes and two hours, with the 
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average length being an hour. The interviews, as discussed earlier, were semi-
structured and were divided into three sections.  
 
The first section sought to gain insight into the background of the interviewee to 
EXLOGDUDSSRUWDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKDWSHUVRQ¶VSRVLWLRQDOLW\FDUHHUKLVWRU\DQG
knowledge. Second, the interview would focus on the role played by that individual 
and their department in articulating a specific stage of mortgage asset production, 
credit scoring development, or securitisation. The third section focussed the 
SDUWLFLSDQW¶VYLHZRI the credit crunch and the specific difficulties that the financial 
sector was experiencing. This semi-structured nature of the interviews enabled the 
participants to provide additional information that they deemed to be relevant, 
which would be guided by additional questions, while the interview schedule 
ensured that each interview covered common ground which enabled me to 
compare and contrast the responses of the interviewees. Following the advice of 
Burgess (1996), the questions were worded carefully, to avoid using leading 
questions and questions overloaded with academic terms that may be unfamiliar to 
the respondents.  
 
The interviews were conducted in England and Scotland reflecting the geography 
of mortgage, securitisation production and consumption within the UK. Five 
interviews were conducted by telephone as the interviewees felt they were too 
busy to meet in person or because they thought that it was not necessary to meet 
face-to-face.25 In retrospect it would be easier for these individuals to cut short an 
interview over the telephone if my questions became critical of them or their 
company, than if I were there in person. Five interviews were not recorded as three 
respondents were not comfortable with this procedure and two interviews were 
conducted in noisy environments. As such, notes were made in the field, while the 
                                                 
25
 Theses interviews took place over the telephone despite several requests for a face-to-face meeting. 
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remaining interviews were recorded. The taped interviews were transcribed as 
soon as possible after the interview had occurred as this made it easier to interpret 
any sections of tape with excessive background noise. The transcriptions were 
then coded by being cut and pasted into Microsoft Word which were then imported 
into the individual chapters.  
 
The success of gaining access to the individuals involved in mortgage asset 
production and RMBS bond production was limited to two factors. First, Ward and 
-RQHV¶ (1999) stress the importance of spatio-temporality in conducting research 
which is crucial in gaining access to research participants. They argue that access 
is not open or closed, but varies temporally and securitisation was no different. 
RMBS notes are issued frequently - throughout the year - although market activity 
decreases over the summer as many city executives take annual holidays. This 
made it easier to gain access to some participants as they had additional free-time 
available, providing they were not on holiday. This was significantly compounded 
by the credit crunch, which had a substantial impact on the research. 
Paradoxically, the credit crunch initially aided the research. It emerged that 
investors were available for interviews, as they were not buying RMBS notes due 
to the market uncertainty. It also became clear that mortgage lenders were not 
issuing RMBS deals as the demand for RMBS notes declined. Subsequently, 
analysts and managers had more free time as they were not working on 
transactions, so research was conducted on mortgage production and RMBS 
investment. This was later followed by interviews at investment banks, bond-rating 
agencies, and corporate service providers. 
 
Towards the end of the research it became progressively harder to obtain research 
access as the effects of the financial crisis began to deepen. Many centralised 
lenders had ceased lending, while others had been closed down, which made 
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obtaining research access difficult. The turbulent economic conditions meant 
analysts were busy working to save their companies from becoming another 
1RUWKHUQ 5RFN 2QH 'LUHFWRU¶V VHFUHWDU\ WROG PH , FRXOG QR ORQJHU PHHW KLP
because he had to attend frequent, short notice (crisis) meetings, which made it 
hard to arrange an interview. Another gatekeeper informed me that it was 
impossible to set up interviews with members of his structured finance team in his 
investment bank as it was highly probable that they were to be made redundant.   
 
While I have discussed how research participants were found and contacted, up 
XQWLOQRZ,KDYHGHOLEHUDWHO\DYRLGHGUHIHUULQJWRWKHVHLQGLYLGXDOVDVµHOLWHV¶DVWKLV
term is problematic and needs to be explored in more detail before understanding 
what makes these individuals unique - and what effects this status had on the 
research. The term elite has been applied to a multiplicity of individuals and actors. 
For example, Parry (1998) VHHV DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V µHOLWH¶ VWDWXV DV HPHUJLQJ IURP D
series of knowledges, which provide these groups with substantial shares of 
control over powerful companies. On the other hand, McDowell (1998) perceives 
HOLWHV WREHPHPEHUVRI µSUHVWLJLRXV¶ ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQVZKLOH&RFKUDQH (1998) 
views political elites as deriving their power from their positions within a political 
network. The problem in theorising elites is summarised by Reisman (1964:528), 
quoted in Smith (2006), who describes how he is uncomfortable with using the 
term elite - due to its connotations of superiority - but he knows of no other term 
that highlights the special treatment that must be given to these research subjects. 
 
$OWKRXJKWKHWHUPµHOLWHLQWHUYLHZV¶KDVJDLned currency as a research technique in 
economic geography (McDowell 1998), critical reflections have cast doubt on the 
DFFXUDF\ RI WKH WHUP µHOLWH¶ (Smith 2006), as the contestation of this term has 
become more complicated, as its meaning has changed over time. According to 
Smith (2006), political economy and Marxist conceptions of power highlighted the 
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SRZHU RI WKH µHOLWH¶ UXOLQJ FODVVHV ZKHWKHU FDSLWDOLVW PRQH\ RZQHUV RU SRZHUIXO
political figures of the state apparatus. However, as elites have been viewed 
through a poststructural lens, the term has become exposed as being under-
theorised when compared with theorisations and debates surrounding sexuality, 
race and gender (Woods 1998). The term elite has been loosely classified as 
political and economic groups that are hard to gain access to, but Smith (2006) 
outlines how research on drug dealers and working class lesbians and other 
marginalised groups are also hard to access, which would ± under the same 
theorisation ± see them become viewed as elite research participants. 
 
Drawing on work by Foucault (1980) and Simmel (1955), Woods (1998) attempts 
to delineate elites and non-elites, and suggests that elites are derived from the 
power of social relations embedded through strong political, professional or 
economic ties. This is a useful approach where Foucault (1980) stipulates that 
power is not acquired or possessed, but is exercised through action which can be 
used to explain how elites are fluid - people obtain and lose power over time. 
Members of the elite are able to exercise power based on the connections they 
have with other members of an elite. The power of individuals over others, derived 
through these social relations, is subject to change and Latour (1986) argues that 
power is a capacity to act, which can be mobilised through networks. The power of 
an elite can also be generated through non-human actors such as machines, 
software and texts, which was useful when seeking to understand how credit 
scoring derives its power. By viewing power as being exercised through actors, it is 
possible to derive who the epistemic elites are that produce, scorecards, mortgage 
assets and securitisation that derive their power through networked objects and 
individuals.  
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7KLV WKHVLV ZLOO DUJXH WKDW VWDWXV RI D ILQDQFLDO µHOLWH¶ LV IOXLG DV LQGLYLGXDOV LQ
banking and finance have power over some individuals, but not others. These 
financial elites have power over three different groups. First, I have not uncritically 
designated the research participants as powerful members of elite epistemic 
communities without careful consideration - I have deliberately elevated the status 
of these individuals in relation to this research project, because they had the ability 
to aid my research, or indirectly hamper it, by barring me from the information 
needed to complete the thesis. As the credit scoring and securitisation sectors 
employ small teams, a small number of refusals, would be detrimental to the 
research as outlined by England: 
 
 ³, DP GHDOLQJ ZLWK FRUSRUDWH HOLWHV HPSOR\HG DW VL[ EDQNV 6R
rejection is more devastating to my research than if I were dealing 
ZLWK D PRUH SOHQWLIXO VXSSO\ RI SRWHQWLDO LQWHUYLHZHHV´ (England 
2001:206). 
 
Second, these research participants, indirectly through their day-to-day practices or 
directly through the engineering scorecards, exercise the ability to provide people 
with mortgages, and the ability to buy a house, wielding significant levels of power 
over the financial security and shelter of UK consumers.  However, these elites do 
not have power over those who do not need a mortgage, so their power is fluid. 
Third, the actors who convert mortgage debt into securities and purchase the debt 
also have power, as they control and direct circuits of capital. They facilitate the 
exchange of debt for cash, to finance housing, while institutional investors invest 
consumer savings in debt, and the shares of other institutions that hold such debt 
which has an effect on pensions. These elites exercise power by directing global 
flows of capital which affect the savings and investments of individuals. This thesis 
argues that this small group of individuals have power over the financial security of 
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UK consumers who participate in the mortgage market and have private savings 
and pensions. Langley (2008) observes how the responsibility of the financial 
security of consumers has been passed from the state to individuals, who have 
turned to the financial markets to offer investments to protect their financial futures. 
The ability for people to buy a house and pay off their mortgage before retirement 
to ensure they have shelter, and financial security through their investments to 
provide them with a living in retirement, is embedded in high finance. Investments 
can be backed by RMBS notes, and prior to the credit crunch, mortgage funding in 
the UK was highly reliant on securitisation. Some individuals are unable to obtain 
mortgages, while other consumers do not require, or desire them, nor will all 
pension and mutual funds be backed by RMBS paper. However, this thesis argues 
that these financial elites H[HUFLVH SRZHU WKURXJK VRFLDO UHODWLRQV RYHU WKH 8.¶V
financialised consumers, who are active in the mortgage market and have come to 
rely upon private savings for their retirement. 
 
+DYLQJ GLVFXVVHG WKH FRQWHVWHG YDULDWLRQV RI WKH WHUP µHOLWH¶ DQG KRZ WKHse 
conceptualisations can be used to view the individuals involved in this research as 
elites, I will now turn to discuss the implications that these powerful individuals had 
on the research and how additional problems in the research process were 
mitigated. One issue revolves around the power of the participants and the settings 
where the interviews were conducted, as the location can have an effect on the 
researcher since the space is controlled by the research participant and it is 
important to acknowledge this effect. The interviews for the research were 
conducted in corporate meeting rooms or communal office areas with the 
exception of one interviewee who had a meeting area in his office and another 
where the interview took place in a café, which perhaps reduced the effects of the 
interviewee-LQWHUYLHZHU SRZHU UHODWLRQV E\ QRW EHLQJ SUHVHQW LQ WKH SDUWLFLSDQW¶V
office. 
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$QDGGLWLRQDOLVVXHVWHPPLQJIURPSRZHUUHODWLRQVLVWKHHIIHFWRIWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶V
positionality that affects the researcher-researched relationship and the privileged 
knowledges that are discussed. Crang (2003) UDLVHVWKHLVVXHWKDWDUHVHDUFKHU¶V
positionality is fluid and unstable, and observes how researchers refashion 
themselves, which leads him to argue how these positionalities need to be 
accounted for, while the importance of appearance and the body is also noted by 
McDowell (1998). My positionality changed throughout the research as my limited 
understanding of mortgage production and securitisation grew. I became more 
proactive in interviews as my understanding of the market developed and I was 
keen to demonstrate my knowledge, in order to be taken more seriously by the 
interviewee, which I argue reduced the lacuna in my knowledge and reduced the 
gap in the researcher-researched power relationship, which had three implications. 
First, by demonstrating a greater command of knowledge and terminology 
interviewees would provide greater detail in their answers and facilitated a debate 
of practices and operations. Second, by being viewed as an informed researcher I 
was more interesting to talk to, and perhaps had useful information, and views of 
the market (within the bounds of confidentiality) which enabled me to increase the 
duration of the interviews. Third, as I became an informed researcher, individuals 
became more willing to act as gatekeepers, as it was perhaps perceived that I 
would not undermine their cultural capital. Although my positionality changed over 
WKHSHULRGRIWKHUHVHDUFK,ZRXOGQRWVD\WKDW,EHFDPHDQµLQVLGHU¶EXW,GLGPRYH
closer towards the banking and financing community, which may have affected my 
positionality (McDowell 1998).  
 
The appearance of the researcher is also important to the research process which 
includes their personality, class, gender and dress which Ward and Jones (1999) 
UHIHUWRDVWKHµPRGHRIHQWU\¶&RFKUDQH(1998) suggests that a researcher should 
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adjust their positionality - or disguise it carefully - as it may be a way of 
manipulating elites, by dressing in their uniform, but he argues that we are 
manipulating ourselves and may not be aware of the effect it has on our 
positionalities and power relations. I adjusted by positionality by wearing sober, 
dark suit with black shoes. I adjusted my hair into a sober style and would walk 
briskly and confidently in an attempt to mimic the City norms and codes of dress. 
McDowell (1998; 2007) EHOLHYHV WKDW WKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VSRVLWLRQDOLW\ IRUFHV WKHPWR
consider whether values and beliefs should be presented to interviewees and sees 
WKDWDUHVHDUFKHU¶VVRFLDOEDFNJURXQGFDQDIIHFWWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV,IRXQGLWXVHIXO
to outline my own viewpoint, once I had time to develop a considered view of the 
credit crunch to respondents to reveal my positionality.  
 
McDowell (1998) raises an important issue which emphasises that the researcher 
has the power to include and suppress parts of the research in their written 
narrative, which traditionally has included the identity of respondents to protect 
them and any commercially sensitive information. The interviews in this research 
were completed on the understanding that the participants and their employers 
were given anonymity. This was vital to gaining research access and the names of 
individuals, their companies, and products were removed from the transcripts, 
which reverses the researched-researcher power relations as I had the power to 
revoke their anonymity from this thesis ± a power I did not exercise. Despite these 
precautions, it became clear that an extra layer of insulation was required to 
protect the identities of the participants and their companies as several 
respondents highlighted that the securitisation community is close knit26. Many 
different firms work with each other on a regular basis and different firms meet at 
industry events such as the annual Global ABS Conference, which attracts 
                                                 
26
 If a company is named in this thesis it is because the information is publically available. 
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individuals and speakers from all sections of the securitisation community27. 
Despite removing specific names from the narrative, particular innovations or 
strategies used by individuals or firms may be inadvertently revealed to individuals 
within the industry who may potentially read the research. Subsequently, some 
empirical material in the research has been omitted completely, or altered in an 
attempt to remove any suggestions to the identities of key research participants.  
 
Triangulation was used, where the responses from the research participants were 
compared and analysed, to identify any incorrect or questionable information 
gleaned from the interviews. However, it is important to acknowledge some issues 
that surround the use of triangulation. For example,  James (2006) and Baxter and 
Eyles (1997) EHOLHYH WKDW WULDQJXODWLRQ¶VDELOLW\ WRSURYLGHPRUHULJRURXVUHVXOWV LV
undermined by two problems. First, powerful actors do not have access to perfect 
information (Crang 2002) EXW WKH\ PD\ µUHYHDO¶ D VDQLWLVHG FRKHUHQW QDUUDWLYH
ZKLFKPD\GLIIHUIURPµUHDOLW\¶6HFRQGGLIIHUHQWRUJDQLVDWLRQVPD\FRQGXFWVSHFLILF
practices in different ways, for example, underwriting uses different data sets and 
procedures. This is a pertinent point insofar as capitalist firms will constantly aim to 
move into different markets and change the way they do business to obtain a 
competitive advantage. This raises the question: Is it appropriate to triangulate 
empirical material in an attempt to obtain rigour? James (2006) believes that 
triangulation generalises a series of different narratives, in a fallacious attempt to 
maintain the scientific value of rigour. As such, this thesis did not use triangulation, 
per se, but did eliminate statements that appeared to be wholly incorrect, or could 
not be substantiated. For example, if there were two contradictory statements on a 
legal issue, between a lender and D ODZ\HU WKH WKHVLV ZRXOG XVH WKH ODZ\HU¶V
VWDWHPHQWWRFOHDUXSWKLVDPELJXLW\DVLWLVWKHODZ\HU¶VDUHDRIH[SHUWLVH 
                                                 
27
 http://secure.imn.org/web_confe/index.cfm?sc=20080601_SF_0024&pg=Agenda (Accessed: 
7/08/2008) 
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4.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter recognises the diversity of the research methods used in 
contemporary economic geography and its continual adoption of new 
methodologies that have frequently changed the lenses through which economic 
geographers and social scientists view the economy. This thesis also 
acknowledges that these new methods are not readily accepted by academics as a 
whole, but are open to frequent contestation, debate and controversy. The new 
directions of research in economic geography have stimulated the use of 
qualitative research methods, which developed an unwelcome fissure between 
geographers splitting them broadly into two camps: one in favour of using 
qualitative research methods and another favouring quantitative methods in the 
belief that qualitative methodologies lacked rigour. One positive outcome from this 
split was a lively and constructive debate on the use of qualitative research which 
led to the increased reflexivity and evaluation of these methods, assisting their 
acceptance within the discipline.  
 
The chapter has explained how interviews are an ideal technique that can be used 
to collect ambiguous and non-standard information and as such, they have been 
used extensively by economic geographers to record the complex practices, 
processes and behaviours exhibited by managers and analysts in finance. As the 
production of mortgages and RMBS securities is practiced through a small series 
of epistemic elites it was decided that interviews would be the most appropriate 
technique to explore these diverse sets of knowledges. The chapter addressed the 
issues that arose in interviewing the epistemic groups involved in mortgage 
production, scorecard development and securitisation. Although the head-count of 
these elites are relatively small ± these groups are disproportionately powerful - 
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and so they can be viewed as financial elites owing to the power that they exercise 
over society. The chapter sought to problematise the term elite to understand 
where financial elites obtain their power from ± to determine what makes them 
µHOLWH¶7KHVH WKUHHHSLVWHPLFFRPPXQLWLHVH[HUFLVHSRZHUE\SURYLGLQJDFFHVV WR
consumer credit, and by affecting the value of assets in the capital markets, but are 
DOVRHOLWHDV WKH UHVHDUFK¶VVXFFHVV LVEDVHGRQ WKHDELOLW\ WR LGHQWLI\DQG ORFDWH
these individuals. In addition, the chapter discussed who was interviewed and how 
the empirics were triangulated.  
 
This methodology chapter has strongly highlighted the importance of temporal 
UHVHDUFKDFFHVVDQGWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVWKDWFDQRFFXULIDUHVHDUFKHU¶VDFFHVVWR
important individuals is suddenly withdrawn. In the context of this project, the credit 
crunch paradoxically aided the research in its initial stages as many individuals 
developed an abundance of spare time as the markets became inactive, although it 
later became difficult to gain access to the mortgage and securitisation community 
as the consequences of the crisis deepened. Although the transcripts and quotes 
were edited to remove the names of individuals, companies and products 
associated with the interviewees, it became clear that other interviewees reading 
the thesis may recognise other interviewees, or companies, from details such as 
corporate strategies, dates and innovations. It became necessary to remove 
sections of texts and to exclude some of the quotes from this thesis to protect the 
identities of those interviewed for the research. The next chapter will turn to explore 
the changing geographies of mortgage production and how its spatial restructuring 
in the late-1980s led to the formation of powerful new financial centres and 
business models whose success would hinge on high-volumes of liquidity and low 
interest rates in the inter-bank markets. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
(Re)building mortgages: The geographies of credit production by UK lenders 
 
 
The [financial] system is aptly described as a well kept- and orderly 
]RR'LIIHUHQWVSHFLHV«ZHUHQHDWO\housed and fed in separate cages 
VHJUHJDWHGE\IXQFWLRQDQGJHRJUDSKLFDOVFRSH«7KHGHUHJXODWLRQRI
WKHVDQGVGHVWUR\HGWKLVLG\OOLFDUUDQJHPHQW«WDQWDPRXQW
WR VPDVKLQJ WKH EDUULHU VHSDUDWLQJ WKH DQLPDOV LQ WKH ]RR«7KHUH
were far too many animals in each cage, and in the zoo as a whole, to 
survive in open competition. Most of the animals had enjoyed a 
sheltered existence like that of farm animals or even household pets. 
Now they were freed, each to become predator and prey in an 
unfamiliar jungle (Wojinilower 1992, quoted in Marshall et al, 1997: 1-
2). 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
$WWKHHQGRIWKH2IILFHRI1DWLRQDO6WDWLVWLFVHVWLPDWHGWKHYDOXHRIWKH8.¶V
total assets at £6,525 billion, with housing assets accounting for £3,915 billion. 28 
This proportion can be explained by the high prices of UK property. According to 
HBOS, the average price of a UK property in March 2008 was £191,556, far 
EH\RQGWKHDYHUDJHFRQVXPHU¶VDQQXDO LQFRPHZKLFKUHTXLUHVPRVWKRPHRZQHUs 
                                                 
28
 ONS (2007) www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=479 (Accessed 01/05/2008). 
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to fund their house purchases, either partly, or entirely with a mortgage29. As 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, mortgage lenders securitize their mortgage assets 
DQG VHOO WKH 50%6 QRWHV WKURXJK LQYHVWPHQW EDQNV ORFDWHG LQ µJOREDO¶ ILQDQFLDO
FHQWUHV,QDORQH¼ELOOLRQRIPortgage debt passed through London30. 
This chapter suggests that although the production of UK RMBS bonds occurred in 
London, the actual mortgage assets, and a substantial proportion of the UK¶VDVVHW
base, are constructed in a series of regional centres located around the UK. This 
leads the thesis to highlight a unique geography of regional finance centres that 
have emerged through a series of social, political and economic legacies. The 
chapter argues that it is important to acknowledge that the important functions of 
WKHVH µRUGLQDU\¶ FLWLHV that KDYH EHHQ SUHYLRXVO\ REVFXUHG DQG KLGGHQ E\ µJOREDO
city-FHQWULF¶QDUUDWLYHV 
 
This chapter has three key aims. First, the chapter will provide an overview of the 
GHYHORSPHQWDQGWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIWKH8.¶VPRUWJDJe market, which is important 
as it explains how mortgage assets are produced, prior to their securitisation. 
Second, this chapter will map the contemporary geography of UK mortgage 
production. Third, the chapter will attempt to emphasise the financial power 
H[HUFLVHG E\ µSHULSKHUDO¶ 8. FLWLHV E\ LOOXVWUDWLQJ KRZ PRUWJDJH SURGXFWLRQ
culminates in the financial inclusion and exclusion of consumers. The remainder of 
the chapter is structured as follows. Section two will critique the world cities 
literature anGZLOODUJXHWKDWDOWKRXJK/RQGRQFDQEHVHHQDVDµJOREDO¶FLW\DQGWKH
8.¶V ILQDQFLDO KXE WKLV SULYLOHJHG VWDWXV LQDGYHUWHQWO\ REVFXUHV WKH UROH RI RWKHU
important city-regions. The third section will provide a historical account of the UK 
mortgage markHW¶V GHYHORSPHQW ZKLFK ZLOO DOVR GHPRQVWUDWH KRZ PRUWJDJH
production has historically been distributed throughout the UK due to the legacies 
                                                 
29
 HBOS (2008) www.hbosplc.com/media/pressreleases/articles/halifax/2008-04-08-
Halifaxhou.asp?section=Halifax (Accessed 01/05/2008). 
30
 ESF (2008) www.europeansecuritisation.com/ESFDataRprt1107.pdf (Accessed 01/05/2008). 
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of small building societies that were locally embedded within regional markets. The 
fourth section will review the VSDWLDO UHVWUXFWXULQJRI WKH8.¶VPRUWJDJHPDUNHW LQ
response to deregulation that occurred in the 1980s, that led to the production of a 
new geography of mortgage decision-making and which gave rise to the production 
of large volumes of mortgage assets that could be securitised. The fifth section will 
conclude the chapter. This chapter, along with chapters 6 and 7 will make 
extensive use of the empirical material collected during corporate interviews. 
 
5HSODFLQJWKHµJOREDO¶FLW\)LQDQFLDOSRZHUDnd asset production in the 
periphery? 
 
This chapter will draw upon the geographies of money literature discussed in 
Chapter 3 and will engage more specifically with three strands of literature - the 
global and world city narratives, a postcolonial developmentalist critique and 
regional financial centres ± to assist the research in developing a geography of 
mortgage production, and also to contextualise these findings within the wider 
debates of economic geography. In doing so, the chapter will critique the 
FRQWHPSRUDU\JOREDODQGZRUOGFLWLHVOLWHUDWXUH¶VXVHRIKLHUDUFKLFDOPRGHOV7KHVH
models are frequently used to explain geographies of financial activity, but they 
VLPXOWDQHRXVO\REVFXUH WKHUROH WKDW µSHULSKHUDO¶FLW\-regions perform in mortgage 
production. It is important to draw attention to the production of mortgages in these 
µSHULSKHUDO¶FLWLHVDVthe stability of UK RMBS bonds, based on mortgages, can be 
attributed to the decision-making enacted in centralised processing centres where 
underwriters attempt to avoid lending to consumers who are seen to bear 
unacceptable levels of credit risk. Although these sites may appear to be mundane 
spaces of financial production, the importance of these sites was demonstrated in 
the US subprime crisis,  where analysts and underwriters failed to effectively 
distinguish between high and low-risk borrowers (Immergluck 2008). Their failure 
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to adequately distinguish between such borrowers resulted in the production of 
high-risk mortgages which contributed to the credit crunch, as detailed in Chapter 
1, as the collateral base of many RMBS bonds were based on these mortgage 
assets. 
  
The first literature, that focuses on global and world cities, investigates what are 
perceived to be the most powerful financial cities, cities that according to Sassen 
(1991), mediate the flows of globalisation. This in itself is problematic, as it is 
GLIILFXOWWRGHILQHZKDWFKDUDFWHULVWLFVPDNHDFLW\DµZRUOGFLW\¶ (Beaverstock et al. 
1999), although such cities often demonstrate dense inter-city relations that are 
associated with globalisation. The early proponents of world city research 
considered locations that were home to a disproportionate number of multi-national 
corporation headquarters as being a world cities (Beaverstock et al. 1999) as they 
performed key roles in governing the global economy. This inevitably led to the 
ranking and compilation of city hierarchies that aimed to identify the most important 
cities involved in globalisation.  Knox (1995) and (Friedmann 1995) observed how 
these hierarchies were frequently centred around economic power. According to 
Beaverstock et al.(2000) most studies of urban hierarchies are based on John 
)ULHGPDQQ¶V (1986) research that ranked cities based on their concentration of 
finance, multinational corporation headquarters, business services, and 
transportation links. More recent research on global cities has used data to 
produce new, fluid hierarchies that assess the current positions of world cities in 
this global hierarchy, leading Beaverstock, et al, (1999) to identify ten cities that 
provide the prime global banking services that coordinate the world economy31.  
 
                                                 
31
 Prime global banking service centres are defined as being a city with eight or more significant bank 
SUHVHQFHV7KHEDQNµSUHVHQFHV¶DUHEUDQFKHVEHORQJLQJWRWHQRIWKHWRSEDQNVGHILQHGE\DVVHWV
(Beaverstock, et al. 1999).  
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Once these hierarchical models had identified key world cities, more specific 
research was undertaken to understand their formation and operation. Sassen 
(1991) contends  that New York, London and Tokyo were the three most important 
global cities in the global economy as they were highly concentrated sites that act 
as command points for the global economy. As globalisation came to be 
conceptualised as a collective of flows and networks (Castells 2000), social 
scientists observed how the geographically dispersed global economy was locally 
controlled  through an elite set of powerful cities (Robinson 2006) and that world 
cities formed the hubs of dense networks of flows (Taylor 2004). Sassen (1991) 
argues that this control was orchestrated through advanced producer services, 
legal and financial organisations and financial innovations that were located within 
world citieV WKDW UHO\ RQ HDFK RWKHU¶V NQRZOHGJH DQG H[SHUWLVH WR FRRUGLQDWH WKH
economy.  
 
Economic geography has continued to build on the hierarchical bones of world city 
research, emphasising the dominance of the City, and how its seemingly perpetual 
innovations KDYH PDQDJHG WR PDLQWDLQ /RQGRQ¶V SRVLWLRQ DW WKH WRS RI WKHVH
hierarchies. For example, Faulconbridge (2004) focuses on the role of knowledge, 
capital and people LQ PDLQWDLQLQJ /RQGRQ¶V UDQNLQJ LQ D relational world city 
network. Clark (2002) UHFRJQLVHV /RQGRQ¶V HFRQRPLHV RI scale and regulatory 
OHJDFLHV DV EHLQJ NH\ UDWLRQDOHV IRU /RQGRQ¶V SHUVLVWHQFH LQ EHLQJ WKH 8.¶V NH\
financial centre. Perhaps the most powerful critique of this literature is its tendency 
to embedd narratives of finance solely within world cities, which dismisses and 
obscures the role of other financial centres. This argument is central to the second 
VWUDQGRIOLWHUDWXUH¶VFULWLTXHRIZRUOGFLWLHVWKDWRULJLQDWHVIURPWKHZRUNRI-HQQLIHU
Robinson. 
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Robinson (2002) draws on postcolonial theory to critique the absence of smaller 
cities from world-FLW\ KLHUDUFKLHV 7KURXJK D µGHYHORSPHQWDOLVW¶ OHQV 5RELQVRn 
(2006) strongly argues that urban theory has become transfixed with the apparent 
success of global cities that are perceived to be dynamic and innovative and 
bemoans this preoccupation with global cities which eclipses the majority of third 
world and smaller western cities that are embedded in peripheral regions owing to 
WKHLU SHUFHLYHG ODFN RI µFLW\-QHVV¶ (Robinson 2006). Taylor (1997) observes how 
these hierarchies are central to world city analysis, but also notes how they have 
simultaneously become the sub-GLVFLSOLQH¶V$FKLOOHVKHHO7KHNH\ZHDNQHVV WKDt 
undermines the validity of these city taxonomies is the quality of data that is used 
to produce them (Robinson 2006).  Short et al, (1996) UHIHU WR WKLV LVVXHDV µWKH
GLUW\ OLWWOH VHFUHW RI ZRUOG FLWLHV UHVHDUFK¶ ZKHUH UHVHDUFKHUV VWUXJJOH WR REWDLQ
comparable data sets for cities that adequately and accurately quantify their global 
flows. The data that is available to social scientists is often state-centric and is 
dominated by city attributes - not relational data ± which makes it difficult to 
authoritatively define the linkages that exist between world cities (Taylor 1997). As 
this chapter will argue later, if data on which the relational power of world cities is 
calculated is flawed, then some cities will be fallaciously omitted, while other cities 
DUHFDWHJRULVHGDVEHLQJµHFRQRPLFDOO\LUUHOHYDQW¶(Knox 1995:41), when in reality 
their roles in the global economy are more substantial. This chapter will 
demonsWUDWH KRZ PDQ\ µSHULSKHUDO¶ 8. FLW\-regions play a significant role in UK 
finance, and the international finance system, as the mortgages which they 
produce finance the housing market which accounted for more that half of the 
YDOXHRI8.¶VDVVHWVLQ 
 
Amin and Graham (1997) contribute to the third strand of literature, relevant to the 
argument being pursued here, by insisting that urban theory has only highlighted a 
small selection of paradigmatic cities and that although large cities act as key 
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command and control centres - incorporating financial markets - many have 
become subjects of spatial decentralisation as advances have been made in 
telecommunications. Robinson (2006) and Amin and Graham (1997) suggest a 
turn to the investigation of what they call µRUGLQDU\ FLWLHV¶ WKDW H[LVW DV XQLTXH
assemblages HQWZLQHG LQ ZLGHU SURFHVVHV ZKHUH HDFK FLW\ LV µGLVWLQFWLYH LQ D
FDWHJRU\ RI RQH¶ (Robinson 2006:109). With regard to regional financial centres, 
Leyshon et al. (1989) have highlighted the emergence of regional financial centres 
as financial service providers began to remove their back-office processing 
functions from London to the South-East during the 1970s, while Neil Marshall and 
Ranald Richardson (1997; 1999; 2000) have led research that has highlighted the 
emergent role of regional cities that specialise in processing financial data. Indeed, 
Bailey and French (2005) have suggested that regional financial centres perform 
many important supportive roles to financial service firms, providing administrative 
UROH DQG PDUNHWLQJ EXW ZLWK WKH H[FHSWLRQ RI )UHQFK¶V (2002) research on life 
assurance underwriting in Bristol ± which draws attention to the expert epistemic 
communities that perform actuarial analysis - there is little geographical research 
that has targeted powerful financial elites in regional centres. It is argued that while 
geographers have identified the role of regional centres, most studies have been 
preoccupied with mundane processing tasks. Amin and Graham (1997) have 
argued that although face-to-face contact is important in urban environments, the 
localised development of tacit knowledge are not confined to large cities and can 
exist in other locations. This thesis suggests that the mortgage processing centres, 
discussed in this chapter, can be viewed as powerful centres as they produce a 
VXEVWDQWLDOYROXPHRIWKH8.¶VILQDQFLDODVVHWVFUHDWHGXQGHUWKHZDWFKIXOH\HRI
epistemic elites, discussed in the next chapter.  
 
Robinson (2006) and Amin and Graham (1997), acknowledge that cities emerge 
from overlapping networks, but assert that the identification of economic, social 
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and political circulations need to become more diverse, and reflexive with particular 
reference to tacit knowledge exchange and proximity. This thesis is not disputing 
/RQGRQ¶VSRVLWLRQDVRQHRIWKHZRUOG¶VJOREDOFLWLHVHVSHFLDOO\DVLWLVWKHORFDWLRQ
where mortgage assets are structured into bonds by investment banks. However, 
this thesis suggests that the role of the largely invisible geography of mortgage 
SURGXFWLRQLQWKH8.¶VSHULSKHUDOFLWLHVQHHGWREH understood and taken seriously. 
 
5.3. Sowing the seeds for growth: A history of mortgage finance  
 
The production of UK mortgages is geographically dispersed and to understand 
this distribution we need to scrutinise the histories and legacies of building 
societies which were the first organisations to offer mortgages to UK consumers. 
Historically, access to bank credit was a privilege reserved for the wealthy, and  
provided by commercial and clearing banks (Davies 2002). Formal, organised 
networks of working class saving and borrowing did not emerge until the 17 th 
FHQWXU\7KHVH ILQDQFLDOSURYLVLRQVZHUHPHGLDWHG WKURXJK µIULHQGO\VRFLHWLHV¶ WKDW
initially provided protection for urban immigrants from unemployment and illness. 
These societies - QRWGLVVLPLODUWRWRGD\¶VFUHGLWXQLRQV- enabled their members to 
borrow money, providing they made regular contributions to their friendly society in 
the form of savings. The societies became so important that in 1793 they gained 
legal recognition under the Friendly Societies Act, which developed to protect the 
VRFLHWLHV¶Vavings and members (Davies 2002). It was not until 1775 that the first 
building society was founded by Richard Ketly, the Landlord of the Golden Cross 
Inn in Birmingham (Cleary 1965; Davies 2002). Building societies were different to 
banks in that they looked to the Victorian virtues of thrift and mutual self-help to 
promote and facilitate home ownership, whereas banks sought to profit from 
lending (Boddy 1980). The mutual society idea proved popular and societies soon 
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began to appear beyond Birmingham, in the wider Midlands region and the North 
of England.  
 
The geography of the building societies movement expanded, but the geographical 
operation of the individual societies remained local. The early societies did not 
operate through branch networks, or individual offices. Meetings were held in 
public houses which articulated a key role in coordinating the trust that maintained 
these societies. Public houses were central to the operation of building societies as 
they offered a neutral location where members would meet and pay monthly 
subscriptions, and many early societies were often coordinated by landlords 
(Boddy 1980). The members were required to pay a monthly subscription to 
provide funds to build homes, and members who did not pay were punished with 
fines. This procedure constituted an early form of surveillance as the reliability of 
members was monitored and recorded at the monthly meetings of the societies. 
The members usually consisted of skilled working class professionals, such as 
carpenters, weavers and stone masons who were relatively highly paid compared 
to the rest of the working class population (Boddy 1980), so although the schemes 
provided housing for the working classes they were still exclusive organisations 
(Davies 2002). The Methodist Church began to run friendly societies in their 
churches, allowing church members to participate in mortgage schemes without 
having to meet in a public house (Davies 2002). The early societies would disband 
once all the members had been provided with a house, although some of the 
societies, often maintained by landlords, began to operate on a permanent basis to 
provide new members with the ability to purchase homes. 
 
Once the building societies became permanent, they began to accept money from 
middle class savers who did not intend to purchase a house, but who benefitted 
from the interest paid on their savings. Consequently, building societies began to 
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grow rapidly as an influx of middle class capital entered the societies. This caused 
a dramatic change in the structure of the relatively informal societies as middle 
class savers did not want to be involved with management. As the volumes of 
money deposited with the societies grew, it became clear that skilled management 
was required to run these permanent societies which resulted in the development 
of building societies with their own premises, outside of public houses (Boddy 
1980). This began to formalise the structure of building societies who became 
subject to stricter government control, through the Building Societies Act (1874) 
which gave building societies a corporate status which limited the liabilities of their 
members (Boddy 1980). During the 1890s, many small regional lenders began to 
absorb smaller societies which culminated in the development of national and 
regional societies that began to rollout new  branch networks to attract additional 
investment (Boddy 1980). The branch staff had four key roles (Leyshon and Thrift 
1999). First, the staff would collect information on the local market conditions. 
Second, the staff would collect depositVZLWKZKLFKWRIXQGWKHVRFLHW\¶VPRUWJDJHV
Third, the branch would be a site of decision-making, where a saver who had 
applied for a mortgage would be interviewed by the branch manager. Finally, the 
branch acted as an administration unit to service the mortgage accounts. The 
building society branch became a relatively autonomous actor, with the power to 
issue mortgages, exercised exclusively by the branch manager.  
 
Figure 5.1 provides a diagrammatic representation of the relationship between the 
building society branches. This decentralised topology situated the power to 
produce mortgages within the individual branches, which were overseen by the 
KHDGRIILFHZKLFKZRXOGFLUFXODWHWKHVRFLHW\¶VVDYLQJVEHWZHHQEUDQFKHV 
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Figure 5.1: 7KHµGHFHQWUDOLVHG¶PRUWJDJHSURGXFWLRQVWUXFWXUH 
 
Branch 1
Branch 2
Branch 3
Branch n
Headquarters
 
 
Source: Author 
 
Mortgage applications were processed by the manager who used qualitative 
guidelines written in manuals and circulars that were supplied by the building 
society headquarters. These were not prescriptive rules, but guidelines, and the 
manager had discretion at all times as to who would be allowed a mortgage (Boddy 
1980). Borrowers were frequently required to save with a building society to 
provide the society with a track record of their financial performance which was 
another early form of surveillance and data collection. Successful applicants would 
often frequently have to wait until the society had enough capital to fund the 
consumer with a mortgage, an early form of credit rationing. Borrowers who did not 
have a savings record with the building society could apply if they were introduced 
by an agent, such as an accountant of independent adviser who would know about 
WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V ILQDQFLDO KLVWRU\ (Boddy 1980), although savers had priority and 
these applications were only successful if the society had a surplus of funds.  
 
The information used by the branch manager to make lending decisions included 
information on the house to be purchased, applicant income, and career history 
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(supplied by an employer), and family status32. Information on borrowers was 
derived through informal contacts, where branch managers would directly contact 
HPSOR\HUVZKRZRXOGFRQILUPDQDSSOLFDQW¶VFXUUHQWMREVWDWXVDQGsocioeconomic 
prospects. The societies would also write to landlords and other building societies 
who would have a record of financial transactions that could be used to judge 
whether the applicant was credit worthy or otherwise (Boddy 1980).  
 
By 1919 only 20 per cent of British households owned their own homes, but by 
1979 this had increased to 54 per cent. This increase  can be attributed to the 
easing of credit rationing as building societies, and the volume of their deposits, 
grew (Boddy 1980). By 2003 the ONS reported householder ownership as having 
increased to 70 percent33. The strong demand for home ownership in the interwar 
years was promoted by conservative governments who sought to reduce local 
authority housing subsides (Boddy 1980). Although successive labour 
governments overturned this policy in an attempt to satisfy housing demand 
through public housing, US foreign policy played a role in influencing the UK 
government into meeting its housing needs through private housing. Following the 
end of the Second World War the US provided tied-aid to European countries 
through the Marshall Plan, where the UK received money for reconstruction, 
providing it conformed to US demands. One demand was to reduce public service 
provisions, including housing, as public housing was perceived as a political threat 
in line with communist ideals. As such, the US believed that nation-states who 
moved increasingly towards market orientated solutions would inhibit the spread of 
communism (Boddy 1980) and so it rewarded countries that complied which 
increased the demand for private UK housing and public housing stock was 
                                                 
32
 7KLVZRXOGLQYROYHKLVWRULFDOLQIRUPDWLRQRQDQDSSOLFDQW¶VSUHYLRXVMREVEXWDOVRLQIRUPDWLRQRQLI
WKHDSSOLFDQW¶VSRWHQWLDOIXWXUHLQFOXGLQJSURPRWLRQVDQGSRWHQWLDOSD\ULVHVDQGLIWKHFRQVXPHUZDVD
SHUFHLYHGWREHDµUHVSRQVLEOH¶LQGLYLGXDO 
33
 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nugget.asp?ID=1105&Pos=6&ColRank=2&Rank=224 (Accessed: 
25/04/08) 
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reduced. In this sense, private housing provision became a political tool and by the 
1970s the Conservative government used private property ownership as a 
technique to legitimise privatisation (Boddy 1980). The geographical distribution of 
mortgages sales through building societies began to shift as the societies began to 
sell mortgages through alternative distribution channels including accountants, 
solicitors, estate agents and insurance brokers (Boddy 1980). These distribution 
channels later become responsible for greater volumes of sales compared to the 
branch networks during the 1990s, when branch networks were pruned and 
mortgage production became centralised. 
 
5.4. Centralisation: Restructuring the UK mortgage Market 
 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the organisation of the UK mortgage 
market underwent a dramatic transformation. Three events would initiate the 
disintegration of decentralised mortgage production and the funding structure that 
building societies had traditionally employed (Leyshon and Thrift 1999). The first 
event was the liberalisation of banking in the UK through the introduction of The 
Financial Services Act (1986) and The Building Societies Act (1986), which 
promoted greater competition in the retail banking sector and caused lenders to 
innovate dramatically, in response to the intensified competition (Leyshon and 
Thrift 1997; 1999). This led to a second event which was the transfer of credit 
VFRULQJ WHFKQRORJLHV DQG D EXVLQHVV PRGHO NQRZQ DV WKH µFHQWUDOLVHG Oender 
PRGHO¶ IURP WKH 86 WR WKH 8. 7KHVH LQQRYDWLRQV ZRXOG ODWHU EH DGRSWHG
throughout the UK, when a third event, the developing countries debt crisis, forced 
UK lenders into restructuring in an attempt to reduce their operational costs. 
 
The subsequent deregulation of the banking and building society sectors allowed 
two new entrants into the mortgage market. First, UK clearing banks began to offer 
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mortgages under The Financial Services Act (1986), while a limited number of 
larger building societies elected to become banks as they rescinded their mutual 
VWDWXV¶ (Martin and Turner 2000). Many societies had been frustrated about not 
being able to access the wholesale money markets to fund the expansion of their 
mortgage portfolios, but demutualisation enabled them to overcome this barrier 
(Martin and Turner 2000). Abbey National became the first building society to 
demutualise in 1989 as it attempted to increase its market share and offer new 
services to customers as the mortgage market became more crowded (Martin and 
Turner 2000) 7KH 8.¶V ILQDQFLDO OLEHUDOLVDWLRQ DOVR ZLWQHVVHG WKH HPHUJHQFH RI
mortgage lenders that utilised the centralised lender model, originally pioneered in 
the US. Instead of developing extensive branch networks that domestic lenders 
had completed over hundreds of years, networks that were also expensive to 
maintain, they sold their mortgage products over the telephone, or through brokers 
and later the internet (Willis et al. 2001). As these lenders could not collect 
consumer deposits to fund their mortgage issuance, they were financed exclusively 
through the capital markets.  
 
This heralded a significant shift in the UK mortgage sector as it had previously 
been funded through local branch networks, and for the first time it became 
integrated with the international capital markets. Building societies, according to 
Harvey (1982), are detached from the circuits of capital accumulation, as the 
money saved by workers was redistributed to provide housing for workers, not 
profit accumulation (Harvey 1982). In this regard, building societies can be viewed 
as redistributive systems that were isolated from national and international circuits 
RI FDSLWDO 7KLV LV GHEDWHDEOH DV FRQWHPSRUDU\ VRFLHW\ PHPEHUV µSURILW¶ IURP
interest on their savings, although Harvey is correct in that their money did not 
travel outside these localised circuits of circulation. Subsequently, it can be argued 
that the UK mortgage market previously operated as a closed circuit of capital. As 
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a result, mortgage availability was dependent on building societies having sufficient 
GHSRVLWV ZKLFK LQ WXUQ ZHUH UHJXODWHG E\ SHRSOH¶VHDUQLQJVVDYLQJV DQG WKH 8.
economy as a whole.  
 
This changed under the new regulation as centralised lenders and retail banks 
began to sell mortgage debt which intHJUDWHG WKH8.¶VPRUWJDJHPDUNHW LQWR WKH
wider capital markets. The centralised lender model had an additional impact on 
the mortgage market, as mortgage applications began to be reviewed in 
specialised mortgage processing centres, where mortgage decision-making and 
management were performed. Marron (2007) discusses the operations of mail-
order processing centres where the companies offer credit to consumers, and 
process their accounts without ever meeting the clients, a system of which the 
centralised lender model is a descendent. Figure 5.2 illustrates the topology of the 
centralised lender structure which is different to the building society organisation 
shown in Figure 5.1. Instead of using bank branches to collect consumer deposits 
to fund mortgages, this would be achieved by securing funds via the capital 
markets at the treasury function and headquarters of the lender. 
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Figure 5.2: 7KHµFHQWUDOLVHG¶PRUWJDJHSURGXFWLRQVWUXFWXUH 
 
Broker InternetCall centreBranch
Processing centre
Headquarters and 
Treasury
Capital markets
 
 
Source: Author 
 
The centralised lender sells mortgages through mortgage brokers, which 
include independent financial advisers and estate agents, as well as websites 
and call centres (Marshall et al. 1997) WKDW DOVR FROOHFW WKH FRQVXPHU¶V
application information, which is then reviewed at the processing centre. This is 
usually located at the headquarters of the lender or at a separate site. 
Centralised lenders were able to offer competitive pricing on their products as 
they minimised their operational costs by not maintaining a branch network, 
while maintaining their ability to offer their products across a wide geographical 
area through intermediaries, as outlined in the quote below: 
 
  
 
 124 
³[Intermediaries] can be independent financial advisors, or 
mortgage brokers, the software is available so mortgage brokers 
can access the systems of a panel of lenders and rather than a 
borrower going into a bank and filling out a form half a dozen times 
they can go to a broker who will take down the necessary 
GHWDLOV«WDNH WKRVH GHWDLOV«DQG NQRZLQJ WKH SURGXFWV LQ WKH
PDUNHWVZKDWWKHEHVWSURGXFWVDUHIRU\RX«PRVWRIWKHPDUNHWLV
broker driven, especially sub-prime and buy-to-OHW«WKH\ DUH
becoming importDQW WR WKH PDUNHW IRU OHQGHUV ZKR GRQ¶W KDYH D
EUDQFK QHWZRUN EHFDXVH WKH\ DUHQ¶W LQWHUHVWHG LQ UDLVLQJ UHWDLO
GHSRVLWV´ (Interview 12: Industry trading body spokesperson, 
February 2007). 
 
The successful operation of these early centralised lenders came to rely on 
credit scoring, the development and adaptation of which will be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter. When a potential consumer applies for a 
mortgage their application details and characteristics are processed at a 
specialist centre. The characteristics of the consumer, once digitised, are 
allotted specific points. An individual who is older and has a higher paying job 
will generally receive a higher point allocation for those characteristics. This 
produces a score for the potential consumer based on their characteristics. 
7KHUH LV D WKUHVKROG ZKHUHE\ LI DQ DSSOLFDQW¶V VFRUH LV KLJK HQRXJK WKH
application is automatically accepted, and if it is too low, the application is 
rejected, or referred to a human operator to investigate further. The points and 
thresholds are determined by each individual lender using a series of statistical 
procedures based on the performance and behaviour of previous consumers.  
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The decision-making process for these lenders was no-longer made by branch 
managers, as it became increasingly automated through the use of computers, 
supported by underwriting staff that analyse ambiguities that arise in the 
µVWDQGDUGLVHG¶ VHWV RI FRQVXPHU GDWD 7KLV DOORZHG WKH FHQWUDOLVHG OHQGHUV WR
make mortgage lending decisions in regional processing centres and eliminated 
the need for lenders to use branches. As more consumer data became 
available, through channels such as credit referencing agencies, as well as the 
OHQGHU¶V RZQ KLVWRULFDO GDWD WKH\ ZHUH DEOH WR FRPSLOH H[WHQVLYH UHlational 
databases which enabled the process of credit scoring to become more 
accurate (Alexander and Pollard 2000). This data is also used to gain an 
understanding of consumer spending patterns through the segmentation of 
customers into categories based on risk (Alexander and Pollard 2000). One key 
outcome from the quantification of consumers was the ability segment their 
consumer populations into those who were profitable and unprofitable (Argent 
2002).  
 
Access to this data changed the landscape and spatial structure of mortgage 
processing as most mortgage lenders were later forced by competitive 
pressures into adopting credit scoring and elements of the centralised lender 
model. In the 1980s the operating expenses of British banks accounted for 65 
per cent of gross income (OECD 1992) and increased competition in the 1980s 
and the recession in the early 1990s had forced the hand of banks to reduce 
their operating costs (Leyshon and Thrift 1993; 1997). It was perceived by the 
banks that the centralised processing model could solve this problem in two 
ways. First, by outsourcing the bank branch functions to brokers, mortgage 
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lenders could offset some of the operating costs of sustaining a branch network 
- by closing their unprofitable branches - while retaining their geographical 
coverage through mortgage intermediaries. Second, the standardisation of data 
and its processing through credit scoring proved more reliable than a branch 
manager making lending decisions, for as lenders began to control consumer 
credit risk centrally, they were able to predict defaults more consistently. Argent 
(2002) discusses how significant bad debts can be traced to poor decision-
making in branch networks during the 1990s, which resulted in the removal or 
UHGXFWLRQRI WKHEUDQFKPDQDJHU¶VGLVFUHWLRQDU\ OLPLWV(YHQWXDOO\ UHWDLOEDQNV
and building societies began to centralise their application processes which 
became more significant as financial products were offered through 
disintermediated mortgage channels (Marshall et al. 2000). The industrialisation 
of mortgage processing also enabled lenders to achieve economies of scale, 
enhanced by the adoption of credit scoring. This made the centralised 
processing model attractive for the retail banks, but it was also adopted by 
building societies as they could also reduce their operational costs which would 
benefit their members with higher rates of interest, or lower mortgage rates 
(Marshall et al. 1997). The building societies that established buy-to-let 
mortgage subsidiaries, such as The Derbyshire, also made extensive use of the 
centralised lender model.  
 
7KHPDQDJHPHQWRIFUHGLW ULVNEHFDPHPRUH WLJKWO\FRQWUROOHGE\ WKH OHQGHUV¶
credit committees once application processing was centralised which also aided 
them in deciding which products and markets that they wanted to participate in 
and how much credit risk they were willing to accept. Previously, lenders 
undertook a bespoke risk assessment of each consumer in different branches, 
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but this was now completed by a single set of codes in one location which gave 
OHQGHUV PRUH FRQWURO RYHU FUHGLW ULVN FRPSDUHG WR EUDQFK PDQDJHUV¶
assessments of applicants34. Using data from previous applicants and credit 
referencing agencies, lenders began to segment their customers, as illustrated 
by the following quote: 
 
³>:H@ then work out who we want to do business with, so this 
ZRXOGEH«WKHDFFRXQWUHFUXLWPHQWELW«GRZHZDQQDGREXVLQHVV
with high-net worth individuals, high indebtedness, high income, 
high loss rates [?]«ZH¶YH JRW WRROV IRU WKDW OLNH VFRUHFDUGV DQG
SROLF\ UXOHV«LI \RX VHQG DQ DSSOLFDWLRQ RXW«\RX ZDQW WR NQRZ
ZKDW VRUW RI FXVWRPHUV DUH JRLQJ WR UHSO\ VR WKHUH¶V ZRUN WR EH
GRQHILUVW«WKHUH¶V no point in sending a load of applications out to 
QHDU SULPH FXVWRPHUV ZKR \RX GRQ¶W ZDQW WR GR EXVLQHVV
ZLWK«\RX¶UH PDQDJLQJ WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ SURFHVV´ ,QWHUYLHZ 
Director, UK retail bank, February 2007). 
 
Once the level of credit risk has been determined, the risk teams in the 
mortgage processing centres begin to analyze their data and begin to produce 
credit scoring models, or arrange to have them built by a credit referencing or 
analytics agency. From the interviews it became clear that some processing 
centres use underwriters to assess the applications of riskier subprime 
borrowers whose circumstances cannot be effectively accommodated by credit 
scoring due to the non-standard nature of the information supplied or if the 
                                                 
34
 Decision-making was not consistent amongst branch managers due to their flexible interpretation 
of underwriting criteria.  
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DSSOLFDWLRQ LV µUHIHUUHG¶35. This organisational shift represented the transfer of 
financial power from branches to processing centres as mortgage lenders 
began to adopt elements of the centralised lender model. The generation of this 
financial power in these centres will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter, but it is essentially derived from the outcomes of credit scoring which 
seek to either include, or exclude, consumers from mortgage finance. While the 
senior management of mortgage lenders, usually located in headquarters in 
various city-regions and in London, wield the power that decides which type of 
customers they want to offer products to, these decisions and consumer 
characteristics are encoded into credit scoring software. This leads the thesis to 
argue that this day-to-day power - which includes and excludes consumers - is 
embedded within the frozen organisational discourse (Bowker and Star 1999) of 
credit-scoring software, which is exercised in centralised processing centres. 
 
The centralised processing centre is also responsible for transferring the money 
to the applicant to purchase the house, as well as ensuring legal documentation 
is in order and that the property survey has been approved. These processing 
centres also ensure the timely collection of the repayments from consumers and 
the servicing of the accounts, practices that were previously completed at the 
branch level36. The centralised processing centre will also coordinate 
repossessions of property from defaulted accounts. However, centralised 
                                                 
35
 µ5HIHUUHG¶DSSOLFDWLRQVDUHDSSOLFDWLRQVWKDWKDYHEHHQFUHGLWVFRUHGEXWKDYHIDOOHQ
short of the required score by a low margin. As a result, a human underwriter will check 
WKHDSSOLFDQW¶VGHWDLOVWRVHHLIDQ\PLVWDNHVKDYHEHHQPDGHLQDQDWWHPSWWRVHHLIWKH
application can be passed. 
36
  If a payment has not been made, computer software alerts an analyst who will contact 
the consumer to determine why the payment has not been made. The timely repayments 
DUHUHFRUGHGDQGDUHXVHGWRHQKDQFHWKHLQIRUPDWLRQDYDLODEOHRQWKHFRQVXPHU¶VFUHGLW
worthiness. If the mortgage lender has securitised an account, they will continue to 
service and manage the account on behalf of the RMBS note holders. 
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processing centres have not completely replaced the role of branches. 
Branches are still important for banks and building societies as they still use 
deposits to fund mortgages, although this too has changed as through the 
advent of electronic settlement systems and online savings accounts (Leyshon 
and Pollard 2000; Bergendahl and Lindblom 2007). More specifically, the 
centralised lender model undermined the role of the branch in three distinct 
ways (Leyshon and Pollard 2000): First, the branch was a site that collected 
information on its customers and local markets. Second, the branch operated as 
a space where consumers could be sold financial products. Third, the branch 
was a place to settle the transactions. The first role has been undermined as 
customer information is now collected through automated processing systems, 
databases and credit scoring, while products are sold over the telephone and 
internet and payments are processed in centralised cheque payment centres or 
are settled electronically in real time (Bergendahl and Lindblom 2007). 
 
The second role has been undermined by a process of disintermediation that 
has been on-going since the 1970s, whereby independent mortgage brokers 
and intermediaries have taken over the role of advising consumers on the 
different types of mortgage products from lenders. Instead, brokers introduce 
consumers to the mortgage products available from a wide range of different 
mortgage lenders and collect the personal information of consumers on behalf 
of the mortgage lenders. Consumers consider brokers to provide a useful 
service to consumers because they are able to access a wider range of 
products than a single bank, or building society branch. Brokers are also 
convenient for consumers as they are able to rapidly check all the products 
available to the consumer in one office as opposed to the consumer having to 
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visit separate mortgage lenders and complete application forms for each 
supplier, as illustrated below: 
 
³«LQWHUPHGLDULHV PDNH XS EHWZHHQ -70% of the mortgage 
PDUNHW«ZHKDYHGHYHORSHGVLJQLILFDQWQHWZRUNVZLWKVRPHRIWKH
ODUJHU HVWDWH DJHQWV«WKH FRQVXPHU OLNHV EURNHUV WKH\ IHHO OLNH
WKH\ JHW D EHWWHU GHDO JRLQJ WKURXJK D EURNHU´ (Interview 28: 
Director of Retail, large UK Building society, February 2007). 
 
The topology of mortgage production and decision-making has changed since 
the centralised processing model was adopted by large mortgage lenders. 
Application processing became increasingly centralised and automated in 
µSHULSKHUDO¶ FLWLHV DQG WRZQV WKDW GHFLGH ZKLFK FRQVXPHUV DUH HOLJLEOH IRU
mortgages. According to Bailey and French (2005), these regional centres have 
experienced a rapid growth in financial jobs as the financial sector began to 
decentralise from London.  This geography is shown in Figure 5.3 with 
additional details in Table 5.1: 
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Figure 5.3: UK mortgage underwriting centres 
Source: Author and CML 
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Table 5.1: Lender locations and size 
 
Lender 
Mortgage   
Origination 
2006 
£ (£Billion) Type Headquarters 
Processing 
locations 
HBOS 73.2 Bank Edinburgh Leeds 
Abbey  32.6 Bank London Milton Keynes 
Northern Rock 29 Bank Newcastle Newcastle 
Nationwide   21.1 Building society Swindon Northampton 
The Royal Bank of 
Scotland  20 Bank Edinburgh Greenock 
Barclays 18.4 Bank London Leeds 
Alliance & Leicester 12.6 Bank Narborough Leicester 
GMAC-RFC 12.1 
Centralised 
lender London Bracknell 
GE Money Home Lending  4.5 
Centralised 
lender London Newcastle 
Kensington Mortgage 4.1 
Centralised 
lender London Reading 
Lehman Brothers 4 
Centralised 
lender London 
High 
Wycombe 
Coventry  2.9 Building society Coventry Coventry 
Paragon/Mortgage Trust 3 
Centralised 
lender Solihull Solihull 
Leeds  1.7 Building society Leeds Leeds 
Norwich & Peterborough  0.8 Building society Peterborough Peterborough 
Derbyshire  0.7 Building society Duffield, Derbyshire Derby 
 
Source: Author and CML 
 
It is clear from Figure 5.3 that there is an absence of mortgage production 
activity in London. This can be explained by the histories of the three types of 
lenders operating in the UK, which will be discussed shortly. Figure 5.3 also 
provides little evidence of clustering for UK mortgage production as the sites are 
distributed around the UK, with the exception of Leeds and Newcastle. The 
Leeds city-region is home to two of the largest mortgage processing centres 
that are responsible for generating substantial amounts of mortgage assets, 
later sold into the debt capital markets as RMBS. Potentially there are additional 
city-regions that may show further evidence of financial agglomeration - as 
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centres of consumer credit production. For example, Northampton is home to 
1DWLRQZLGH¶VPRUWJDJHGHFLVLRQ-making operations, known as underwriting, as 
well as %DUFOD\FDUG¶VFUHGLWFDUGXQGHUZULWLQJ7KHPDSSLQJRIFLW\-regions that 
underwrite consumer credit in the UK more generally falls outside of the scope 
of this project, although the patterns illustrated in Table 5.1 raise two interesting 
points. First, mortgage underwriting is not clustered and exists outside of 
London. Second, the data suggests that there is a different set of rationales that 
determine the particular locations of mortgage production for the three different 
types of mortgage lender. 
 
The first point can be explained through Amin and *UDKDP¶V (1997) thesis 
which suggests that face-to-face contact,  tacit knowledge and epistemic 
communities are not confined to world cities, as implied by the world-city 
literature, and exist in other locations such as peripheral cities and processing 
centres as the processing of standardised information still needs to be 
interpreted and placed into circulation. It can be argued that credit scoring and 
underwriting involve the interpretation of standardised data, but specialist skills 
and training is still required to interpret the information. Furthermore, data 
ambiguities are still prevalent and require special attention from underwriters 
and analysts. The research that has been conducted on the centralisation of the 
retail financial industry has been limited to the development of call centres 
(Bailey and French 2005), with the exception of work by French (2002) on 
insurance underwriting. The relative lack of research has created a lacuna of 
knowledge on the development and practice of marketing, underwriting, credit 
scoring and account administration. Bailey and French (2005) argue that 
processing centres in general, not just mortgage production centres, undergo 
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clustering to take advantage of the skilled, experienced labour pools that can be 
found in city-regions.  
 
This brings us to the second point:  the three different types of mortgage lender 
have different rationales that underpin their locational choices for centralised 
processing centres. Earlier, it was discussed how building societies have strong 
historico-regional ties, contingent on where they were initially established. For 
example, the Leeds building society has never had a managerial or processing 
presence in London, because it has no need to. On the other hand, HBOS and 
Bradford & Bingley, both demutualised mortgage lenders with roots in 
Yorkshire, developed a presence in London because of their reliance on 
securitisation and the capital markets. As Marshall et al.  (2000) point out; the 
community links of smaller, regional building societies frequently mean that 
many of their employees are customers, which also makes them members. 
6XEVHTXHQWO\UHORFDWLQJDSURFHVVLQJFHQWUHRXWVLGHRIDVRFLHW\¶VORFDOUHJLRQ
and making staff redundant is not in the interHVW RI D VRFLHW\¶V PHPEHUV. In 
addition, being based outside of London allows them to maintain low 
operational costs. 
 
The processing centres for retail banks are more widely dispersed and spread 
further away from their bank headquarters. There are three reasons that 
underpin this distribution. First, unlike building societies, banks offer a more 
diverse range of products, such as private and corporate banking, and have 
extensive branch coverage, so as the following quote suggests, the banks are 
used to operating as geographically dispersed organisations: 
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³«ZH KDYH a network of support offices, area offices and 
processing offices, as well supporting the branches,´,QWHUYLHZ
Risk Manager, large UK Retail bank, February 2007). 
 
Second, banks such as Abbey and Barclays are based in London where 
operating expenses are very high, so these lenders conduct their standardised 
processing functions outside of London as it is not necessary for these tasks to 
be undertaken in the City. This led the financial sector, in general, to locate their 
backroom operations outside of London, a trend that began in the 1970s and 
1980s (French and Leyshon 2003). This trend spurred the emergence of a 
spatial division of labour, where the performance of lower paid, mundane tasks 
became clustered in low cost locations away from London (Marshall et al. 
2000). As information technology allowed the financial sector to remove its 
mundane practices from their head offices, they could be located at alternative 
sites which benefit from low labour costs as well as financial incentives, such as 
tax cuts, offered by local government (Richardson and Marshall 1999). The 
quote below suggests how low operational costs have a propensity to explain 
the locational choice of newer lenders, who do not have a series of historical 
legacies to consider: 
 
³«WKHUHLVDVWURQJSRRORIODERXU«IRUWKHNLQGRIEXVLQHVVZHGR
DQG LW¶V DOZD\V FKeap, I would never setup one of these 
businesses in London, why pay someone 40k a year, when you 
FDQSD\IRUWKHVDPHVNLOOVHWND\HDU´ (Interview 32: Director 
of Finance, UK centralised lender, September 2007). 
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Third, when the retail banking sector underwent a round of mergers and 
acquisitions in the 1990s (Including the high-profile mergers of The Royal Bank 
of Scotland with Natwest, and The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation Limited with the Midland Bank), financial organizations would also 
have acquired a series of processing centres and skilled members of staff 
situated in specific cities and towns. Some processing centres are used to fulfil 
new roles (Marshall et al. 1997), but if their functions were duplicated, 
processing centres were amalgamated and closed. However, some banks 
realised that the skills of their employees were important to the business and 
that some expert staff would not necessarily be prepared to move to new sites 
which had the potential to disrupt their ability to effectively process mortgage 
applications, while a reduction in the quality of skills within a new centre could 
jeopardise the quality of the risk management procedures, as suggested below:  
 
³«LW¶VKLVWRULFHUPZH¶YHJRW  [Lender x] erm, [Lender x] bought 
[Lender y], erm who were based in [location A] then [Lender x] and 
[Lender z] merged then that all became part of [Lender xz], so the 
reasons the loans operation is based in [location A] is because that 
is where [Bank y] is based, the reason why credit cards are in 
[location B] is because we bought [Lender w]«ZKR UDQ RXW RI
[location B]«LW¶V YHU\ FRVWO\ WR PRYH D EXVLQHVV LW¶V YHU\
ULVN\«SHRSOH ZKR ZRUN LQ WKH EXVLQHVV KDYH WR EH ZLOOLQJ WR XS
DQG PRYH VRPH ZLOO VRPH ZRQ¶W´ (Interview 20: Risk Manager, 
large UK retail bank, February 2007). 
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Most centralised lenders, such as, Kensington, GE Money and GMAC are 
headquartered in London, although their processing centres are located outside 
of London. When US mortgage lenders began to move into the UK in the 1980s 
and 1990s, they became established in, or close to London, where 
securitisation was being pioneered. )RUH[DPSOH7KH0RUWJDJH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶V
processing centre was based in Surrey, while its parent company, Salomon 
Brothers had a presence in the City. It was useful for these lenders to be 
located near investment banks and law firms when producing their mortgage 
products and their early securitisation programmes. Early processing centres 
were located in the south-east, outside of London, but where the proximity 
allowed bankers to visit analysts and underwriters at the new processing 
centres. Many early centralised lenders were part of US investment banks who 
already had office space in London. With the exception of GE Money, mortgage 
processing takes place outside of London; IRU H[DPSOH .HQVLQJWRQ¶V
processing centre is in Reading, as these mundane practices of processing can 
be conducted outside of London.  
 
The credit crunch may stimulate a further restructuring of mortgage production, 
out of which a new set of geographies could emerge. First, HBOS and Lloyds 
have merged, while Banco Santander, owner of Abbey, has purchased Alliance 
& Leicester and Bradford & %LQJOH\¶VEUDQFKQHWZRUNZKLFKFRXOG LQLWLDWH WKH
amalgamation and closure of centralised processing centres, imbuing the 
remaining centres with more financial power as they become responsible for 
originating larger volumes of finance to fund homeownership. Second, 
mortgage lenders have realised that borrowing money from the interbank 
markets and selling RMBS notes to raise capital can be unreliable, as the 
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volumes of available money and the price of capital can fluctuate substantially 
These factors may stimulate the roll-out of new branches to enhance the 
collection of deposits - although it is highly likely that these branches would be 
located in affluent areas (Leyshon et al. 2008).  
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
Since its inception, the UK mortgage market has undergone a series of 
dramatic transformations - both organisationally and geographically. This 
FKDSWHUKDVDUJXHGWKDWDVXEVWDQWLDOSURSRUWLRQRIWKH8.¶VDVVHWVKDYHEHHQ
ILQDQFHGWKURXJKDVHULHVRIµPXQGDQH¶SURFHVVLQJFHQWUHVVLWuated around the 
UK, outside of London. This chapter has questioned the myopia of the world 
cities literature in failing to acknowledge the significant role of smaller financial 
centres - a consequence of using flawed hierarchical models ± that only 
highlight cities that are perceived to have global links. This is not to deny that 
London is an important finance centre, especially with regard to this thesis as it 
is an essential space involved in the production of securitisation. This chapter 
contends that not only do regional financial centres perform an integral role in 
the production of finance; there is evidence to suggest that these centres are 
deeply embedded with global financial networks as they produce the assets that 
are engineered into RMBS bonds. Subsequently, the chapter asserts that ± in 
addition to London - D VXEVWDQWLDO IUDFWLRQ RI WKH 8.¶V ILQDQFLDO SRZHU LV
H[HUFLVHG LQ µSHULSKHUDO¶ FLWLHVDURXQG WKH8.7KHFKDSWHUGLVFXVVHGKRZ WKH
geographical dispersal of mortgage production can be understood through the 
historical legacies of building societies. These societies, initially savings clubs 
for members of the working class, produced a series of localised circuits of 
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capital used to finance working class housing. These small societies eventually 
spread across Britain but it was not until they developed larger branch networks 
and began to amass middle class savings that they were able to expand their 
geographical reach and increase home ownership. 
 
The next substantial shift in the geography of mortgage production occurred as 
a result of the financial restructuring though The Financial services Act (1986) 
and The Building Societies Act (1986). This deregulation allowed building 
societies to shed their mutual status in favour of that of a fully fledged bank, 
allowing them to access interbank money markets which allowed them to 
rapidly expand their mortgage portfolios. The deregulation permitted banks to 
issue residential mortgages, while centralised lenders were also able to enter 
the mortgage market.  The localised circuits of mortgage funding thus became 
integrated with the international capital markets as mortgage lenders accessed 
the interbank markets. Centralised lenders, who funded their mortgage 
issuance exclusively through securitisation, processed mortgage applications in 
specialised centres using credit scoring technologies. This had two profound 
impacts on the industry. First, it reduced the operational costs of lenders. 
Second, credit scoring reduced the number of mortgage defaults and allowed 
lenders to exercise a consistent lending policy. This new model was soon 
adopted by banks and building societies, who like centralised lenders, began 
selling their mortgages through intermediaries, initiating a rationalisation of 
branch networks.  
 
The geography of the centralised processing centres is not clustered, but is 
dispersed across the UK. The thesis argues that the geography of these centres 
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is largely a reflection of their institutional legacies. Building society processing 
centres are located close to the building society headquarters, to facilitate more 
effective management. This geography is reinforced by the historical locations 
of building society headquarters that are distributed around the country. The 
location of bank processing centres are more widely distributed which can be 
explained by the large networks of processing centres that banks have, but also 
because they operate on national scales compared to building societies and are 
more likely to locate their centres where they can exploit low operational costs. 
Centralised lender processing centres are located outside of London to benefit 
from low operational costs while their headquarters are located in London as it 
provides them with access to the capital markets, as well as, law firms and 
investment banks, key actors in the processes of securitisation The 
contemporary geography of mortgage processing is dynamic and will continue 
to change in response to regulatory transitions and technological innovations. 
The current credit crunch may initiate a new phase of restructuring, which may 
produce new geographies. The dissertation will now turn to discuss the 
implementation of credit scoring within the UK and will explore how scorecards 
are developed and used in the production of consumer mortgages. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Accept(ed), Reject(ed), or Refer(ed)?: The uneven geographies of credit 
information and automation. 
 
 
 
³:H EHOLHYH WKDW FUHGLW VFRULQJ LV IDLU DQG LPSDUWLDO ,W GRHV QRW
single out a specific piece of information as the reason for 
declining an application. We test our credit scoring methods 
regularly to make sure they continue to be fair and unbiased. 
 
Responsible lending is essential for the good of both applicants 
and lenders. The Office of Fair Trading regulates credit and 
FRQVLGHUVFUHGLWVFRULQJWREHDQDLGWRUHVSRQVLEOHOHQGLQJ´ (FLA 
2000:15). 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Both the UK mortgage industry and government agencies have welcomed the 
adoption of credit scoring (FLA 2000; Van Dijk and Garga 2006). Credit scoring 
had previously been used more intensively in the processing of credit card 
applications and loans, but has been adopted rapidly by the mortgage industry 
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in recent years. A report commissioned  by the Council of Mortgage Lenders 
and Standard and 3RRU¶V UHYHDOHG WKDW  SHU FHQW RI PRUWJDJH OHQGLQJ
decisions in 2005 were made using credit scoring (Van Dijk and Garga 2006)37. 
As the technology and accuracy of credit models improve, this number will 
undoubtedly grow. Credit scoring has enabled lenders to make rapid lending 
decisions and the automation of application processing has allowed many larger 
lenders to reduce their processing and operational costs, while reducing the 
number of customers who are likely to default (Leyshon and Thrift 1999).  
 
Despite widespread praise by the mortgage industry, credit scoring has not 
escaped criticism. Social scientists have argued that these systems exclude 
some borrowers from cheaper mainstream credit, and reject individuals who do 
not meet specific criteria (Leyshon et al. 2004). Perhaps the most dogged 
criticisms of credit scoring centre upon its scientific epistemology and its ability 
WR DFFXUDWHO\ GLVFULPLQDWH EHWZHHQ µJRRG¶ RU µEDG¶ FRQVXPHUV (Capon 1982). 
The development of scorecards is problematic and the production of these 
scientific tools are frequently shaped by subjective practices, which raises 
questions as to whether this technology can be crowned with its unblemished, 
scientific status. However, it can also be argued that credit scoring has allowed 
mortgage credit to be extended to consumers who would have previously been 
denied credit, while these standardised systems simultaneously prevents 
applicants from being excluded due to gender, race and sexuality (Aalbers 
2007). This thesis views the system sympathetically; as although credit scoring 
is clearly problematic, it is arguably more accurate at identifying consumers who 
                                                 
37
 The Council of Mortgage Lenders is the UK trade body for mortgage lenders and Standard & 
3RRU¶VLVDERQG-rating agency. 
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may (or may not) default, compared to the face-to face interviews conducted by 
branch managers. 
 
While social scientists have found it easy to critique credit scoring, many of its 
FULWLFLVPV FDQ EH GUDZQ GLUHFWO\ IURP VRFLDO VFLHQFH¶V RZQ HYDOXDWLRQV DQG
methodological tradition (Leyshon and Thrift 1999). For example, economic 
geography shares part of its antecedents with credit scoring. During the 1960s, 
HFRQRPLF JHRJUDSKHUV EHJDQ WR XVH µREMHFWLYH¶ VWDWLVWical methods and 
modelling to accept, or reject hypothesises in economic geography (Barnes 
2001). During the 1970s and 1980s, bankers began to use similar statistical 
methods to decide whether applicants for consumer credit should be accepted, 
RU UHMHFWHG :KLOH HFRQRPLF JHRJUDSK\¶V µTXDQWLWDWLYH UHYROXWLRQ¶ ZDV D VKRUW
lived affair, soon migrating towards Marxist, post-Marxist and poststructural 
HSLVWHPRORJLHV UHWDLO EDQNLQJ¶V DGRSWLRQ RI WKHVH PHWKRGRORJLHV ZDV PRUH
epochal, leading to the substantial spatial restructuring of banking infrastructure 
LQWKHODWHVDQGHDUO\VZKLFKHQDEOHGWKH8.¶Vmortgage market to 
expand dramatically.  
 
)RUUHWDLOEDQNLQJ WKH WHUP µTXDQWLWDWLYHUHYROXWLRQ¶KHUDOGHGDVKLIW IURPIDFH-
to-face decision-making by a building society, or bank manager, to a 
quantitative and automated, decision-making system (Leyshon and Thrift 1999). 
The decision to lend money to a borrower has always been hampered by what 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981; 1992) call information asymmetries. An information 
asymmetry emerges as borrowers naturally have a more detailed knowledge 
about their own financial background, future intentions and ability to service 
their debts than a potential lender, who does not immediately have access to 
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this information. Lenders aim to overcome these asymmetries to decide who will 
EH D µJRRG¶ RU µEDG¶ FUHGLW ULVN E\ DPDVVLQJ GDWD RQ WKat consumer. In this 
sense, the consumer is rendered into a financial subjectivity, or an electronic 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ ZKHUH LQIRUPDWLRQ LV XVHG WR GHVFULEH D FRQVXPHU¶V ILQDQFLDO
and socio-economic characteristics which are then stored in databases. There 
are three key disadvantages with face-to-face decision-making between a bank, 
or building society manager, and a prospective lender. First, face-to-face 
interviews are a time consuming and costly process (Leyshon and Thrift 1999; 
Marron 2007). Second, the manager can only collect a very geographically 
limited set of information to help them make a judgement and consequently the 
process was not efficient at uncovering riskier borrowers (Leyshon and Thrift 
1999) 7KLUG WKH OHQGLQJ GHFLVLRQ¶V PDGH E\ WKH PDQDJHUV ZDV H[WUHPHO\
inconsistent. The solution was to adopt a new automated system that would use 
information from shared, electronic databases, where lenders could report on 
which of their consumers had made their repayments on time, or not. This data 
would then be analysed by computer software which has proved to be more 
successful in detecting consumers who had previously, or were likely to default.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to draw upon research from the social sciences, 
statistics and operational management to review how credit scoring, a decision-
making system, was initially developed and how it was exported from the US 
and implemented into the UK. This chapter will also discuss the geographies of 
consumer information to explain where credit scoring operates. The remainder 
of this chapter is as follows: section 6.2 briefly explores in more detail what 
credit scoring is. Section 6.3 will explore the origins of credit scoring and its 
implementation in the UK. Section 6.4 will discuss how credit scoring has 
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become a powerful tool within mortgage finance. Section 6.5 will explain how 
scorecards are produced, evaluated and maintained. Section 6.6 will discuss 
the uneven geographies of credit scoring practice and section 6.7 will conclude 
the chapter. 
 
:KDWLVµFUHGLWVFRULQJ¶" 
 
There are many definitions of credit. For example,  Hand and Henley (1997), 
writing from a statistical background define credit scoring as a term used to 
describe the formal statistical methods that are used to classify applicants into 
µJRRG¶ DQG µEDG¶ Flasses. Hand (2005) goes on to discuss how retrospective 
information is used to build models that predict the behaviour of new customers 
based on past characteristics and separates consumers into one of the binary 
FODVVHVRI µJRRG¶RU µEDG¶ULVN2QWKHRWKHUKDQGFUHGLWVFRULQJV\VWHPVKDYH
EHHQ GHILQHG E\ %DWW DQG )RZNHV  DV µVWDWLVWLFDOO\ EDVHG
PDQDJHPHQWWRROVIRUIRUHFDVWLQJWKHRXWFRPHRIH[WHQGLQJFUHGLWWRLQGLYLGXDOV¶
(cited in Leyshon and Thrift, 1999).  In what follows, I want to take issue with 
such unitary definitions as they singularly fail to acknowledge that there are four 
discrete stages involved in the development of automated decision-making, that 
have been identified in this thesis. These four stages are shown in Figure 6.1: 
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Figure 6.1: The four stages of credit scoring 
 
Stage 1: Scorecard development Stage 2: Credit scoring Stage 3: Decision evaluation
Stage 4: Scorecard adjustment
 
Source: Author 
 
The first stage is the development of the scorecard, which currently takes the 
form of a piece of software. The development of a scorecard is different to the 
use of a scorecard, a distinction that previous accounts have failed to 
DFNQRZOHGJH UHIHUULQJ WR ERWK VWDJHV DV µFUHGLW VFRULQJ¶ IRU H[DPSOH VHH
Hand and Henley, 1997) which frequently ignore the development process, 
which is arguably more important than the credit scoring process38.  In order to 
produce a scorecard, which is discussed in more detail later, statistical 
techniques are used to isolate consumer characteristics (such as income, 
occupation and age) that may be useful in predicting whether a consumer will 
default, or not. The chosen characteristics are then given weightings and 
included in a scorecard. The second stage, the practice of credit scoring, is 
ZKHUH D FRQVXPHU¶V FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DUH HQWHUHG LQWR D FRPSXWHU UXQQLQJ WKH 
scorecard programme, by a lender or broker. This process is the quantification 
RI D FRQVXPHU¶V OLIH ZKHUH WKHLU SHUVRQDO GHWDLOV DQG FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DUH
captured and encoded into the computer software running the scorecard 
programme, producing an electronic representation of a consumer. This data is 
                                                 
38
 The reason for this is discussed later in the chapter, which reveals the source RIDVFRUHFDUG¶V
power. 
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WKHQGHVSDWFKHGWRDFHQWUDOFRPSXWHUDWWKHOHQGHU¶VSURFHVVLQJFHQWUHDQGLV
combined with information from credit referencing agencies. The points, or 
weightings, calculated in the first stage are then addeG WR WKH FRQVXPHU¶V
particular characteristics.  
 
Figure 6.2 provides an early example of how different consumer characteristics 
are allotted different points, or scores. The sum of the points are calculated by 
the software and the consumer will fall into one of three categories. The first is 
µ$FFHSW¶ZKHUHDFXVWRPHULVDFFHSWHGIRUFUHGLW7KHVHFRQGLVµ5HMHFW¶ZKHUH
DFXVWRPHU LVGHFOLQHGFUHGLW)LQDOO\ µ5HIHU¶ LVDFDWHJRU\ZKHUHDFRQVXPHU
has failed to gain enough points to be accepted. However, in this case, the 
consumer has failed marginally, and so a human underwriter will look at the 
LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ D FRQVXPHU¶V FUHGLW ILOH WR GHWHUPLQH LI WKHUH LV DQ\
supplementary information available to decide whether the consumer should be 
accepted or rejected.  
 
The third stage of scoring is the continual evaluation of the scorecards to 
HQVXUH WKH\ FRQWLQXH WR DFFXUDWHO\ GLVFULPLQDWH EHWZHHQ µJRRG¶ DQG µEDG¶
customers. This leads to the fourth stage, where the scorecard is recalibrated if 
necessary, and new weightings are assigned to different characteristics, or the 
µDFFHSW¶DQG µGHFOLQH¶ WKUHVKROGVDUHDOWHUHG ,I WKHVFRUHFDUG LVGHHPHGWREH
inaccurate, a new replacement scorecard will be developed. The use of credit 
scoring was discussed in Chapter 5, but the production, evaluation and 
adjustment of the scorecards will be discussed in greater detail in section five. 
There are two main types of credit scoring. The first type is application scoring 
that decides if a consumer will default or not on a mortgage. The second type is 
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known as behavioural scoring and is a more recent development which uses 
the same principals of application scoring but seeks to determine the size of 
debt that can be offered to a consumer based on their credit history (Thomas 
2000). Behavioural scoring seeks to predict the future behaviour of a consumer 
and is also used by lenders to target specific consumers with particular financial 
products as well as determining how aggressively to recover an account in 
default (Thomas 2000). 
 
Figure 6.2: 0HUFDQWLOH&UHGLW¶VVFRUHFDUG 
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Each individual lender has a series of different scorecards for their particular 
products, including; personal loans, credit cards, hire-purchase agreements and 
mortgages - each with different weightings and thresholds39. The use of credit 
scoring to produce mortgages in the UK did not become common place until the 
1990s and its adoption is still uneven depending on the credit product, lender size 
and the type of market (Van Dijk and Garga 2006). For example, small, regional 
building societies have not adopted credit scoring, as they do not produce the 
volumes of mortgages to make implementing credit scoring economically viable. 
On the other hand, some subprime products are another area where credit scoring 
cannot be used, as the non-standard, consumer information cannot be 
accommodated by scorecards as borrowers vary significantly. 
 
My research has identified four different types of data that are used in application 
and behavioural scoring: short-temporal, long-temporal, positive and negative data, 
as illustrated in Figure 6.3. This data can be classified as Long-Temporal-Positive 
Data, as these attributes do not vary frequently and contribute to a higher credit 
VFRUH ZKLFK LQFUHDVHV DQ DSSOLFDQW¶V FKDQFH RI EHLQJ JUDQWHG FUHGLW Long-
Temporal-Negative Data includes county court judgments (CCJs). Paradoxically, if 
a scorecard contains a characteristic for which an applicant has no information it is 
deemed as being of a higher risk as there is greater uncertainty. These attributes 
are usually used in application scoring, and are often supplied by the consumer in 
their application as well as credit referencing agencies. Short-Temporal Data is 
information that is updated on a monthly basis and is frequently used in 
behavioural scoring to judge how well a consumer has being managing their credit 
                                                 
39
 Different products require different scorecards because of the different risks 
involved for each product. For example, a secured loan is seen to bear less credit risk 
than an unsecured loan, due to the underlying security. As such, different weightings 
are required and so each product has a different scorecard to reflect this. 
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obligations40. Short-Temporal-Positive Data LQFOXGHV D UHFRUG RI D FRQVXPHU¶V
monthly credit repayments that have been made on time. Short-Temporal-Negative 
Data LQFOXGHVDKLVWRU\RIPLVVHGSD\PHQWVRQFRQVXPHU¶VDFFRXQWV WKDWZLOOEH
penalised in credit and behavioural scoring. An underwriter is also able to review 
accounts in default to see how much money is owed and the value of the 
outstanding debt. 
 
Figure 6.3: Ontology of credit referencing data 
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Source: Author 
 
There are three main groups of actors involved in mortgage application decision-
making. The first are the mortgage lenders. They obtain money-capital and decide 
who to lend to, which they do in two ways. First, many of the larger mortgage 
lenders produce their own scorecards and decide how to allocate the weightings 
                                                 
40
 A consumer with no credit history or a limited history will be discriminated in the same way 
someone with a poor record would be, as there is not enough credit data to calculate a score. 
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that are used in the scoring. Second, lenders exchange their consumer data 
through a second actor: credit referencing agencies. Credit referencing agencies 
collect and compile databases based on information from lenders, and then 
distribute it to their clients for use in their credit scoring and underwriting 
procedures. There are currently three companies in the UK that act as credit 
referencing agencies, Experian, Equifax and Callcredit. Together with Fitch, an 
analytics, consultancy, they also produce decision-making metrics and scorecards 
for smaller lenders and also provide marketing products for direct mailing 
marketing campaigns and provide services that aid the retrieval of cash from 
defaulting consumers.  
 
The third set of actors are government institutions, including the electoral roll units 
of local county councils and the Registry Trust41. Despite the advanced statistical 
models used in the development of credit scoring and the rich array of data 
mobilised, the names and addresses of consumers continue to form the foundation 
of credit files. Although the distribution of credit data is privatised, credit referencing 
agencies and lenders are still reliant on databases maintained by the state to verify 
the location of consumers.  
 
Credit scoring has become a powerful technology within the UK mortgage industry, 
and by 2006 it was used by 95 per cent of prime lenders and 62 per cent of sub-
prime lenders (Van Dijk and Garga 2006). Despite its popularity amongst lenders, 
credit scoring has been the subject to much criticism. Aalbers (2005) argues that 
the profiling techniques used to stratify consumers into groups means that some 
consumers will be rejected for credit even though they may not constitute an 
immediate credit risk. As such, they are excluded on the perception of how other 
                                                 
41
 The registry trust provides details of CCJs from county courts that are added to the credit 
records. 
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consumers in their sub-group have performed in the past. In addition, Burton et al, 
(2004) TXHVWLRQ FUHGLW VFRULQJ¶V DELOLW\ WR RSHUDWH HIIHFWLYHO\ LQ an unstable 
neoliberal economy, as currently now being witnessed, and they argue that 
temporary labour markets have destabilised the linear life experiences that are 
central to credit scoring methodologies, which rely on stable credit histories.  
 
6.3. The origins and geographies of credit scoring 
 
Having briefly discussed what constitutes credit scoring, and the actors involved,  
this chapter will now turn to develop an understanding of the history and evolution 
of credit scoring in the United States and its subsequent adoption and adaptation in 
the UK. Marron (2007) explores how US department stores that offered consumer 
credit on purchases initially used specialised, in-house credit officers to process 
FUHGLWDSSOLFDWLRQVE\SHUIRUPLQJTXDOLWDWLYHDVVHVVPHQWVRIDFRQVXPHU¶VZHDOWK
DQG LQFRPH ZKLOH REVHUYLQJ FRQVXPHUV WR VHH KRZ µVKLIW\¶ µHYDVLYH¶ µVHHG\¶ RU
µIODVK\¶WKey looked (Jeacle and Walsh, 2002:743). The enhanced coding and the 
systemisation of consumer data in the 1920s and 1930s saw the development of 
nascent credit databases, that continued to grow as lenders began to view 
consumers as populations and not individuals. Marron (2007) sees this as the 
beginning of the development of a technocratic and epistemic community whose 
skills and knowledges constitute the origins of credit scoring technology. At the 
same time, mail order companies, who were unable to interview customers, were 
forced to make lending decisions based on the consumer data that they had 
amassed. As such, they would only issue credit to customers from specific postal 
areas that had a history of repayments, while denying it to applicants in post codes 
where its own customers had failed to make repayments in the past (Capon 1982; 
Leyshon and Thrift 1999). These practices began to form the foundations of 
contemporary credit scoring. 
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Thomas (2000) traces the technocratic genealogy of credit scoring to the early 
work of Fisher (1936) who developed the idea of using statistical techniques, such 
as discriminatory analysis, to develop categories with which to separate natural 
phenomena into particular groups. Thomas (2000) argues that Durand (1941), 
undertaking research for the US Bureau of Economic Research, realised that the 
same technique could be used to isolate good and bad loans, by applying 
discriminatory, statistical procedures on consumers, using Chi-Square tests to 
identify WKHYDULDEOHV WKDWGLVWLQJXLVKHG µJRRG¶DQG µEDG¶ ORDQV (Johnson 1992). It 
EHFDPHSRVVLEOH WRXWLOLVH µVFLHQWLILF¶PHWKRGRORJLHV WRGHWHUPLQHZKLFKYDULDEOHV
identified consumers that were statistically more likely to default on their loans. The 
implementation of these new scientific procedures met resistance from the credit 
officers and underwriters employed by lenders as they feared that they would 
become victims of deskilling. However, economic pressures, high default rates and 
the second world war ensured the displacement of underwriters  (Johnson 1992).  
Lewis (1992) reflects on how mail order stores eventually underwent forced 
deskilling, as they lost the tacit knowledge and expertise of the, predominantly 
male, credit officers to conscription, which in turn led to the development of manual 
scoring as a generic knowledge system.  
 
Female clerical employees who had no experience of underwriting were given 
µFUHGLW VFRULQJ IRUPV¶ WKDW ZHUH HQFRGHG ZLWK WKH DFFXPXODWHG Nnowledge of the 
male underwriters, so that new, inexperienced underwriters could give weightings 
to specific, predefined characteristics, dividing customers into the binary categories 
RI µJRRG¶DQG µEDG¶$OWKRXJK WKHVHHDUO\ZHLJKWLQJVZHUHDUELWUDU\ WKHy enabled 
inexperienced operatives to make lending decisions (Lewis 1992). Lewis (1992) 
suggests that it was not until the 1950s, when William Fair and Earl Isaac, with 
their backgrounds in engineering and maths, began a business consultancy in the 
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field of operational research, where they realised that they could produce and 
market scorecards as a decision-making tool for lenders42. Once adequate 
computing power became available in the 1960s and 1970s, the practice of credit 
scoring became automated, which was important for the consumer credit industry 
as it allowed the growing volumes of credit card applications to be efficiently 
processed, both quickly and at low cost (Thomas 2000).  
 
The origins of credit referencing in the UK can be traced to the 1970s in the mail 
order industry which, like its US counterparts, could not meet face-to-face with its 
customers to decide if they were a bad credit risk. Subsequently, the only 
information that credit risk decision-makers was a name and address. These 
companies began to collect data on their customers that could be used in credit-
scoring to decide whether the customers would repay their credit lines, a model 
WKDWZRXOGVRRQEHFDPHWKHVWDQGDUGIRUWKH8.¶VUHWDLOILQDQFHLQGXVWU\DVSower 
was removed from bank and building society managers to make lending decisions. 
The decision making capability of consumer lending was transferred to the 
centralised processing centres developed in the 1980s and discussed in the 
previous chapter. This ZDVWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHµTXDQWLWDWLYHUHYROXWLRQ¶ZLWKLQUHWDLO
financing, as suggested in the following quote: 
 
³>,WZDVQRWXQWLO@the early to mid-1980s when it [credit scoring] started 
to take off with the banks, there was added competition in the banking 
sector, they were under pressure to improve efficiency, reduce costs, 
decision-making had been distributed around a large branch network, 
that was subjective, there was lots of variability, the branch manager 
was making decisions, it was an expensive way of making money, so 
                                                 
42
 Now a leading scorecard and analytics consultancy. 
              
 155 
RQHE\RQHWKH\EHJDQDSSOLFDWLRQVFRULQJ´ (Interview 10: Director of 
Risk, credit referencing agency, November 2007). 
 
The decision by mortgage lenders to implement credit scoring enabled them to 
make more consistent lending decisions; this allowed them to measure their credit 
risk more effectively so they could forecast to a reasonable degree, how many 
defaults they could expect (Aalbers 2005). The use of credit scoring technologies 
began to reduce operational costs in an industry where margins were tightening 
under increased competition, spurred by The Financial Services Act (1986) and 
The Building Societies Act (1986). In an attempt to refine this technology, lenders 
began to demand increasingly rich sources of data to enhance the accuracy of 
their models, which credit referencing bureaus sought to provide. This data took 
WKH IRUP RI UHODWLRQDO GDWDEDVHV WKDW FRXOG VHJPHQW WKH 8.¶V SRSXODWLRQ LQWR
specific groups for which they could tailor generic financial products.  
 
This provided two very significant outcomes for the industry. First, as the data 
quality improved, the mortgage market became more segmented and new market 
opportunities such as the sub-prime market became visible. Sub-prime consumers 
are usually excluded from mainstream, low-priced credit because credit scoring is 
a standardised procedure and some individuals lives are not standardised enough 
to be accommodated by scorecards, such as agency workers who frequently have 
unstable incomes (Burton et al. 2004). Other borrowers in the sub-prime market 
include consumers with impaired credit histories where they have previously 
defaulted on credit agreements, increasing the risk of credit default in the eyes of 
lenders (Immergluck 2008).  
 
Extended analysis of this new consumer data revealed that people who had been 
previously denied access to credit would not necessarily default. For example, self-
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employed individuals were previously rejected for credit due to the perceived 
instability of their income, but forensic analysis of credit data revealed that this 
excluded high paid contractors and consultants who did not pose a high likelihood 
of default. As lenders began to offer credit WR µULVNLHU¶ ERUURZHUV DGGLWLRQDO GDWD
became available and lenders began to identify some groups of sub-prime 
consumers who occasionally defaulted on their monthly repayments, but frequently 
recovered and repaid their instalments, making them profitable if penalty charges 
were taken into account. Second, as the industry began to identify different groups 
of consumers through the segmentation of the credit market, it began to price 
FUHGLW DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI GHIDXOW E\ FRQVXPHUV ZKLFK VDZ µULVNLHU¶
consumers gain access to mainstream credit products, but at higher interest rates. 
 
The development of these databases occurred at the same time as the banking 
industry began to slowly automate their day-to-day banking practices. Fisher and 
McKenny (1993) highlight how banking was traditionally reliant on the manual 
sorting of checking accounts until the Bank of America instigated the production of 
RQHRIWKHZRUOG¶VILUVWbanking machines ERMA (the Electronic Recording Machine 
Accounting) in 1955. ERMA and similar machines enabled American banks to keep 
pace with the rapid expansion of checking accounts and the substantial volumes of 
associated paperwork that needed to be processed (Fisher and McKenny 1993). 
Eventually, these electric calculators were adapted to calculate interest on 
DFFRXQWV DQG WKHVH PDFKLQHV EHFDPH SURJUDPPDEOH (YHQWXDOO\ WKHVH µHDUO\¶
computers were able to manipulate data statistically, which enabled them to run 
automated scorecard systems (Neukom 2004). The development of temporal 
database systems became instrumental in ordering information that could be both 
accessed rapidly (Jensen and Snodgrass 1999; Leyshon and Pollard 2000). 
Leyshon and Thrift (1999) argue that in the 1980s a prevailing marketing discourse 
XQGHUSLQQHG WKH FRQVXPHU ILQDQFH LQGXVWU\¶V DGRSWLRQ RI FUHGLW VFRULQJ
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technologies, where lenders began to pre-approve consumers through geo-
demographics systems. Under this strategy lenders would send application forms 
offering credit to consumers living in particular postcodes, promoting specific 
products. This improvement in data and technology coupled to the construction of 
niche markets witnessed the generation of substantial data sets that have made 
scoring more accurate, as the following quote suggests: 
 
³[We] moved from having a little scorecard, where you have name and 
DGGUHVVWRNQRZZKHUH\RXDUHKRZORQJ\RX¶YHEHHQWKHUHQRZLI
you want better scRUHFDUGV\RXZDQWEHWWHUGDWD LW¶VVXFKDVKRXVH
type of house, what your income is, have you got children, do you 
RZQ\RXUKRXVHKDYH\RXURZQSKRQH´ (Interview 5: Director of Risk 
Management, large UK retail bank, February 2007). 
 
Lenders now have access to credit scoring products that recommend how much 
debt a coQVXPHUFDQDIIRUGWRµVHUYLFH¶ as lenders can purchase information on a 
FRQVXPHU¶V VSHQGLQJ SDWWHUQV 7KLV DOORZV OHQGHU WR FDOFXODWH D FRQVXPHU¶V
maximum level of indebtedness to avoid over-lending, which could trigger 
consumers into defaulting on their credit agreements. 
 
5HJXODWRU\SUHVVXUHKDVDOVRKDGDQLPSDFWRQFUHGLWVFRULQJ¶VDGRSWLRQLQWKH8.
as credit scoring has allowed lenders to centralise their processing operations, as 
discussed earlier, enabling lenders to control more consistently who is offered 
credit. This has allowed lenders to meet the demands that have been put in place 
by regulators, as illustrated by the following quote: 
 
³«EDQNVDUHXQGHUSUHVVXUHIURPWKHUHJXODWRr in the UK to be seen 
WRGRHYHU\WKLQJDERYHERDUG WRPDQDJHFUHGLW«D ORWRI WKH OHQGLQJ
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done this way has made money, it provides better, or at least more 
consistent, but also we can control it better, if we want to change our 
lending policy we can do it centrally, if it was down to individual bank 
PDQDJHUV LWZRXOGEHQLJKRQ LPSRVVLEOH«VRWKHUHDVRQZK\ WKLQJV
have changed in that perspective is external pressure from the FSA to 
OHQG EHWWHU DQG DOVR LW¶V FKHDSHU´ (Interview 7: Director of Trade 
Body, January 2007). 
 
&UHGLWVFRULQJ¶VXVHKDVDOVREHFRPH LQFUHDVLQJO\ LPSRUWDQWZLWK WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ
of Basel II regulation. If a lender has credit scored its consumers, it can 
quantitatively state the magnitude of default risk which it is potentially exposed to - 
if the lender follows the Basel II guidelines. Since Basel II stipulates that the 
amount of regulatory capital a lender must retain on its balance sheet is 
proportional to the credit risk of its mortgages, these more sensitive ratios can 
reduce the amount of regulatory capital that they must hold. 
 
7UDFLQJWKHVRXUFHRIFUHGLWVFRULQJ¶VSRZHU 
 
Credit scoring plays a central role in decision-making as the pre-programmed 
judgments of a scorecard dictate who is permitted access to mortgage credit, and 
for many, the ability to become a homeowner. I will now seek to conceptualise the 
power of credit scoring through the lens of actor-network theory (ANT), which was 
discussed earlier in Chapter 2. ANT is a useful tool as it can be used to 
conceptualise the relations of human and non-human actors that are integral to the 
production, execution and evaluation of scorecards. The heterogeneous 
components used in credit scoring consist of texts, machines, people, software and 
money, which are used in an attempt to solidify and stabilise social relations that 
endure through space and time (Murdoch 1998). In this sense, credit scoring and 
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scorecard production can be seen as an actor-network which seeks to crystallise 
the social relations that produce financial inclusion and exclusion through the 
automation of judgements, which can be seen as a techno-economic network 
(Callon 1991). 
 
Scorecards are similar to other socio-technical networks; they use people, 
knowledge, codes, computers manuals, skills, ideas, software and information to 
operate. Once a scorecard has become stable and ordered, it can be viewed as an 
actor in itself, when it becomes part of the mortgage production network, operating 
as an obligatory passage point43. However, credit scoring takes on a more unique 
role as, contrary to other actor-networks that attempt to enrol other elements such 
as consumers, the scorecard actively seeks to exclude specific actors, considered 
to have characteristics associated with a high probability of default, from joining the 
network of mortgage production. The scorecard, as an actor-network, is embodied 
with power by coercing a series of assemblages, including consumers into meeting 
its objectives (Allen 2003), in this case the avoidance of bad debts and acquisition 
of profitable customers. Credit scoring derives its power through three 
mechanisms: 
 
)LUVW SRZHU LV GHULYHG IURP D VFRUHFDUG¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH QHWZRUN RI PRUWJDJH
credit production. A prospective borrower is temporarily enrolled into the network 
as they need money, to satisfy their desire to purchase a property, developing a 
power asymmetry44. As the practice of credit scoring stands between the applicant 
DQG WKH OHQGHU¶VPRQH\ WKH practice of scoring acquires power, as an obligatory 
                                                 
43
 In order of an actor to enter a network it must satisfy the interests and politics of the 
network that have been defined by the most powerful actors in the network, known as 
SDVVLQJWKURXJKWKHµREOLJDWRU\SDVVDJHSRLQW¶ 
44
 The consumer must want a mortgage, for the assemblages of mortgage production cannot 
force a consumer to take out a mortgage. 
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passage point, as the applicant must pass information to the lender to obtain a 
mortgage.  
 
Second, the ability of credit scoring to amalgamate and control credit information 
provides it with power. The increased accumulation of credit data has not 
annihilated information asymmetries; indeed it never will, although the increased 
surveillance and data collection has reduced the asymmetries - and likelihood of 
defaults - for many lenders.  The practices of data collection and credit scoring 
produce a virtual consumer; their characteristics are encoded in computer software 
and elements of their life become duplicated as a discourse, or subject. Miller and 
Rose (1990) UHIHUWRWKLVGLVFRXUVHDVDµWHFKQRORJ\RIWKRXJKW¶WKDWXVHVWHFKQLFDO
devices, listing and numbering to understand reality,  arguing that language is a 
translation device with which to perceive reality. Similarly, application forms, 
consumer data and credit scoring are all devices that translate the consumer into a 
VHULHVRITXDQWLWDWLYHLPPXWDEOHPRELOHVWKDWHQDEOHWKHµRXWVLGH¶WREHUHSUHVHQWHG
RQ WKH µLQVLGH¶ RI FUHGLW GHFLVLRQ-making, whose aim is to eradicate information 
asymmetries and to exclude undesirable consumers. 
 
The surveillance exercised by credit decision-making systems acts as a disciplining 
mechanism. Previously, the social stigma of consumer debt was a mode of 
discipline within the UK, although DV WKLV KDV QRZ ZDQHG DV FRQVXPHU FUHGLW¶V
availability has grown. Miller and Rose (1990) argue that power is exercised 
through assemblages of state institutions, procedures and analysis, which 
highlights the multiplicity of materials  needed to exercise power, a concept can be 
used to understand how lenders, and credit rating agencies, act as an assemblage 
of institutions and procedures, mobilised through actor-networks to reduce defaults 
by disciplining consumers. Credit referencing agencies have attempted to raise 
consumer awareness of their credit reports, which in turn articulates a form of 
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consumer discipline, as consumers have become aware that their financial 
activities are recorded and monitored, they are also aware that they must not fall 
foul of the credit databases by defaulting. This disciplinary technique is formalised 
E\ D FRQVXPHU¶V DELOLW\ WR YLHZ WKHPVHOYHV WKURXJK WKH H\HV RI OHQGHUV E\
subscribing to frequent credit record updates, or by requesting an isolated check to 
enable them to maintain, modify and regulate their behaviour. 
 
Third, the scorecards exercise power through the encoded epistemic knowledges 
of credit risk analysts who organise the necessary elements for the development, 
use, evaluation and recalibration of scorecards. The development of scorecard 
point allocation and the corresponding thresholds combine the social relations and 
knowledges fostered by analysts, which takes the form what Bowker and Star 
(1999) call a frozen organisational discourse, where the scorecard can be viewed 
as embodying a series of pre-defined judgements from the credit analysts. 
 
6.5. Raising (and lowering) the bar: the production, evaluation and 
maintenance of score(card)s 
 
Academic research on credit scoring can be broadly divided into two schools. The 
first, in the social sciences, has been discussed in sections two and four. The 
second, on the statistical methods used in scorecard production, an exemplar of 
which is, Thomas, et al, (2005). Although statisticians recognise credit scoring as 
EHLQJ DQ LPSRUWDQW GHYLFH IRU UDQNLQJ WKH SRSXODWLRQ LQWR µJRRG¶ DQG µEDG¶ ULVN
consumers, they are not concerned with how these devices are produced, and how 
this affects the geographies of financial inclusion and exclusion. The chapter will 
now elaborate on four stages involved in scorecard engineering used to produce 
WKH PDMRULW\ RI WKH 8.¶V PRUWJDJHV 7KHUH DUH WZR GLIIHUHQW ZD\V LQ ZKLFK
scorecards are developed in the UK. As the next quote suggests, scorecards were 
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originally developed by consultants with expert knowledge in scorecard production, 
such as Fitch Ratings, Experian, Equifax and Scorex: 
 
³«certainly in the 1980s no-one had their own in-house team, [but] 
over time the larger organisations have started to take more in house, 
WKHELJEDQNVKDYH WKHLURZQWHDPVQRZ´  (Interview 16: Director of 
Risk, credit referencing agency, December 2007). 
 
Later, as credit scoring became more widely used by lenders, the expert 
knowledges and skills of analysts became more widely available and larger retail 
banks and building societies began to accumulate and organise small groups of 
analysts to start producing their own scorecards, as illustrated below: 
 
³«WKHUH LV D WHDP RISHRSOH ZKR SURYLGH DFHQWUH RI H[SHUWLVH ZKR
SURYLGH«WKRVH EXVLQHVVHV loans, credit cards, mortgages«[with] 
scorecard development´(Interview 20: Risk Manager, large UK retail 
bank, February 2007). 
 
Credit scoring consultants, who work for the credit referencing agencies, continue 
to provide bespoke scorecards for smaller lenders who are not large enough to 
merit having their own analytics team, or lenders who lack the expertise to produce 
their own scorecards. The first stage of scorecard production is to understand what 
the lender is aiming to do. They may want their scorecard to reduce the number of 
defaults on WKHLUORDQERRNRUWKH\PD\ZDQWWRLQFUHDVHWKHQXPEHURIµDFFHSWV¶
Additionally, the lender may be seeking to increase the efficiency of their 
operations, by reducing the number of underwriters involved in manually 
processing applications. There is an art to the science of producing scorecards 
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ZKHUH WKH µTXDQWLWDWLYH¶ WHFKQRORJLHV are embedded in a social milieu, as one 
interviewee explained: 
 
³ZKDWWKHVNLOOLI\RXOLNHLQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIVFRUHFDUGVLVLVILUVWO\
having a good understanding of the business, so understanding what 
are the factors surrounding, how can you understand the 
EXVLQHVV«LW¶V QRW MXVW VLW GRZQ DW D GHVN DQG HUP DQG \RX NQRZ
SUHVVWKHEXWWRQVDQGGRWKHDQDO\VLV\RX¶YHJRWWRFRQWH[WXDOLVHWKH
the results to make sure you understand why certain trends or arrears 
DUH WKHUH´  (Interview 20: Risk Manager, large UK retail bank, 
February 2007). 
 
The statistical analysis conducted by analysts often reveals trends that exist within 
the consumer data, such as the trend whereby younger consumers are statistically 
more likely to default, for example.  However, these results alone do not provide 
enough information to produce a scorecard; there are two other aspects of this 
data that need to be understood in order to contextualise the information. The first 
issue is the need to understand the difference between correlation and causation. 
This has been highlighted by Sayer (1982), within the context of economic 
geography, in that statistical associations do not in themselves explain events, and 
that there is a risk of making accidental associations. For example, Sayer (1982) 
cites the statistical relationship between Swiss interest rates and divorce rates, 
which boasts a strong numerical relationship, but which is, in reality, entirely 
coincidental. This issue also concerns scorecard production. Capon (1982:90) 
reports how one early US scorecard used the first letter of consumer surnames as 
LW ZDV IRXQG WR KDYH DVWDWLVWLFDO UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK WKH ERUURZHU¶V DELOLW\ WR UHSD\
their credit. Although an extreme example, it is essential that analysts understand 
the mechanisms behind these relationships, which requires a further layer of 
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interpretation, embedded within the tacit knowledge shared by scorecard analysts. 
The second issue involved in interpreting the information is to understand the 
meaning of the GDWD DQG KRZ LW FDQ EH LPSOHPHQWHG LQWR WKH OHQGHU¶V EXVLQHVV
model, and who the lender wants to produce mortgages for. There is no point in 
producing a scorecard that will penalise applicants who have an unstable credit 
history if the company is seeking to lend to subprime customers.   
 
The second stage of scorecard production is to order and amalgamate 
heterogeneous sources of data. The data will come from one, two or perhaps three 
credit referencing agencies, as most lenders do not use the services of all three 
agencies. This is largely because the underwriting software used by many lenders 
is not compatible with all of the different credit referencing agencies and to upgrade 
these systems would be expensive and disruptive to the lenders activities. The 
effect of this configuration is that defaults from some consumers will become 
µLQYLVLEOH¶ WR other lenders as they do not all use the same credit reference 
agencies. This scenario is changing as some lenders have realised that the use of 
multiple agency data can reduce their defaults significantly. The data from the 
credit referencing agencies is then combined with the historical data from the 
OHQGHU¶VRZQSRUWIROLRRIPRUWJDJHV, as outlined in the following quote: 
 
³«WKHPRVWUHFHQWGDWDLVZRUWKPRUHWKDQold data and directionally 
[over time, the recent] data is worth more than static data [address, 
ages etc] VRLI\RX¶UHLQFUHDVLQJ\RXUFUHGLWDSSHWLWHWKDWWHOOV\RXDORW
PRUH´ (Interview 5: Director of Risk Management, large UK retail 
bank, February 2007). 
 
This enables the analysts to reveal which previous borrower characteristics 
GLVWLQJXLVK EHWZHHQ µJRRG¶ DQG µEDG¶ FRQVXPHUV 7KH PLQLPXP DPRXQW RI GDWD
              
 165 
QHHGHG WREXLOGDVFRUHFDUG IURPDFRPSDQ\¶VRZQKLVWRULFDOGDWD LVPRQths, 
although three years is perceived as the industry standard to check for seasonal 
variations in defaults over the year (Interview 16: Director of Risk, credit 
referencing agency, December 2007). As one interviewee explained, there are 
problems in initially organising all the data sets into one coherent database to 
begin the analysis that will lead to the development of a scorecard, especially for 
outside consultants: 
 
³«PDLQIUDPHWDSHVFDQDUULYHLQDER[RQHGD\QRGHVFULSWLRQRI
ZKDW¶V LQWKHPRr indication of which file goes with which, so a lot of 
work is getting the data compiled into a usable format and that can 
WDNH IURPDZHHN WRD\HDU«ZKDWGDWDGR WKH\KDYH IRUXV WRZRUN
ZLWK«ZKDWLVWKHPHDQLQJRIWKHGDWDLQWKHDUFKLYHZKDWGRHV06 
and D mean in the file called marital status, and why is this file of data 
X, Y, Z, instead of M (married), S (single) and D (divorced)´ (Interview 
16: Director of Risk, credit referencing agency, December 2007). 
 
The third stage is to begin analysing the database that has been compiled. 
Leyshon and Thrift (1999) view scorecards as being coded, day-to-day systems of 
power using taken for granted protocols. However, here I want to argue that 
although scorecards are important in shaping the landscape of consumer credit, 
their power is provided by the analysts who decide, using statistical tools, which 
characteristics are numerically significant. The role of analysts in developing these 
power geometries is important, as it is their judgements that decide which 
characteristics identify defaulters, and to what degree they should be penalised in 
the scorecard. This is not to dispute the fact that scoring software is central to 
decision making practices but they need to be situated within a wider milieu to 
avoid attributing these systems with too much power. It is the architects of these 
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technologies, the analysts who are the elites of the socio-technical scorecard 
network. The aim of the database exploration is to separate out which 
characteristics of past customers are affiliated to accounts that were defaulted and 
DFFRXQWVWKDWGLGQRWZKLFKDUHRIWHQGHULYHGIURPDOHQGHU¶VRZQKLVWRULFDOGDWD 
 
³«LI \RX¶UH DQ HVWDEOLVKHG EDQN ZLWK D KLVWRU\ RI OHQGLQJ \RX FDQ
ORRN EDFN UHWURVSHFWLYHO\ «DQG \RX FDQ ORRN DW WKH SHUIRUPDQFH RI
WKDWJURXSRIFXVWRPHUV«WRZRUNRXWwhich ones (the customers) had 
D GLVSURSRUWLRQDWH HIIHFW RQ RQ SHUIRUPDQFH«\RX PLJKW JLYH PRUH
SRLQWV WR WKH SHUVRQ ZKR¶V D KRPHRZQHU EHFDXVH KLVWRU\ WKH
QXPEHUV WROG \RX WKDW WKH SHRSOH SHUIRUPHG EHWWHU´ (Interview 20: 
Risk Manager, large UK retail bank, February 2007). 
 
The scorecard analysts then use statistical software to isolate a number of 
consumer characteristics from their entire consumer database and those of credit 
reference agencies, which is achieved by processing characteristics through 
regression analysis. Once these characteristics have been chosen they will be 
used in the scorecard, as suggested below: 
 
³«ZHWKURZWKRVHDW WKHUHJUHVVLRQDQG WKHUHJUHVVLRQSURFHVVZLOO
KDQGOH WKH LQWHUDFWLRQV EHWZHHQ WKH GDWD LWHPV« WKH ZD\ WKDW WKH
process works is that you set in the variables one at a time and there 
are various statistical packages that allow you to do that one at a time, 
\RX FDQ GURS WKLQJV RXW ODWHU RQ ZKHQ QHZ YDULDEOHV FRPH LQ´
(Interview 16: Director of Risk, credit referencing agency, December 
2007). 
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The research could not find a clear consensus regarding what qualifies as a 
statistically significant value for the correlation between two variables, although 
analysts use manuals and texts to help them decide. One lender accepted 
consumer characteristics when there was a 95 per cent probability that there was a 
relationship between a variable and the probability that it will lead to a default. The 
analysts look for strong statistical relationships, for example, people who have lived 
at the same address for a longer period of time are statistically more likely to repay 
their debts. Once again, analysts seek to understand the mechanisms behind 
these statistical relationships to minimise the risk that these relationships are 
accidental. This variable will then be accepted for the scorecard as illustrated 
below:  
  
³«\RXWDNHDVDPSOHRIGDWDDQGWKHQ\RXPD\H[WUDFW-40 pieces 
of information from the application form, we store over 200 pieces 
from the credit bureau so you have 250 potentially explanatory 
variables, so stage one is look at the relationship between each of 
those variables, individually, good-bad, default, non-default, then we 
look at them one at a time and say there is some predictive power 
WKHUH«´ ,QWHUYLHZ  'LUector of Risk, credit referencing agency, 
December 2007). 
 
Although each UK lender undertakes analysis using their own data and produces a 
different scorecard to the other lenders, the characteristics are very similar 
according to one interviewee: 
 
³«HYHU\body thinks they have the holy grail, but they tend to have 
pretty much the same characteristics, typically you can take 20 
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characteristics and 8 feature in all45 [scorecards]´ (Interview 12: 
Trade Industry Spokesperson, January 2007). 
 
Once the predictive consumer characteristics have been chosen, the analysts 
develop the scores that will be associated with characteristics, as illustrated in 
Figure 6.2. The coefficients from the regression analysis are used to develop the 
scores. Once this has been achieveG DQDO\VWV GHYHORS WKH QXPHULFDO µDFFHSW¶
µUHIHU¶DQGµGHFOLQH¶WKUHVKROGV by applying the scorecard to the customer database 
to see how many people will default on their accounts and if this is acceptable for 
the business. The thresholds can then be altered to increase or decrease the 
number of potential defaults, as detailed below:  
 
³«\RXPLJKWGRDUHJUHVVLRQWKDWZD\LVWKHUHDQ\OLQNEHWZHHQWKLV
[characteristic] , how are they weighted to these [characteristics], [in] 
WKHROGGD\V\RX¶GJXHVVKRZ PDQ\SRLQWV\RX¶GJLYH WR WKHPSOD\
with it, a statistical programme will decide the weightings, time at 
address [will be allocated a score of] 0-1, 1-2, 2-5, 5-10, the 
programme will do it for you, it might split into stupid chunks like 
3.965-4.713, you use judgement...so these tools split the data into 
VRPHWKLQJ DQG FRPH XS ZLWK DQ DOJRUK\WKP WKDW ZHLJKWV WKHP´  
(Interview 5: Director of Risk Management, large UK retail bank, 
February 2007). 
 
The new scorecard is then tested on the available data of past customers that the 
lender has previously financed, as the lender already knows which consumers 
ZHUH µJRRG¶ DQG µEDG¶ GHEWV 7KH FRQVXPHU GDWD LV SURFHVVHG E\ WKH QHZ
                                                 
45
 This does not mean that all scorecards have the same 8 characteristics, but that 8 out of 
potentially 20 characteristics may be present in any one scorecard. 
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scorecard to see how accurate it is at uncovering past losses, which can be 
checked against the record of actual defaults. Once the lender knows how 
accurate the new scorecard is, it can be used to forecast how many potential bad 
debts may occur, as an interviewee explained: 
 
³«\RXFDQDSSO\WKHVFRUHFDUGWKDW\RX¶YHGHYHORSHGWRWKRVHSHRSOH
and work out what they would [have] all scored, to get the distribution 
which shows, lets say the score was between 0-50, and you could see 
how many people scored 0-10, 11-«LI \RX ORRNHG at 41-50 you 
could see what the arrears rate was, it might be 5 per cent, erm 
QRZ«ZKDW \RX¶UH UHDOO\ VD\LQJ LV WKDW ZKDW \RX¶UH H[SHFWLQJ LQ WKH
IXWXUH«EDVLFDOO\ ZH XVH LW DV D WRRO VR WKDW ZH NQRZ ZKDW OHYHO RI
DUUHDUV ZH¶UH SUHSDUHG WR DFFHSW DQG WKDW¶V KRZ ZH EDVH RXU
GHFLVLRQV DQG FRQILGHQFH´ (Interview 20: Risk Manager, large UK 
retail bank, February 2007). 
 
Once these scores and thresholds have been developed, the points can be used to 
XSGDWH WKH OHQGHU¶V FUHGLW VFRULQJ VRIWZDUH:KHQ DPRUWJDJHDSSOLFDQW¶V GHWDLOV
DUH DGGHG LQWR DQRQOLQH IRUP ZKHWKHU LQ D EUDQFKPRUWJDJHEURNHUV¶RIILFH RU
RYHUWKHLQWHUQHWWKH\DUHVFRUHGLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHOHQGHU¶VQHZVFRUHFDUG 
 
The fourth stage to scorecard production is to check that the card is continuing to 
DFFXUDWHO\VHSDUDWHµJRRG¶DQGµEDG¶FXVWRPHUVRYHUWLPH7KHUHDUHWKUHHZD\VLQ
which a scorecard can fail to discriminate between good and bad customers 
accurately. The first factor is time: Hand (2005) argues that as soon as a scorecard 
is implemented it is out of date, because the scores and thresholds are based on 
the performance of historic customers. Once a scorecard is used, new customers 
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DUHDGGHG WR WKH OHQGHU¶VGDWDEDVHDQG WKHVFRUHFDUG LVQR-longer based on all 
the available information:  
 
³«VFRUHFDUGVDUHEDVHGRQ WKHDVVXPSWLRQ WKDW WKHSDVWZLOOSUHGLFW
the future, if you have no information about the past or you are going 
LQWR D QHZ IXWXUH WKHQ WKH DVVXPSWLRQ GRHVQ¶W KROG´ (Interview 16: 
Director of Risk, credit referencing agency, December 2007). 
The second issue concerns societal changes. For example, Burton et al, (2004) 
observe how many self-employed consultants earn large amounts of money, but 
were previously perceived by bankers to have an unstable income, and were 
included with other, often low paid individuals, who also had unstable, non-linear 
incomes. As this has changed, some scorecards slowly became out of date as they 
would reject self-employed applicants, even if they were wealthy. The third factor is 
due to a shift in the market. For example, a prime lender may want to offer 
mortgages to subprime customers, which its prime customer scorecard would 
immediately reject. Consequently, scorecards are reviewed on a regular basis 
taking the companies business model as well as new data into consideration, as 
illustrated below: 
³«HYHU\VFRUHFDUGZLOOKDYHDQDQQXDOUHYLHZZKLFKZLOOEHLV LWVWLOO
fit for purpose? Is it working? DR ZH WKLQN LW¶V WLPH ZH UHEXLOW LW
because the population¶s shifted or [the] Gini [coefficient]ZKDW¶VXVHG
to measure the performance of it haVIDOOHQ"´ (Interview 5: Director of 
Risk Management, large retail bank, February 2007). 
Some lenders will check their scorecards every three months, or more frequently, 
during an economic downturn. During this time the ability of a scorecard to 
GLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQµJRRG¶DQGµEDG¶FXVWRPHUVZLOO IOXFWXDWHUHTXLULQJWKHVFRUHV
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on the scorecarG WR EH HLWKHU UHFDOLEUDWHG RU WKH µ$FFHSW µ5HIHU¶ DQG µ'HFOLQH¶
thresholds to be adjusted. The deterioration of a scorecard can be measured in two 
ZD\V)LUVW WKHUHPD\EHDVWHDG\ LQFUHDVH LQGHIDXOWVRQ WKH OHQGHU¶VPRUWJDJH
book. The second method is to analyse the Gini Coefficient that measures the 
ability of a scorecard to rank order risk46.  
The Gini Coefficient has in the past been used by economic geographers as an 
alternative to nearest neighbour analysis and utilises the comparison of percentage 
frequencies (Smith 1975). During the quantitative revolution, the use of techniques 
such as the Gini Coefficient became commonplace in order to investigate the 
concentration of economic activity across space, such as, the density of industry 
(Smith 1975). A series of paradigm shifts in economic geography soon displaced 
the popularity of quantitative methods, which were dismissed for their lack of 
explanatory power, powerlessness to contribute towards the overturn of class 
struggle and inability to capture the creativity of the cultural industries. However, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, the statistical methods continued to be used 
outside economic geography by credit analysts and the Gini coefficient became an 
important tool in the evaluation of scorecards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 http://www.rhinorisk.com/Publications/Gini%20Coefficients.pdf (Accessed 14/04/2008). 
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Figure 6.4: $/RUHQ]&XUYHVKRZLQJDVHOHFWLRQRIµJRRG¶DQGµEDG¶DFFRXQWVVHOHFWHGE\D
hypothetical scorecard. 
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Figure 6.4 shows a Lorenz Curve that is used to illustrate the effectiveness of a 
VFRUHFDUG WKURXJK WZR GLVWULEXWLRQV ZKLFK DUH FDVHV RI µJRRG¶ DQG µEDG¶ FUHGLW
accounts, selected for a hypothetical scorecard. The Lorenz Curve is used as a 
measure of statistical dispersion (Shaw and Wheeler 1994), and as scorecards 
VHHNWRVSOLWµJRRG¶DQGµEDG¶FXVWRPHUVLQWRWZRVHSDUDWHJURXSVVFRUHFDUGVWKDW
have a greater dispersion are better at sorting customers into the two categories. 
The two distributions are illustrated through the Lorenz Curve. If the Curve were to 
follow the diagonal line, then there would be no distribution difference between the 
two variables. In such a scenario, the scorecard¶V DELOLW\ WR GLIIHUHQWLDWH EHWZHHQ
µJRRG¶ RU µEDG¶ ULVN FRQVXPHUV ZRXOG EH QR EHWWer than chance or luck, a trait 
belonging to a very poor scorecard. The area between the diagonal line and the 
Lorenz Curve is the Gini Coefficient (Smith 1975; Shaw and Wheeler 1994), which 
LVXVHGWRPHDVXUHDVFRUHFDUG¶VDELOLW\ WRVXFFHVVIXOO\VHSDUDWHµJRRG¶DQGµEDG¶
customers. If the Coefficient is one, then the scorecard is working perfectly but as it 
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decreases towards zero, it shows a decrease in the scorecards ability to separate 
SRWHQWLDOO\ µJRRG¶ DQG µEDG¶ FXVWRPHUV 7KLV LV VKRZQ LQ )LJXUH  XVLQJ D
hypothetical example. As the Coefficient decreases over time the level of defaults 
will increase. Figure 6.5 also illuVWUDWHV KRZ WKH VFRUHFDUG¶V SHUIRUPDQFH LV
improved once it has been reviewed and recalibrated, in this case every three 
months, demonstrated by the breaks.  
Figure 6.5: 7KHK\SRWKHWLFDOPLJUDWLRQRIDVFRUHFDUG¶VµSUHGLFWLYHSRZHU¶RYHUWLPH 
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The scorecard, the final product of the analysis, is constantly evolving as its 
thresholds and scores are frequently adjusted and it should be viewed, not as a 
static set of codes, but a dynamic network of human expertise, skills and 
techniques. The corresponding spaces of financial inclusion and exclusion are also 
dynamic as they are reshaped by these scorecard changes. As scorecard 
production continues to evolve, introducing new techniques and data sets, the 
spaces of inclusion and exclusion will come to reflect these changes.  
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This review of the production and management of scorecards begins to 
problematize some of the key tenets of credit scoring. On the one hand, credit 
scoring can be considered fair and unbiased as claimed by the FLA (2000), as all 
consumers are judged on the same criteria and are allotted the same number of 
points. On the other hand, credit scoring can be seen as a standardised 
WHFKQRORJ\ EXW LW FDQQRW EH VHHQ DV KDYLQJ WKH µVFLHQWLILF¶ TXDOLWLHV RI EHLQJ DQ
objective and quantitative technology. Credit scoring technology does not, and 
cannot, find universal truths, and should be viewed as a decision-making tool that 
is constantly subject to revision rather than a scientific artefact, leading to the 
conclusion WKDW WKH µREMHFWLYLW\¶ RI FUHGLW VFRULQJ¶V PHWKRGRORJ\ is questionable. 
Even though scorecards use statistical techniques favoured by the natural 
sciences, the chapter has argued that the data and practices used are not purely 
quantitative; they consist of a quantitative-qualitative hybrid. This information is 
subjected to the application of human judgements and tacit knowledge to 
understand and add meanings to produce the scores and thresholds.  
 
6.6. The uneven geographies of credit data 
 
The accuracy of credit scoring is determined by the quality and range of the 
available consumer data maintained by credit referencing agencies. However, the 
geographies of consumer data vary significantly by country dependent on a series 
of tensions between the different actors who regulate and own the data. As such, 
there is a significant difference between the information held on consumer 
characteristics used in the UK and US. In the US, the credit referencing agencies 
own consumer data, while in the UK data is owned by the lenders, even though it is 
stored by the credit referencing agencies. This led to the development of an 
informal steering committee in the UK called the Steering Committee On 
Reciprocity (SCOR) that mediates the regulation of data exchange. As one 
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interviewee explained, 6&25¶VFRPPLWWHHFRQVLVWVRILQGXVWUy representatives and 
consumer credit lenders and it aims to govern what types of consumer data can be 
used for in applicant selection: 
 
³«[SCOR] was set up in the early 1980s, it has a very clear mandate 
DQGVHWRILQVWUXFWLRQV«WKH&$V [credit reference agencies] have a 
seat on SCOR and each of the trade bodies, depends on the size and 
VFRSHVR%%$$3$&6&0/)/$«VRQHZLGHDVRQKRZWKHGDWD
can be used goes to that body and all of those decisions get referred 
back to the trade bodies, they make a decision on if their members 
DUHKDSS\ZLWK WKHXVHRI WKDWGDWD´ (Interview 10: Director of Risk, 
credit referencing agency, November 2007). 
 
This committee seeks to synthesise a dialectal problem experienced by lenders. 
Lenders benefit from maximising their access to consumer information through 
SCOR, as it allows lenders to expand their credit portfolio by correctly identifying 
µJRRG¶ FRQVXPHUV XVLQJ WKH GDWD ZKLOH H[FOXGLQJ FXVWRPHUV ZKR SRWHQWLDOO\
represent adverse credit risks. Access to additional credit data also allows lenders 
to segment the credit market more accurately, and promote new products to the 
µULJKW¶ SHRSOH 7KLV EHFRPHV DFRPSHWLWLYHSUREOHP DV VRPH OHQGHUV ZLOO EHQHILW
more than others, so SCOR seeks to decide how much information to share, and 
retain, as suggested below: 
 
³«, WKLQN D QXPEHU RI RUJDQLsations realised that there were some 
competitive aspects to whether or not they wanted their competitors to 
do some things with their data and there was a realisation that there 
was a need for regulations and what could and could not be done with 
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the data³ (Interview 10: Director of Risk, credit referencing agency, 
November 2007). 
 
In the UK, licenses are required from the Office of Fair Trading (Interview 9: 
Electoral Services Manager, borough council, October 2006), to permit credit 
referencing agencies to gain access to electoral information. This information 
includes consumer names and addresses from councils and forms the foundations 
RI DOO FUHGLW UHSRUWV 7KH XVH RI GDWD LV DOVR FRYHUHG E\ WKH 8.¶V ,QIRUPDWLRQ
&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V 2IILFH ,&2 ZKR SROLFH WKH HQIRUFHPHQW RI WKH 8.¶V 'DWD
Protection Act (1998) regulating what consumer data can be used, and how it is 
used. Credit reference agencies are exempt from having to ask permission from 
consumers to use their data to create credit files47. When comparing the 
LQWURGXFWLRQRIUHJXODWLRQZLWKFUHGLWVFRULQJ¶VORQJHUKLVWRU\ LWEHFRPHVFOHDUWKDW
the regulatory landscape has undergone significant changes since credit scoring 
began. As the following quote suggests, the industry has changed accordingly: 
 
³«WKH data protection regime in this country has changed a lot over 
WKHSDVW\HDUVZHFDQ¶WUHOHDVHWKHVRUWRIGDWDWKDWZHKDYHLQWKH
SDVW« DQG [it] ZLOO FRQWLQXH WR HYROYH RYHU WLPH´ (Interview 16: 
Director of Risk, credit referencing agency, December 2007). 
 
Over the years SCOR has also changed its view on what information can be 
shared amongst lenders. There has been a tendency for the industry to disclose 
information on consumers that previously would have been kept private, as an 
interviewee explains:  
 
                                                 
47
 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/practical_application/credit_%2
0agreements%20-%20data_%20sharing.pdf (Accessed: 28/02/2008). 
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 ³«DW RQH WLPH \RX FRXOGQ¶W XVH WKH GDWD DW DOO IRU DQ\ QRQ-risk or 
IUDXG DFWLYLW\ EXW 6&25¶V YLHZ KDV FKDQJHG«VR LI VRPHERG\ ZKR
was a customer in the last few years, you can check their appetite for 
further credit and more credit from you, 15 years ago that was a no, 
QR«>³@,¶PQRWKDYLQJ%DQN;SRDFKP\EHVWFXVWRPHUV>³@ but attitudes 
KDYH FKDQJHG´ (Interview 16: Director of Risk, credit referencing 
agency, December 2007). 
 
$QLPSRUWDQWOLPLWDWLRQRI6&25¶VUHJXODWLRQLVWKDWLWFXUUHQWO\SUHYHQWVthe sharing 
of credit information with other actors that would find the information useful in 
preventing, or reducing, adverse economic events, in particular the bond-rating 
agencies. Bond-rating agency access to SCOR-regulated data is restricted to a few 
datasets from individual lenders, datasets which include information on CCJs and 
the loan-to-value ratios of mortgages. If bond-rating agencies were able to access 
additional credit referencing agency data they would be potentially able to measure 
default risk more accurately, and independently, which could be used to structure 
RMBS notes, making them more robust. However, due to the reciprocal 
arrangement of data exchange between lenders, bond-rating agencies are 
currently blocked from accessing consumer data by SCOR, because bond-rating 
agencies do not provide any information.  
 
There is a changing national geography of credit scoring and this geography is 
underpinned by the political geographies of different nation-states and their specific 
regulatory powers, or absence of them, which governs the control of consumer 
data. CRQWUROOLQJ ZKLFK W\SHV RI GDWD FUHGLW EXUHDX¶V DUH SHUPLWWHG WR KROG DQG
which data sets lenders can use in their scorecards. A second geography is 
centred on the quality of available credit data, as countries that have a more 
extensive and advanced retail consumer credit market have access to more 
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detailed data.  Although some geo-demographic data can be used in the UK, it is 
only a small part of the many variables used in credit scoring and it cannot be used 
solely to reject an application.  
 
One scorecard analyst discussed how they had not used postcodes in UK 
scorecards for a number of years as the UK now has access to a substantial 
amount of historical data on individual consumers, especially their repayment 
histories. Although the implicitly geographical postcode indicator has been 
removed, this does not mean that geography has ceased to matter in the UK 
housing market. Socio-economic status and the desire to live in particular areas, 
for example urban living with young executives, or suburban living near high-quality 
schools, continue to reinforce clustering of consumers with particular 
characteristics into specific postcodes. The key difference is the delineation of 
postcode areas in exchange for more clusters of consumers, whose individual 
demographic and financial characteristics are more explicit and effective at 
explaining default rates, than segmented postcode data. Consequently, red-lining 
is not as useful at preventing defaults as are other variables which provide a more 
JUDQXODU QDUUDWLYH RI D FRQVXPHU¶V ILQDQFLDO KLVWRU\ VXFK DV DJH RU RFFXSDWLRQ
Based on this premise, the UK can be considered as having the most advanced 
credit referencing agency data in Europe and countries without this data, such as 
the Netherlands, continue to use postcodes (see Aalbers 2005a; 2005b) as these 
codes provide a rudimentary, but predictive indicator of an indLYLGXDO¶V DELOLW\ WR
repay their debt. There is a specific geography to the quality and range of the credit 
referencing data available within Europe, which is dependent on the historical 
legacies of consumer credit markets. According to one interviewee, the availability 
of credit data varies markedly between countries: 
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³,Q)UDQFHWKHUHLVQRFUHGLWEXUHDX\RXFDQJHW [data] from Banque 
de France, [but] you can get a negative-RQO\ ILOH VR LI \RX¶UH
SURVHFXWHGLW¶VRQILOH,Q6SDLQLW¶VDQHJDWLYHRQO\-fiOHVR«WKHTXDOLW\
is nowhere near as good, Germany is a halfway house in that you 
GRQ¶W KDYH SRVLWLYH GDWD EXW \RX KDYH GHOLQTXHQW GDWD DV ZHOO DV
GHIDXOWV ,W¶V WKHVDPH LQ WKH1HWKHUODQGV ,WDO\¶VDELWEHWWHUDV WKH\
KDYH SRVLWLYH GDWD«LW¶V GLIIHUHQW Fountries, with different cultural 
KLVWRULHVGLIIHUHQW UHJXODWLRQV´ (Interview 16: Director of Risk, credit 
referencing agency, December 2007). 
 
As the UK credit referencing agencies hold positive data, it allows the market to be 
segmented more finely, anG KDV HQDEOHG WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH 8.¶V FRPSOH[
range of mortgage products. However, having access to better data does not 
guarantee immunity to consumer defaults. It can be argued that the US ± where 
credit scoring and credit data collection has its roots - had some of the highest 
quality credit data in the world, but this did not prevent US consumers defaulting in 
ODUJH QXPEHUV RQ WKHLU PRUWJDJH UHSD\PHQWV &UHGLW VFRULQJ¶V PHWKRGRORJLFDO
shortcomings were undermined by lenders¶ PLVXVH RI data to produce high-risk 
mortgage products, and the poor quality of data supplied by consumers and 
lenders, either as a result of fraud, or through negligent mortgage brokers miss-
selling products (Immergluck 2008). As has become painfully clear, credit scoring 
is only ever as reliable as the data on which it is based.  
 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to provide a detailed explanation of credit scoring, and in 
doing so, it has sought to demystify its internal workings. The aim was to elaborate 
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on the specific stages involved in credit scoring, by situating the process of scoring 
in a wider context of its production and maintenance, so as to view it as a socio-
technology. This is contingent on the different types of available information that 
DUHYLHZHGDVKDYLQJWKHDELOLW\WRGLVWLQJXLVKFRQVXPHUVDVEHLQJµJRRG¶RU µEDG¶
risks. The circumstances surrouQGLQJFUHGLWVFRULQJ¶VRULJLQVDQGH[SDQVLRQLQWKH
US were explored. The implementation of credit scoring in the UK was a result of 
lenders having to reduce their bad debts, and to reduce the cost of processing 
mortgages while increasing processing speeds, against an environment of 
increasing deregulation. The chapter also attempted to explain how FUHGLWVFRULQJ¶V
power is derived through the alignment of heterogeneous materials and human 
relations. This leads the thesis to identify the VRXUFHRIFUHGLWVFRULQJ¶VSRZHUIURP 
its ability to position itself as an obligatory passage point that provides access to 
credit for those who desire it, through the practice of surveillance and epistemic 
knowledge. As such, I have argued that credit scoring, as an actor-network, in 
addition to enrolling borrowers, actively works to exclude specific actors bearing 
particular attributes from joining the network.  
 
This chapter has also highlighted the process used to develop scorecards, and in 
doing so, sought to stress the importance of human expertise developed in a 
specific epistemic community that is responsible for developing the codes used by 
credit scoring software. Although credit scoring is automated and quantitative, it is 
still reliant on social judgements. It was outlined how the spaces of financial 
inclusion and exclusion evolve over time as the ability of scorecards to segment 
consumers accurately, varies over time too. There is not a homogenous geography 
of credit data, but multiple geographies of credit data that are subject to self-
regulation by lenders, but are also governed by nation-states. These interactions 
affect the geographies of credit information temporally within a state, but also 
between different nation-states. This is dependent on governments who decide 
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what credit data can be used, but is also governed by the history and extent of a 
countU\¶V FUHGLW PDUNHW &RXQWULHV WKDW KDYH D ORQJHU OHJDF\ RI FRQVXPHU FUHGLW
have records of consumer behaviour that are more extensive and predictive when 
used in credit scoring. However, the chapter also argues that the standardised and 
objective politics of credit scoring and its subsequent data are open to abuse. The 
US, arguably, has access to some of the most extensive credit data in the world 
but its misuse, or omission, contributed to the US subprime mortgage crisis, and 
the development of the credit crunch. Immergluck has drawn attention to fraudulent 
applications made in the US and if the data passed through credit-scoring systems 
is not legitimate then the scorecard will not perform its job effectively. 
 
The dissertation will now turn to look at how the mortgage assets produced in 
regional finance centres, through the assistance of credit scoring, are financially 
reengineered into RMBS bonds by investment banks and law firms before they are 
sold to investors. 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
(Re)structuring and the spaces of RMBS production 
 
 
³>&@RPPRGLWLHV DUH QRW VROG IRU PRQH\ EXW IRU D ZULWWHQ SURPLVH WR
SD\ IRU WKHP DW D FHUWDLQ GDWH«6XFK ELOOV RI H[FKDQJH LQ WKHLU WXUQ
circulate as means of payment until the day on which they fall due; 
and they form commercial money in the strict meaning of the term. To 
the extent that they ultimately balance one another by the 
compensation of credits and debts, they serve absolutely as money, 
VLQFH QR WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ LQWR DFWXDO PRQH\ WDNHV SODFH´ (Marx 1909 
[1876]:469-70). 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
:KHQ 1RUWKHUQ 5RFN EHJDQ LWV GHPLVH SULRU WR LWV QDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ WKH PHGLD¶V
preoccupation with long lines of ordinary consumers queuing on British high-streets 
to withdraw their savings neglected to follow the other emerging stories 
surrounding the bank, including its role in establishing a family of independent 
FRPSDQLHVWKDWKDGSURYHGFULWLFDOLQIDFLOLWDWLQJWKHPRUWJDJHEDQN¶VUDSLGJURZWK
Attention was drawn to these companies when it was revealed that a small, 
regional charity, WKH 'RZQ¶V 6\QGURPH 1RUWK (DVW $VVRFLDWLRQ '61($ ZDV
linked to an offshore, Jersey based company called the Granite Master Trust, 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWK1RUWKHUQ5RFN¶VDPELWLRXVVHFXULWLVDWLRQSURJUDPPH'61($KDG
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been named ± without their knowledge - as the beneficiary of a charitable trust that 
owned Granite; a company with no employees, offices, or assets with the 
exception of billions of pounds of UK mortgages (Cobain and Griffiths 2007). The 
organisers of DSNEA were stunned to learn that they were the beneficiary of a 
company that owned more mortgage assets than Northern Rock, and confused as 
WR ZK\ WKH\ KDG QHYHU UHFHLYHG DQ\ µEHQHILWV¶ GHVSLWH EHLQJ QDPHG DV D
beneficiary.  
 
The geographical relationships that connect a regional charity based in the north 
east and an offshore company in Jersey, while appearing obscure, form a legal 
structure commonly used in structured finance transactions in the UK by 
centralised lenders and retail banks. For example, Birmingham Midshires operated 
its securitisation programme through a family of companies called Pendleford; 
$EEH\¶V DVVRFLDWHG FRPSDQLHV DUH QDPHG +ROPHV ZKLOH WKH WURXEOHG OHQGHU
+%26¶V FRPSDQLHV ZHUH LURQLFDOO\ FDOOHG 3HUPDQHQW 7KH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKHVH
companies enables lenders to financially engineer the income streams from 
mortgages in an attempt to reduce the risks borne from both taxation and credit 
defaults, before selling the residential mortgage-backed bonds to investors.  
 
Earlier, this thesis outlined how mortgages are produced and how lenders attempt 
to manage credit risk by financially excluding consumers who are considered to be 
unlikely to successfully repay their mortgage. It also illustrated how mortgage 
lenders attempt to repackage their mortgage assets (Langley 2006) through 
securitisation in order to increase the volumes of their consumer lending and 
profits. The aim of this chapter is to explore the geographies involved in the 
performance of securitisation and the attempts of epistemic elites to minimise two 
specific types of risk: the risk of taxation and the restructuring of credit risk.  
Section 7.2 will briefly outline the roles of different actors that are involved in 
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performing securitisation. Section 7.3 will explore the geographies of securitisation 
that emerge in an attempt to reduce tax risk. Section 7.4 will examine how 
epistemic elites engineer space in an attempt to reduce the geographical effects of 
credit defaults for selected RMBS notes. The final section, 7.5, will conclude the 
chapter. 
 
7.2.   Interfaces, boundaries and expertise 
 
Once a mortgage lender has decided to securitize all, or part, of its mortgage 
portfolio, it will usually take between two and four months to complete the 
transaction. Thrift (1994) highlights how financial products and innovations are 
produced at the boundaries of firms, where they require additional skill sets and 
knowledges to supplement their own expertise and production of financial 
products. The performance of securitisation is no different, as mortgage lenders 
require the unique, expertise from a variety of different financial service providers 
to successfully complete each securitized transaction. These firms, and the expert 
knowledges embedded within their analysts and managers, include: investment 
banks, law firms and corporate management firms. Both contemporary economic 
geographers and social scientists have drawn attention to the importance of 
epistemic elites, especially within finance and legal professions, (Thrift 1994; Pryke 
and Lee 1995; Leyshon and Thrift 1997; Faulconbridge 2007; Pryke and du Gay 
2007). These epistemic elites are involved in the development of RMBS bonds 
through their ability to interpret and manipulate complex information, perform 
analysis; and to collect and disseminate new financial knowledge through formal 
networks such as training (Hallsworth and Skinner 2008), but also through informal 
networks consisting of trusted colleagues and associates (Thrift 1994).  
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The social relationships, shared languages, knowledges and interpretational skills 
of financial elites are central to the development and practice of financial markets. 
Leyshon and Thrift (1997) argue how the City of London can be represented by 
four overlapping actor-networks: the nation-state; the media; money capitalists and 
machine intelligence ± which can be used to interpret how these networks enable 
the City to function as a finance centre. This perspective can be used to 
understand why London became the European centre for securitisation. The City of 
London is constituted through dense networks of financial expertise, is inhabited by 
money capitalists who are assisted by professionals practicing accountancy and 
law, is provided with favourable political regulation that allows new financial 
innovations to be nurtured, facilitated by machine intelligence, while information 
technology, circulates knowledges and ideas through the media. The adoption and 
deveORSPHQWRIVHFXULWLVDWLRQ LQ WKH8.FDQEHDWWULEXWHG WR WKH&LW\¶VKHULWDJH LQ
implementing new financial innovations and technologies. Clark (2002) discusses 
how London has historically engineered financial instruments for the European 
PDUNHWWKH&LW\¶V LQQRYDWLRQVDLGHGE\WKHLQWHUDFWLRQVEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWILQDQFLDO
institutions that have emerged over time (Leyshon and Thrift 1997).  
 
The clustering of financial institutions was spatially enforced by the Bank of 
England which demanded that banks reside within the Square Mile, for clearing 
and surveillance purposes, a rule not relaxed until as late as 1985 for foreign banks 
(Pryke 1991). The effects of this spatial regulation and the consequent clustering of 
financial institutions fostered the development of what Knorr-Cetina (1999) refers to 
as an epistemic culture. Epistemic cultures are networks of individuals, that 
EHFRPH HQWZLQHG WKURXJK DIILQLW\ QHFHVVLW\ DQG µKLVWRULFDO FRLQFLGHQFH¶ ZKLFK
governs what people know, and how they know it (Knorr-Cetina 1999). These 
µFXOWXUHVRINQRZLQJ¶GHWHUPLQHKRZNQRZledge is generated and validated, which 
became solidified as banking professionals began to form epistemic communities, 
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through their spatial proximity and shared financial knowledges, circulated through 
face-to-face networks that became entrenched within financial markets. The 
epistemic FXOWXUHV RI /RQGRQ¶V ILQDQFLDO FRPPXQLW\ KDYH FRQWLQXHG WR HYROYH
stimulated by social and regulatory change. For example, the homo-social nature 
RI µJHQWOHPDQO\ FDSLWDOLVP¶ WKDW H[LVWHG SULRU WR WKH %LJ %DQJ¶  JRYHUQHG WKH
behaviour and practices of financial firms and their employees, through tight-knit, 
self-regulation (Leyshon and Thrift 1997; Augar 2000; Cain and Hopkins 2002). 
After the Big Bang, new epistemic elites became embedded in the fabric of the 
City, which were no longer exclusively male and from public schools, but were 
literate in complicated modelling procedures and banking techniques ready to 
adopt new financial  innovations, technologies,  and later managerial discourses 
(Pryke 1991). 
 
US investment banks developed a strong presence in the City, through 
representative offices during the 1960s due in part to their participation in the 
Euromarkets (Plender 1986), and deregulation in the 1970s, which witnessed an 
expansion of services offered by these investment banks while, additional US 
investment banks began to locate their European headquarters in London (Augar 
2000) as they were allowed membership of the London Stock Exchange. By the 
1980s Salomon Brothers, the firm that had pioneered and developed securitisation 
in the US, introduced RMBS securitisation to the City, when it began to securitize 
the mortgages of its centralised lender, The Mortgage Corporation, a company that 
it had established after the Financial Services Act (1986) (Lewis 1989; Pryke and 
Whitehead 1994) 6DORPRQ¶V DFWLYLWLHV LQWURGXFHG DQ HSLVWHPLF FXOWXUH RI
securitisation into London, based on its emergent expertise in securitizing 
residential mortgages in the US. These knowledges and skills were later 
introduced to continental Europe though the London headquarters of US 
investment banks.  
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The epistemic communities of lawyers in London provide essential services to the 
corporate finance sector, due to legal uncertainties and technicalities that concern 
everyday financial transactions. The legal advice supplied by these firms can 
include, but are not limited to, the legal implications surrounding contract and 
property law (Hartmann 1995) that affect lending and borrowing; which ensures 
that the knowledges of law firms and their partners becomes indispensible to 
investment banks involved in  the development of new financial products. The skills 
of UK law firms enabled the US practice of securitisation to become compatible 
with the UK¶VOHJDOODQGVFDSHZKLFKDV with the US investment banks, contributed 
WR/RQGRQ¶VVWDWXVDVWKH(XURSHDQFHQWUHIRUVHFXULWLVDWLRQ$V/RQGRQLVWKHVHDW
RI WKH 8.¶V Government, its legal system is situated in London, especially with 
UHJDUG WR WKH SURPLQHQW ODZ ILUPV ORFDWHG DURXQG /RQGRQ¶V /DZ &RXUWV DQG ODZ
societies in Holborn (Goddard 1973). Faulconbridge (2007) argues that this 
clustering is necessary as new knowledge is circulated through the law societies, 
including  their extensive social networks, and that being close to regulators 
enables law firms to  lobby for new regulation, which this thesis argues can have a 
profound affect on the feasibility of new financial innovations and technologies, 
such as securitisation. The proximity of lawyers is important, as face-to-face 
interactions fosters trust between legal practitioners, which grants credibility to new 
knowledges and interpretations surrounding the legal system (Goe et al. 2000). 
This also enables lawyers to discuss and interpret new ideas that are not easily 
transferable without face-to-face interactions (Faulconbridge 2007). The location of 
these firms in London is important to securitisation, as the lead managers of 
securitisations and corporate service providers are both located in London, making 
proximity an important attribute, necessary to nurture and maintain client 
relationships (Beaverstock et al. 1999). This is illustrated by the location of the law 
firms such as Clifford Chance and Allen Ovary in Canary Wharf, and other firms 
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such as Slaughter and May and Freshfields, close to the City, that are located near 
to the investment banks that manage and perform securitisation.  
 
London became the centre of UK securitisation, though the skills of the epistemic 
communities that are merged to produce RMBS notes on behalf of mortgage 
lenders. Before the complex and problematic process of securitisation begins, it is 
necessary for a mortgage lender to select the expert skills and knowledges from 
investment banks, law firms and corporate service providers, securitisation is 
performed on the boundaries of these different firms, and where mortgage-backed 
securities emerge as a product of their combined efforts. As one interviewee 
explained, the securitisation process begins when the lender invites investment 
banks and law firms to a meeting about the proposed issue of the notes: 
 
³We start off, and have the [investment] banks and the lawyers in and 
we have what we call a beauty parade and say wH¶YHJRWDQRWKHUGHDO
FRPLQJXSWKLVLVWKHFROODWHUDOZH¶YHJRWKRZ¶VWKHPDUNHWORRNLQJDW
the moment...we choose which [investment] banks we want to work 
with and which lawyers we want to work with,´,QWHUYLHZ Finance 
Director, centralised lender, September, 2007). 
 
The mortgage lender will select the supporting firms based upon the experience 
and particular attributes of these partner firms. If a lender has a frequent 
securitisation programme, where it securitizes its assets on a regular basis, there is 
a tendency for the firms to enlist the expertise of the same legal firms and 
investment banks, as their shared understanding of previous securitisations and 
LQWLPDWH NQRZOHGJH RI WKH OHQGHU¶V EXVLQHVV HQVXUHV WKDW WKH H[HFXWLRQ RI WKH
securitisation is performed smoothly as the lender, law firms and investment banks 
share tacit knowledge. On the other hand, mortgage lenders who make less 
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frequent securitisations - or indeed, may be securitising a pool of assets for the first 
time - seek to enlist the services of investment banks that are experienced in 
facilitating successful securitisations for other lenders. The competency of 
investment banks can be considered to be the most important attribute valued by 
mortgage lenders, especially if they are themselves inexperienced in securitisation, 
DVWKHLQYHVWPHQWEDQN¶VUROHZLOOEHPRUHVLJQLILFDQWLQVWUXFWXULQJWKHWUDQVDFWLRQ
,Q WKLV FDVH WKH DQDO\VWV RI LQYHVWPHQW EDQNV DUH LQYLWHG WR PHHW WKH OHQGHU¶V
treasury analysts to compete for the roles and promote their structured finance 
services, as suggested below:  
 
³«you look at leading investment banks, what their track record is, 
ZKLFKRWKHUGHDOVWKHUH¶YHEHHQLQYROYHGLQWKHQZHLQYLWHDQXPEHU
to come and present to us, or some may have already come in and 
presented to us, as a part of a routine funding visit, but then we select 
the ones that we think have the best competency and fit for what were 
ORRNLQJ IRU´ (Interview 4: Securitisation Manager, retail bank, 
September, 2007). 
  
The investment bank that manages the securitisation of the mortgage assets and 
UHHQJLQHHUV WKH LQFRPH VWUHDPV LV NQRZQ DV D µOHDG PDQDJHU¶ DQG WKLV ILUP
coordinates the transaction. Additional investment banks are involved in the 
marketing and sale of the RMBS notes, as they have access to different types of 
investors, different countries and different sectors, providing wide market coverage. 
This enhanced market coverage is required as large quantities of RMBS notes are 
produced from each securitisation, requiring a proportionally large pool of investors 
to purchase the notes. One manager highlighted how it was important to have 
working relationships with a series of different investment banks as the expertise 
and knowledge necessary for securitisation is embodied in specific analysts and 
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teams -  and consequently the specialist knowledge desired by a lender is mobile, 
circulating through specialist labour markets to competing investment banks:  
 
³We have a panel of banks who work for us on securitisation 
transactions, VR \HDK ZH¶OO JLYH LW WR WZR RU WKUHH EDQNV IRU WKH
WUDQVDFWLRQV«\RX GRQ¶W ZDQW WR EH UHOLDQW RQ DQ\ RQH EDQN RU DQ\
individual at any one bank because obviously teams and individuals 
FDQPRYH IURPEDQN WREDQN«DQG WKHVHDUHSUHWW\ELJ WUDQVDFWLRQV
so you need a big sales force to do this, ³,QWHUYLHZ: Securitisation, 
Manager, large retail bank, April, 2007).  
 
Law firms and the legal expertise of their lawyers are also integral to the 
performance of securitisation, as the sale of the mortgage assets and the RMBS 
notes generate a series of complex, multifaceted legal implications that are 
affected by contract, securities, tax and property laws. The geographies of 
securitisation also experience the indirect projection of the legal systems of 
different political economies onto UK lenders and their RMBS notes. Within the UK, 
for example, property law is different in England and Scotland, which requires the 
mortgage lender and investment banks to seek legal counsel from law firms in both 
England and Scotland, but when the RMBS notes are to be marketed in the US, 
which they frequently were, prior to the credit crunch, these notes must comply 
with US securities regulation, which requires legal advice from global law firms with 
expertise in US financial markets.  
 
Once a mortgage lender has selected the investment banks and law firms that best 
suit their needs, it will appoint the assistance of a corporate service provider. 
Corporate service providers perform an important role in securitisation because 
they manage and perform the administrative responsibilities on behalf of special 
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purpose vehicles (SPVs). Legally, SPVs function like any normal company, they 
produce annual reports and pay tax but effectively outsource all of their day-to-day 
operations. They do not have offices, or employees, and are managed by 
independent trustee managers, provided by the corporate service provider (Ferran 
1992; Langley 2006). The SPVs provide an important role in the securitisation 
process because they enable the ownership of mortgage assets to become legally 
separated from the mortgage lender (Langley 2006). The Granite Master Trust, for 
example is an SPV that holds the mortgage assets produced by Northern Rock on 
behalf of RMBS note investors. 
 
The separation between the mortgage lender and the assets that it has originated 
is essential for two reasons. First, it allows a bank to reduce its regulatory capital 
reserves providing the bank with more capital that it can deploy within the financial 
PDUNHWV 6HFRQG WKH DVVHWV EHFRPH µEDQNUXSWF\ UHPRWH¶ D OHJDO WHUP  ZKLFK
means that if the lender were to go bankrupt the repayments of the RMBS bonds to 
investors would continue uninterrupted, because the assets are owned by a 
company (a SPV) that is legally independent and separate from the lender48.  Each 
time a lender develops a new securitisation programme, a new family of SPVs are 
established by the lender to provide ownership of the mortgage assets on behalf of 
the investors. The chapter will now turn to examine how these families of SPVs are 
used to perform securitisations and reduce the exposure of the mortgage assets to 
the risk that rates of taxation, to which they are liable, may increase. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 ,IWKHOHQGHUJRHVEDQNUXSWWKHQWKHFRUSRUDWHVHUYLFHSURYLGHUVZLOODSSRLQWDµEDFN-
XSVHUYLFHU¶RUOHQGHUWRFROOHFWFRQVXPHUPRUWJDJHUHSD\PHQWVRQEHKDOIRIWKH
investors.  
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7.3. Securitisation: building a transaction structure 
 
As highlighted earlier, once a mortgage lender initiates the securitisation of a pool 
of its mortgages, it will, with the assistance of its chosen law firms and corporate 
service providers establish a family of SPVs. The securitisation process is 
complex, as one interviewee explained, because the mortgage assets are sold by 
the lender to a SPV which holds the titles of the mortgages, which then passes the 
mortgage repayments of consumers through a series of SPVs - known as the 
µVHFXULWLVDWLRQVWUXFWXUH¶ 
 
³«SHRSOHVD\\RXKDYHVROG\RXUPRUWJDJHV WR WKHERQGKROGHUV LQ
IDFW \RX KDYHQ¶W \RX¶YH VROG \RXU PRUWJDJHV WR D WUXVW«WKH WUXVW
RZQV 8. PRUWJDJHV´ (Interview 1: Treasury Director, large retail 
bank, December 2007). 
 
The research identified two reasons which explain why these mortgage assets are 
VROGWR639VDQGDUHQRWNHSWRQWKHPRUWJDJHOHQGHU¶VEDODQFH-sheet. First, retail 
banks choose to securitize their mortgage portfolios to obtain regulatory capital 
relief from Basel regulation ± a mechanism that governs UK retail banks. The 
introduction of capital adequacy ratios in 1988, called Basel, was a policy 
developed by the Bank of International Settlements, which was then applied and 
enforced by national governments49. The ratios were used to dictate the size of a 
EDQN¶V FDSLWDO UHVHUYHV WR FXUE WKH GLVDVWURXV HIIHFWV RI LOOLTXLGLW\ SUREOHPV
experienced by commercial banks after the developing world debt crisis (Leyshon 
and Thrift 1997). The capital ratio for mortgage assets is calculated by multiplying 
HLJKWSHUFHQWRIWKHYDOXHRIDEDQN¶VPRUWJDJHSRUWIROLRE\DULVNZHLJKWLQJRI
                                                 
49
 The regulation became known as Basel, after the place where the ratios were 
developed. These ratios are currently being replaced with new capital regulations, 
known as Basel II which is more sensitive to the particular risks of individual assets. 
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For example, if a bank has £1 billion in mortgage assets - and it is not uncommon 
for single RMBS issues to be measured in billions - it would have to retain £40 
million in capital reserves under the Basel regulation (Wainwright 2009). 
Consequently, the lender cannot maintain possession of the mortgage assets if it 
wants to reduce its regulatory reserves, but the investors do not want to buy the 
individual mortgage assets either, they want to purchase RMBS bonds bearing 
specific degrees of credit risk and bond yields. As such, the mortgage assets are 
transferred from the balance sheet of the bank to an intermediary, an SPV.  
 
Second, mortgage lenders frequently use securitisation to fund their mortgage 
business by exchanging the RMBS bonds with investors for fresh capital to be 
recycled through their lending business. The securitisation of a portfolio of 
mortgages enables the revenue streams from the mortgage assets to be 
reengineered ± which produces a range of new bonds that are exposed to varying 
ranges of credit default risk, identified through bond-rating metrics, illustrated in 
Table 7.1. The bond-ratings of RMBS notes usually range from AAA notes through 
to BB notes50.  The bonds that are perceived to bear the least amount of credit risk, 
by the rating agencies and investors are the AAA notes, which prior to the credit 
crunch were seen to bear a level of credit risk that is broadly equivalent to that of 
sovereign bonds51. The interest repayments to investors of AAA bonds are low, as 
the bond is assumed to have a low risk of credit default, while bonds exposed to 
greater credit risk, progressively moving towards the BB bonds, pay a greater 
return to investors, associated with the higher-likelihood of default52. As such, the 
investment banks attempt to reengineer the revenue streams to maximise the 
                                                 
50
 0RRG\¶VXVHVVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQWOHWWHULQJIRUHDFKW\SHRIERQGEXWWKHPHWULFVRIDOO
three are broadly equivalent. 
51
 )RUH[DPSOHD8.50%6$$$ERQG¶VULVNRIGHIDXOWZRXOGEHWKHVDPHDVD8.
gilt. 
52
 AAA RMBS interest rates usually pay investors less than one percent, plus the most 
recent three month LIBOR rate. 
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number of AAA bonds that can be issued from the pool of mortgages ± which 
enables the mortgage lender to obtain money from investors at the lowest possible 
price.  
 
Table 7.1: Bond-rating metrics for RMBS bonds 
 
 Low Risk    High Risk 
6WDQGDUG	3RRU¶V AAA AA A BBB BB 
Fitch Ratings AAA AA A BBB BB 
0RRG\¶V Aaa Aa A Baa Ba 
 
Sources: 6WDQGDUGDQG3RRU¶V)LWFK5DWLQJVDQG0RRG\¶V 
 
In order to obtain a AAA rating from the bond-rating agencies, the mortgages are 
moved to an SPV. Once the mortgage assets have been transferred to an SPV, 
the credit risk of the emergent notes is strictly limited to the mortgage assets ± as 
the assets are isolated from the credit risks of the lender. For example, if Bank A 
which has securitised its mortgages owes money and is in default to Bank B, Bank 
B cannot legally claim revenue from the mortgage assets because they are 
technically owned by a separate company. As such, a AAA metric can be issued 
by the bond-rating agencies as the assets are not linked to the issuing lender. The 
use of SPVs has enabled retail banks with lower credit ratings such as AA or A, to 
issue AAA rated RMBS notes, providing them with access to cheaper credit which 
they could not obtain through issuing MTNs53. In effect retail banks like Northern 
Rock, through the Granite Master Trust and its associated SPVs, establish a series 
of new companies to hold their mortgage assets ± managed by corporate service 
providers, before handing the ownership of these companies to charitable trusts, 
where the beneficiary is a registered charity, such as the DSNEA. 
 
                                                 
53
 Medium-Term Notes (MTNs), are similar to corporate bonds and mature over 5-10 
years and can only receive a bond-rating as high as the rating of the institution.  
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$V639VRSHUDWHOLNHµWUDGLWLRQDO¶8K companies, they continue to be liable for tax 
DQG DUH REOLJDWHG WR ILOH WKH FRPSDQ\¶V DFFRXQWV ZLWK &RPSDQLHV +RXVH $V
highlighted earlier, SPVs are unique because they have no employees or 
infrastructure, but as they are required to perform tasks such as filing accounts, 
independent directors are appointed to administer the company in advance by the 
mortgage lender, who in turn appoints auditors to file the annual accounts. SPVs 
DUHHVWDEOLVKHGLQDGYDQFHE\ODZILUPVEHIRUHWKH\DUHµVROG¶WRPRUWJDJH lenders 
at which point the ownership of these companies, and their mortgage assets, are 
transferred to a charitable trust. The directorship roles at these companies are 
transferred from the law firm to the directors of corporate service providers - for 
example, SFM Management and the Law Debenture Trust ± before the SPVs are 
prepared for use in the securitisation deal, as illustrated below:  
 
³6RPHRI WKH0DJLF&LUFOH ODZILUPV OLNH&OLIIRUG&KDQFH/LQNODWHUV
Freshfields, just have, they keep these compDQLHV RQ WKH VKHOI LW¶V
then simple, it exists as a company, it has shareholders, a company 
VHFUHWDU\WKHQWKRVHUROHVDUHWUDQVIHUUHGWRXV«,FDQJXDUDQWHHWKDW
DQ,NHDIODWSDFNLVLQILQLWHO\PRUHFRPSOLFDWHG´ (Interview 28: Director 
of a Corporate Service Provider, June, 2007). 
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Figure 7.1: A securitisation structure 
 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 7.1 illustrates the main SPVs that are used in a typical securitisation. These 
SPVs include; the Mortgage Trust SPV, Funding SPV and Issuer SPV. Once the 
639 VWUXFWXUH KDV EHHQ GHYHORSHG E\ WKH GHDO¶V ODZ\HUV DQG FRUSRUDWH VHUYLFH
providers, the deal is launched and the SPVs begin to fulfil their individual tasks, as 
suggested in the following quote: 
 
³«one day everything goes across [the structure] instantaneously, the 
SPV [mortgage trust] buys the assets off the originator, the SPV 
[Funding] passes the interest of those assets up to the trustee, the 
SPV [issuer] issues the notes and the cash [is passed] back to the 
RULJLQDWRU«DQGZKDW\RX¶UHOHIWZLWKLVDFRPSDQ\WKDWSHUIRUPVLWVWLOO
operates as a company, in the sense it has to produce accounts, it 
has WRGRFRPSDQLHVKRXVHILOLQJLWKDVWRKDYHGLUHFWRUV´ (Interview 
28: Director of a Corporate Service Provider, June, 2007). 
 
The originator, or mortgage lender, will sell the mortgage assets to the Mortgage 
Trust SPV to remove the assets from its balance-sheet and the mortgage 
repayments to the lender are then passed into a guaranteed income contract 
account (GIC), effectively a current account, operated by a commercial bank, on 
behalf of the SPV. The money is held in a GIC until it is required to pay the 
bondholders, usually every 90 days54. The Issuing SPV, that issues the notes to 
the bondholders, provides a series of loans to the Funding SPV, and the money 
received every 90 days from the GIC is used to repay the loans, where each loan 
corresponds to the categories of AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, used to repay the investors 
The money that the Funding SPV received from its loan to the Issuing SPV is used 
to purchase the mortgage payments from the Mortgage Trust SPV. The Funding 
                                                 
54
 As the money is stored in another bank account the money from mortgage repayments will 
not necessarily be from homeowners but from other deposits with the commercial bank. 
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639¶V PDLQ UROH LV WR SURYLGH IXQGLng for the transaction and also stabilises the 
revenue flows of the transaction through the use of currency and interest rate 
swaps to transform the repayments into different currencies for investors and to 
balance fixed mortgage repayments with floating interest rates. The Funding SPV 
may also have a liquidity facility provider that may provide cash in the form of a 
short-term loan to repay the bondholders, if the structure experiences a temporary 
shortfall in revenue flows, due to consumer defaults. 
 
The Mortgage Trust, Funding and Issuer SPVs are all owned by charitable trusts, 
for example the Granite Mortgage Trust, because under UK law there must be an 
owner for these companies, but it cannot be the mortgage lender. Using trust law, 
the charitable trusts are able to hold the shares of the SPVs on the behalf of 
charities, the named beneficiaries, who are unable to affect the day-to-day 
operations of the SPVs, but are able to benefit from any remaining monies from the 
company once the securitisation structure has been dismantled and the investors 
KDYHEHHQUHSDLG7KHµFKDULWDEOHWUXVW¶VWDWXVLV LPSRUWDQWIRUWKH0RUWJDJH7UXVW
SPV, as charitable trusts benefit from not having to pay income tax, investment tax, 
corporation tax, and capital gains tax under UK legislation. As one interviewee 
explained, once the mortgage assets were WUDQVIHUUHG RII WKH OHQGHU¶V EDODQFH-
sheet they are converted into new revenue streams and securities that would be 
liable for different taxes: 
 
³«OHW¶V PRYH VRPH DVVHWV ZKDWHYHU they are, into an SPV, right, 
ZKHQ\RXPRYHDVVHWVVWDPSGXW\«RK ULJKW ZHOO WKHUHJRHVRQH
SHUFHQWPD\EHRXWRIWKHGHDO«VHFRQGSUREOHPVRZHWKLQNRNZH
QHHGVRPHRQHWRVHUYLFHWKRVHDVVHWV«DUHWKH\DFWLQJDVDJHQWIRU
the SPV collecting that money, err, yes ok, right in which case they 
are undertaking a service, that service is then presumably VATable, 
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oh, exit 17.5 percent on VAT, bad idea, ok, next problem, [the] Trust 
sells consumer assets to an SPV, does it make a gain on those 
assets when it sells, them, maybe it did, ahh, capital gains tax, 
another capital tax hits you, does perhaps, is the income re-
FKDUDFWHULVHG IRU LQVWDQFH«GLG \RX ZULWH DQ\ LQWHUHVW UDWH
VZDSV«ZHUH WKHUH DQ\SURILWV IURP WKRVH VZDSV«DOO WKRVHVRUWVRI
things become serious problems, next thing is, how are you going to 
put flow, income flows from the assets into the SPV, they have to be 
divided between principle and interest flows, you also want a 
mechanism by which the lender can take back the excess spread 
EDFN«E\VHOOLQg the cash flows into a trust, which is a curious thing, 
this device, you can then reallocate the flows over the trust and they 
RQO\EHFRPHWD[DEOHZKHQWKH\HQGXSLQWKHLURZQWD[DEOHGRPDLQ´
(Interview 34:Ex-commercial Bank Director, July 2007). 
 
The use of SPVs during a securitisation enables the investment bankers, lawyers 
and the mortgage lenders to pursue a strategy of legal tax avoidance (Roberts 
1994; Quirk 1997) ZKLFK PLQLPLVHV WKH H[SRVXUH RI WKH WUDQVDFWLRQ¶V UHYHQXH
streams to taxation and reduces the potential volatility that could emerge through 
the alteration of tax rates. The changing rates of taxation have the potential to 
increase over time and even minor increases in tax rates can have a marked effect 
upon the cash flows passing through the transaction structure, due to the 
substantial amounts of money passing through the transactions. These reductions 
in the capital flowing through the securitisation structure could reduce the 
repayments to investors, or trigger defaults on some of the RMBS bonds, incurring 
downgrades from bond-rating agencies on the RMBS notes, which would 
jeopardise the ability of the mortgage lender to raise low-cost capital through 
securitisation, as their reputation amongst investors could become tarnished. The 
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exposure of the revenue streams from mortgage repayments to taxation is 
managed through the use of SPVs, as suggested below:  
 
³«\RXZRXOGRQO\HYHUSD\WD[RQQHW LQFRPH\RXZRXOGQ¶WSD\WD[
on the cash flow, because these things would be blown out of the 
ZDWHUEHFDXVHWKH\DUHYHU\YHU\ELJQXPEHUV«WKH\DUHVWUXFWXUHG
LQVXFKDZD\DVWRPDNHVXUHWKH\GRQ¶WPDNHDQ\PRQH\\RXMXVW
dRQ¶WZDQWWKH639WRPDNHPRQH\LIWKH639LVPDNLQJPRQH\WKHQ
WKHVWUXFWXUHLVQ¶WHIILFLHQW«LI\RXVXGGHQO\KDYHWKH639JHQHUDWLQJ
WD[DEOH LQFRPH \RX GRQ¶W NQRZ ZKDW WKH WD[ UDWHV DUH JRLQJ WR EH
and then, the rating agencies say, this is a variable here, and if it 
VWDUWVEHFRPLQJWD[DEOHRQLW¶VLQFRPHPD\EHVRPHWKLQJHOVHZLOOJHW
WD[HG WKHUH¶V XQFHUWDLQW\ DQG PDUNHWV KDWH XQFHUWDLQW\´ (Interview 
27: Director of a Corporate Service Provider, June, 2007). 
 
The SPVs incur profits from providing their services to investors, whether this 
involves holding mortgage assets, or issuing repayments to investors, but as SPV 
profits are taxable, the research found that profits are kept deliberately low to 
reduce the flow of capital lost from the revenue streams that are used to repay the 
investors. The aim of SPVs is to maximise the amount of money flowing to 
investors, as the more money that is available to investors, means that more 
money can be effectively borrowed by the mortgage lender from investors, through 
the SPVs, hence the importance of minimising the flows of capital that are removed 
by SPVs. Geographers such as Cobb (1999), Roberts (1994) and Hudson, (1998) 
have highlighted the role of offshore financial centres in assisting corporations to 
reduce their rates of taxation by registering their companies, or subsidiaries, in 
offshore financial centres, that boast favourable tax regimes. Although mortgage 
lenders and lead managers attempt to reduce the exposure of securitised 
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transactions to taxation, there is a particular geography to UK RMBS SPVs, which 
is concentrated in London, not offshore financial centres. The complex 
geographies of international taxation - determined by the different political 
economies of nation-states ± have inadvertently constrained the spatial location of 
RMBS SPVs, making it difficult for lenders to move their UK RMBS assets outside 
of the UK, to offshore financial centres that offer lower taxes, such as the Cayman 
Islands and Bermuda: 
 
³«MXULVGLFWLRQ LVTXLWH LPSRUWDQWQRZVRPHWLPHV\RXGRQ¶WKDYHD
choice, or not a very straight forward choice, so residential 
PRUWJDJHV LW¶V YHU\ GLIILFXOW WR WUDQVIHU WKRVH WR D QRQ-UK 
HQWLW\«PRUWJDJH SD\PHQWV E\ WKH ERUURZHUV ZRXOG FDXVH KXJH
payments if you subjected borrowers to the risk of withholding tax, if 
WKH\ZHUHVXGGHQO\SD\LQJ WR/X[HPERXUJ«VRW\SLcally residential 
mortgage transactions  use a UK vehicle [whereas with]«&'26
the underlying collateral is structured so it is not susceptible to 
ZLWKKROGLQJ ULVN«VR VRPH DVVHWV DUH PRUH PRELOH WKDQ RWKHUV´ 
(Interview 18: Partner, law firm, July 2007). 
 
The SPVs are registered at the addresses of the corporate service providers ± for 
accounting and legal purposes ± as this is where the SPVs are administered. The 
result of this practice concentrates large numbers of SPVs and the high-value of 
their assets within a compact geographical cluster. For example, Table 7.2 
illustrates the RMBS SPVs administered by Structured Finance Management, a 
corporate service provider, located in London, between 2000 and 2008, to outline 
the concentration of RMBS SPVs, an outcome of international tax regimes. 
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Table 7.2: RMBS SPVs administered by Structured Finance Management (2000-2008). 
 
Year SPV  
Value 
Bn(£) Originator-Servicer 
2000 Fosse Securities No. 1 plc £0.250 Alliance & Leicester 
2000 
Shipshape Residential mortgages 
No. 1 plc £0.300 Bank of Ireland 
2001 RMAC 2001-NS1 plc £0.227 GMAC 
2001 RMAC 2001-NSP2 plc £0.833 GMAC 
2002 RMAC 2002-NS2 plc £0.528 GMAC 
2002 RMAC 2002-NS1 plc £0.604 GMAC 
2003 RMAC 2003-NS4 plc £0.498 GMAC 
2003 RMAC 2003-NS2 plc. £0.503 GMAC 
2003 RMAC 2003-NS3 plc £0.539 GMAC 
2003 RMAC 2003-NS1 plc £1.000 GMAC 
2003 Permanent Financing (No.2) plc £4.772 HBOS 
2004 RMAC 2004-NS3 plc £0.500 GMAC 
2004 RMAC 2004-NS1 plc £0.597 GMAC 
2004 RMAC 2004-NSP4 plc £0.800 GMAC 
2004 RMAC 2004-NSP2 plc £1.035 GMAC 
2004 Aire Valley mortgages 2004-1 plc £2.000 Bradford & Bingley 
2004 Permanent Financing (No.5) plc £3.520 HBOS 
2004 Permanent Financing (No.4) plc £6.200 HBOS 
2005 Farringdon Mortgages No.1 plc £0.125 Rooftop  
2005 Farringdon mortgages No.2 plc £0.200 Rooftop  
2005 RMAC 2005-NS4 plc £0.400 GMAC 
2005 RMAC 2005-NS3 plc £0.481 GMAC 
2005 RMAC 2005-NS1 plc £0.753 GMAC 
2005 Aire Valley mortgages 2005-1 plc £1.000 Bradford & Bingley 
2005 RMAC 2005-NSP2 plc £2.000 GMAC 
2005 Permanent Financing (No.8) plc £2.250 HBOS 
2005 Gracechurch Mortgage Funding plc £4.500 Barclays 
2006 
Landmark Mortgage Securities No.1 
PLC £0.200 Amber/Unity/Infinity 
2006 Mansard Mortgages 2006-1 Plc £0.509 Rooftop  
2006 Aire Valley Mortgages 2006-1 plc £2.000 Bradford & Bingley 
2006 Clavis Securities Plc £10.000 Basinghall Finance 
2007 EuroMASTR plc £0.201 Victoria Mortgages 
2007 Mansard Mortgages 2007-1 plc £0.250 Rooftop  
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2007 Eurohome UK Mortgages 2007-1 plc £0.354 DB UK 
2007 
Landmark Mortgage Securities No.2 
plc £0.358 Amber/Unity/Infinity 
2007 Eurohome UK Mortgages 2007-2 plc £0.500 DB UK 
2007 Aire Valley Mortgages 2007-1 plc £2.500 Bradford & Bingley 
2007 Fosse Master Issuer plc. 2007-1B £2.500 Alliance & Leicester 
2007 Pendeford Master Issuer plc £2.531 HBOS 
2007 Bracken Securities plc £10.300 Alliance and Leicester 
2008 
Permanent Master Issuer plc, 2008-
1 Issue £9.000 HBOS 
 
  
 
Sources:   
Structured Finance Management: 
 http://www.sfmlimited.com/transactions/transactions_asset.php (Accessed 29/05/2008). 
Fitch Ratings: 
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/sectors/issuers_list_struct.cfm?mm_id=&sector_flag=3
&marketsector=2&detail=&body_content=issr_list&start_alpha=R&start_row=151&searchTe
xt (Accessed 29/05/2008). 
 
Although the geography of RMBS SPVs is determined by a myriad of tax regimes, 
controlled by different nation-states, the location of SPVs in the UK is dictated by 
the locations of the corporate service providers. Corporate service providers are 
located within the City, so that they are in close proximity to the lawyers and 
investments bankers that perform securitisation, to facilitate convenient face-to-
face meetings, but also to promote their services to industry contacts, to seek out 
new business opportunities.  
 
7.4. Securitisation: building the waterfall structure 
 
One of the particular attributes that makes securitisation a unique financial 
technology is the financial engineering used to produce a range of different RMBS 
bonds, exposed to different degrees of credit risk, from AAA, though to BB. 
Folkman et al, (2007) have discussed the function of new financial intermediaries 
and elites that are involved in the development of financial products, such as 
investment bankers, which Hall (2009) argues, articulate a particular role in 
organising financial transactions. It is important to understand the role of 
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investment bankers, in particular structurers, who use complex financial techniques 
to reengineer the revenue streams from mortgage assets that are converted into 
RMBS notes.  
 
Bond-rating agencies also provide a dominant role in the production of RMBS 
reengineering through their governance of the financial sector. Successive 
government policy and dominant neoliberal ideologies have sought to minimise 
IRUPDO VWDWH OHJLVODWLRQ LQ IDYRXURI µOLJKW WRXFK¶ UHJXODWLRQ D UROH WKDWKDV ± to a 
degree ± been fulfilled by the operation of bond-rating agencies (Sinclair 1994; 
1994; Augar 2000). Bond-rating agencies have performed a central role in the 
financialisation of Anglo-American capitalist economies (Erturk et al. 2004), 
through their judgements on the quality of investment products. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, bond-UDWLQJDJHQFLHVSHUIRUPµLQGHSHQGHQW¶DQDO\VLVDQGDVVLJQPHWULFV
to the quality of each new investment, in an attempt to provide investors with the 
ability to overcome information asymmetries and avert losses (Sinclair 2005). 
However, the research conducted in this thesis has identified how this role has 
become extended such that bond-rating agencies have begun to perform a 
powerful role in securitisation by indirectly shaping the financial engineering of UK 
RMBS notes. As such, the analysts of bond-rating agencies can be viewed as 
actors that, in combination with the structurers of investment banks, control the 
financial engineering, and credit quality of RMBS.   
 
Social scientists and economic geographers have drawn attention to the socio-
cultural technological practices that are exercised by investment bankers to 
produce complex financial products (Pryke and Lee 1995; Li Puma and Lee 2005; 
Bryan and Rafferty 2007). The socio-cultural technology used to reengineer the 
income streams in securitisation, flowing from consumer mortgage repayments to 
investors, is performed through the production of a mathematical model  called the 
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µZDWHUIDOO VWUXFWXUH¶ (Wainwright 2009).  Figure 7.2 illustrates  how the waterfall 
structure works operates, where the interest and principal repayments from 
consumers, are not divided up evenly and distributed to investors, but flow, as the 
metaphor implies, down through this hypothetical structure. The repayments first 
µILOOXS¶WKHWRSWUDQFKRI$$$QRWHVEHIRUHIORZLQJWR WKH%%%QRWHVDQGUHVHUYH
fund, where investors who have purchased AAA notes are repaid first, reducing 
their exposure to consumer credit risk, while the BBB investors are paid last. 
 
Figure 7.2: 7KHµ:DWHUIDOO6WUXFWXUH¶ 
 
 
Income from 
Mortgage Assets
AAA
BBB
Reserve Fund
Equity Piece
AAA Investor 
Income
BBB Investor 
Income
 
Source: Wainwright (2009) 
 
7KHDLPRI WKH µZDWHUIDOOVWUXFWXUH¶ LVQRW WRVSUHDG WKHFUHGLW ULVN related to each 
mortgage asset, but to concentrate any consumer defaults in the lower tranches of 
the waterfall structure. The rationale behind the separation of revenue flows into 
tranches is that if a significant number of consumers default on their mortgages, 
the BBB notes known as junior notes may not be repaid, but in theory, it was 
calculated by bond-rating agencies that AAA investors, purchasing so-called senior 
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notes, would be protected from the defaults. The use of junior notes to protect the 
senior notes is called subordination, where the junior notes are subordinated by a 
reserve fund55. The waterfall structure, prior to the credit crunch, enabled the 
production of high-quality, AAA notes to be produced for investors, while also 
providing a series of BBB notes that had a greater exposure to consumer credit 
defaults, but paid a higher return for investors.  
 
The structurers produce a mathematical model of the waterfall structure - based on 
mortgage and consumer data supplied by the mortgage lender, where they 
calculate the number of notes that can be produced for each tranch in the 
structure. The construction of the waterfall structure resonates with research by 
Mackenzie (2005) who argues that the performances of financial theory, reformats 
the economy, producing a virtualism where abstract models become reality (Miller 
1998). This is illustrated through the engineering of the waterfall structure, which is 
a mathematical model, or representation, that is used to reorder income streams 
which dictate which investors are exposed to the disproportionate number of credit 
defaults from consumers, based on calculations by bond-rating agencies. Knorr-
Cetina and Bruegger  (2002) have highlighted the role of post-social relationships, 
where financial markets and the economy, are represented and performed through 
screens and technical devices In the performance of securitisation, the 
relationships between investment bankers, computers, software, training and the 
manuals are used to construct these abstract waterfall structures through 
heterogeneous networks (Callon 1991). The structurers, as epistemic elites, are 
important because their expertise generates trust amongst investment bankers, 
investors and bond-rating agencies, which is important as each bond and its 
coupon is not fixed to a physical commodity, but is construed through the mutual 
                                                 
55
  More cash is funnelled through the waterfall structure than is necessary to repay the 
investors. This excess cash is stored in a reserve fund which can be used to cover any 
temporary shortfalls in future mortgage repayments. 
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understanding of epistemic elites and their attempts to tame credit risk through 
financial engineering.  
 
Early waterfall models in the UK were produced independently by individual 
investment banks, but as the expertise of bond-rating agencies has grown since 
the early 1980s, the calculations that underpin their metrics have become more 
sophisticated as they developed detailed codes and standards, circulated through 
manuals to structurers to aid their development of their waterfall models, so that 
WKH50%6QRWHV WKDW WKH\DUHVHHNLQJ WR LVVXHDUHDZDUGHGWKHDJHQFLHV¶ERQd 
ratings. This codified knowledge is used to determine the tranches in the structure, 
and the structurers use these templates to develop a waterfall structure that will 
obtain the desired ratings from the bond-rating agencies. Once structurers begin to 
produce waterfall models that conform to these manuals, the bond-UDWLQJDJHQFLHV¶
role has moved beyond rating RMBS notes to co-producing them. Once the 
structurers have developed their model, it is tested to observe how the revenue 
streams from consumers and the structure would perform in specific situations that 
are stipulated by the rating agencies, as illustrated in the following quote: 
 
³«\RXUXQ WKURXJKDOO WKHPRGHOVGRDOO WKHGLIIHUHQWVWUHVVHVHDFK
[bond rating] DJHQF\KDVGLIIHUHQWVWUHVVHVVRWKHUH¶VLW¶VMXVW&35
[Constant Prepayment Rate- the rate at which consumers refinance 
their mortgages with another company] all prepayments from 40 per 
FHQWWRKDOIDSHUFHQWVWUHVVDUUHDUVJRLQJXSWRHUPLW¶VGLIIHUHQWIRU
different rating categories, err, if you look at the rating methodology of 
WKH DJHQFLHV VR LW¶V UXQQLQJ WKH FDVK IORZ PRGHOV FRPLQJ RXW ZLWK
your  lRVVVHYHULW\ZKLFKZRXOGJLYH\RXD$$$«WKHUHDUHGLIIHUHQW
WULJJHUV\RXSOD\ZLWK WKHPRGHO WKHZKROH WLPH«VR LIDUUHDUVJR WR
IRXU SHU FHQW \RX VWDUW  WUDSSLQJ  FDVK VR WKH ZKROH WLPH \RX¶UH
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SOD\LQJDURXQGWU\LQJ WRPD[LPLVH WKHVWUXFWXUHV\RXFDQJHW« if we 
made a swap and put an interest rate cap, how much AAA? So your 
main aim is get as most AAA out of it as you can and reduce, so 
WKHUH¶VGLIIHUHQW WKLQJV WKDW\RXFDQGR WRPD[LPLVH$$$´ (Interview 
25: Structurer, investment bank, June 2007) 
 
The data used to develop the waterfall structures includes the loan-to-value ratio of 
each mortgage and the value of each mortgage, as the industry perceives that if a 
consumer has made more repayments then there is less outstanding debt in the 
structure, which reduces the severity of a credit default on the revenue streams 
passing through the waterfall structure. The number of consumer mortgage arrears 
and CCJs are also included in the model, as the bond-rating agencies argue that if 
a consumer is more likely to default on their repayments, then additional junior 
notes are required to support the senior notes56. This is important, because unlike 
credit scoring, where the lender attempts to predict which consumers will default, 
the model must include all the mortgage assets to be securitised and seeks to 
protect investors by calculating how quickly the mortgage lender can repossess a 
property and resell it to ensure that money continues to pass through the waterfall 
structure.  
 
Due to this feature of securitisation, geography becomes an important factor in the 
credit quality of the RMBS notes. House prices and the performance of local 
housing markets vary, based on levels of employment and demand for housing, 
but also house price inflation, which can substantially alter the value of a property 
once it is repossessed. Investors and bond-rating agencies alike are interested in 
                                                 
56
 For this reason subprime securitisations consist of higher proportions of BBB and BB notes 
to support the AAA notes due to the increased probability of credit defaults. For example, the 
proportion of AAA bonds produced from the securitisation of a UK subprime lender called 
Rooftop Mortgages securitisation accounted for 80 per cent of the notes, compared to 90 per 
cent for a prime Abbey securitisation.  
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the geographical concentration of mortgage assets, especially if the mortgages 
backing RMBS bonds are strongly concentrated in an area where the residential 
property is perceived to be overvalued. In a recession, the value of these houses 
may drop significantly, and if they are repossessed, there may be a significant 
reduction in the income streams used to repay the investors, which will reduce the 
value of their bonds and repayments. House price volatility was an issue that put 
severe strain on building societies based in London and the south-east during the 
1990s housing downturn, who experienced higher repossession rates compared to 
other parts of the country (Marshall et al. 1997). 
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Table 7.3: Average UK house prices before and during the credit crunch, by region 
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Table 7.3 illustrates the regional differences in house price appreciation and 
decline prior to, and during the crunch. It is interesting to note the overall 
percentage change in the average house price for each region to understand the 
geographical differences in price changes. For example, house prices in the 
second quarter of 2009 decreased by 6.2 per cent in Wales, compared to the 
previous year, while house prices in Northern Ireland decreased by 26 per cent 
RYHU WKH VDPH SHULRG 1RUWKHUQ ,UHODQG¶V DYHUDJH KRXVH Srices had grown 
significantly during 2006 and 2007, in comparison to other regions, suggesting that 
house prices in this region were becoming over-inflated in comparison to price 
increases in the rest of the UK.  
 
If a mortgage lender had lent a disproportionate amount of capital to borrowers in 
Northern Ireland and then suffered from a high rate of repossessions, then the 
changes in house prices would make it difficult for the lender to recoup the entirety 
of capital. In the event that the mortgage assets have been securitised, the lender 
acting as a servicer will repossess the houses from borrowers who have defaulted 
on their payments on behalf of the RMBS investors. In an attempt to reduce the 
effects of this scenario, investment banks and bond-rating agencies attempt to 
build additional protection into RMBS transactions for investors. This is achieved in 
two ways. First, the structurers seek to model the potential decrease of housing 
values in a market downturn. Second, they attempt to increase the number of 
subordinate notes below the AAA bonds, if there appears to be an excess of 
geographical concentration. The bond-rating methodologies used by investment 
banks contain calculations and standards devised by bond-rating analysts that 
forecast the potential decreases of house prices in economic downturns. These 
standards are used to calculate whether the mortgages that are due to be 
securitised are overly represented in particular regions, which the bond-rating 
DJHQFLHVFDOOµDQH[FHVVFRQFHQWUDWLRQ¶, as one interviewee explained: 
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³«VRRXUPRGHOWDNHVWKHSRVWFRGHDQGWKRXJKWKHSRVWFRGHZHFDQ
are able to, get a table [in a spreadsheet] of geographical distribution, 
WKHPRUHJUDQXODULWLVWKHEHWWHULWLV«ZHKDYHGLIIHUHQWDVVXPSWLRQV
of market value in the underlying properties in relation to the regions 
RU FRXQWLHV«VR LW¶V LPSRUWDQW IRU XV WR DVVHVV IRU HDFK ORDQ SHU
region, because we apply a different assumption in terms of market 
YDOXHRIDSURSHUW\«DORWRILW¶VWRGRZLWKUHSRVVHVVLRQVDQGPDUNHW
value, decline whether we expect values to decline, due to 
repossession, so we do repossession studies, all  the mortgage 
lenders get data, from there, and assess the evaluation that they have 
LQWKHLUV\VWHPVDJDLQVWWKHVDOHSULFHDQGWKDW¶VWKHPDUNHWYDOXHDW
WKHWLPH´ (Interview 17: Bond-rating Analyst, November 2007). 
 
For example, Table 7.4 EHORZ VKRZV DQ H[DPSOH IURP D 0RRG\¶V ERQd-rating 
PHWKRGRORJ\ 7KH WDEOH OLVWV WKH EHQFKPDUN RU WKH µLGHDO¶ JHRJUDSKLFDO
concentration of a mortgage portfolio, as well as the actual portfolio composition of 
a hypothetical pool of mortgages. The lender is permitted a ten per cent margin of 
error, known as the Allowed Concentration Portfolio. If the geographical 
concentrations of the mortgage assets that are going to be securitised exceed 
these parameters, then they are penalised by the rating agencies, and additional 
subordination has to be produced to protect the AAA bonds. The excess 
concentration in this example is calculated as 6.9 per cent which is multiplied by 50 
per cent, which is then multiplied by the value of what will be rated as the AAA 
tranch. This is calculated in the example using data including the loan-to-value, 
VHDVRQLQJ DQG RWKHU LQIRUPDWLRQ WR EH ¼ 7KH WRWDO DGMXVWPHQW LV
FDOFXODWHGWREH¼ZKLFKPHDQVWKDWRXWRIWKHLQLWLDOSRUWIROLRYDOXHGDW
¼DQH[WUDSHUFHQWRIWKHSRUWIROLRKDVWRbe used to support the  
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Table 7.4: Credit enhancement for excessive geographical concentration 
 
 
Source: 0RRG\¶V(2005) 
 
 
              
 214 
AAA notes because of the extra risk borne from what is perceived to be an 
excessive geographical concentration. 
 
Once the structurers have completed their model, and have calculated the number 
of notes that can be issued for each tranch, the deal documentation is sent to the 
bond-rating agencies who will review the transaction to see if it complies with their 
standards, before they give the notes their ratings. They will test the structure of 
the SPVs and the waterfall structure to see that these structures meet their 
guidelines. The bond-rating agencies simulate what the effect of an increase in 
interest rates or consumer defaults would have on the structure, to view how the 
securitisation would perform in stressed scenarios such as recessions of varying 
severity. For example, a UK BBB note should have been able to withstand the 
defaults and interest rDWHVRIWKH8.¶VVKRXVLQJFULVLVDVFHQDULRWKDWPD\EH
reviewed in the light of the recent crisis. The bond-rating agencies will check that 
the SPV structures insulate the assets from the mortgage lender and if they are not 
satisfied with the transaction structure and waterfall model they may request 
additional changes to these structures.  
 
The credit crunch, and the failure of US subprime RMBS notes to repay their 
investors, has resulted in bond-rating agencies undergoing extreme scrutiny from 
investors, the industry and the media, raising questions about WKHYLDELOLW\RI µOLJKW
WRXFK¶ UHJXODWLRQ (DUO\ 8. 50%6 ERQGV ZHUH VWUXFWXUHG LQGHSHQGHQWO\ E\
investment banks which would be verified by the bond-rating agencies and while 
this ensures that investments banks are performing securitisations to particular 
standards:  
 
³«EDQNHUVXVHGWRPRGHOWKHWUDQVDFWLRQDQGZHXVHGWRYDOLGDWHWKH
PRGHO DQG QRZ ZH PRGHO RXU RZQ WUDQVDFWLRQ VR LW¶V D ORW PRUH
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LQGHSHQGHQW DQG HDVLHU WR XQGHUVWDQG ZKDW¶V JRLQJ RQ Zith the 
WUDQVDFWLRQ , WKLQN WKDW¶V WKH PDLQ FKDQJH VR ZH FDQ UHFRQFLOH RXU
PRGHO ZLWK WKH EDQNHU¶V PRGHO DQG ZH NQRZ WKH EDQN LVQ¶W KLGLQJ
DQ\WKLQJ´(Interview 33:  Bond-rating Analyst, April 2007) 
 
However, the role of bond-rating agencies as institutions that provide governance 
should be strictly limited to the provision of risk metrics concerning transactions, 
but this separation has become blurred as they have begun to inadvertently 
structure RMBS transactions through the methodologies distributed to structurers, 
which have become used as templates. Some investment bankers and investors 
interviewed during the research discussed how these ratings may lose importance 
amongst investors, as the ratings underestimated the credit risk underlying US 
RMBS bonds. While it is doubtful that bond-rating agencies will cease to produce 
metrics for investors on the quality of RMBS notes, there is early evidence to 
suggest that additional modes of governance may emerge in the UK through 
private consultancies that can provide additional analysis on the credit risk within a 
portfolio of mortgages that investors may chose to utilise to enable them to monitor 
the credit quality of their notes. A centralised lender in the UK ± Edeus - has 
reengineered its credit scoring and underwriting system to perform credit risk 
analysis on existing mortgage portfolios, which could be operated on behalf of 
investors, providing them with additional transparency towards the underlying 
credit quality of RMBS notes.  
 
7.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to outline how individual mortgages are converted - 
through securitisation, into bonds, where epistemic elites reengineer the income 
streams from mortgages to produce a range of bonds that bear differing exposures 
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to credit risk, while attempting to reduce the exposure of the transaction to taxation. 
The initiation of securitisation - despite being coordinated by mortgage lenders - 
occurs on the boundaries of the lender, where it interfaces with other financial 
service providers; investment banks, corporate service providers and law firms. 
The chapter discussed how mortgage banks attempt to choose particular financial 
service providers before uniting and solidifying the relations between these 
epistemic elites to perform securitisation, where the skills and knowledges of these 
epistemic elites are performed - through mathematic modelling and law - to ensure 
that their performance of securitisation conforms to codes developed by bond-
rating agencies.  
 
These advanced producer services and the elite technical expertise of their 
employees are based in London. The chapter examined how de-regulation and the 
µ%LJ%DQJ¶OHGWRWKHWUDQVIHUHQFHRIVHFXULWLVDWLRQIURPWKH86WRWKH8.WKURXJK
investment banks, which imported the idea of securitisation into the City and 
introduced and nurtured the formation of new epistemic elites who began to 
perform securitisation in the UK for mortgage lenders. London later became the 
European centre for securitisation, as investment banks began to structure deals 
for European mortgage banks. The chapter highlighted how the clustering of the 
8.¶VSURPLQHQWODZILUPVLQ/RQGRQIRVWHUHGWKURXJKWKHQHFHVVLW\RIIDFH-to-face 
proximity with clients, and also to interpret alternations to UK legislation as well as 
lobby for new regulation with the Law Courts, has also been important for the 
adaption and performance of securitisation within the UK. 
 
I then turned to explore the important role of SPVs in the performance of 
securitisation as they insulate originators from credit risk, reduce regulatory capital 
reserves, while reducing the effect of tax liabilities on the revenue streams involved 
in the transaction. This section discussed how these financial structures are 
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produced by law firms and are managed by corporate service providers to ensure 
that the SPVs function in the interests of the securitisation structure while being 
legally detached from the lender and outlined how these SPVs are designed to 
minimise their profits and use charitable trust statuses to minimise their tax 
liabilities, which reduces the likelihood that changes in taxation rates will reduce 
the repayments in RMBS investors. The SPVs are located within London, 
constrained by the variations in tax regulation of different nation-states which 
produces a geography whereby mortgage assets - valued in millions of pounds are 
located in a few select locations. 
 
The reengineering of consumer income streams was investigated to explain how 
the associated credit risk of consumers is (re)engineered into a series of RMBS 
notes that bear different exposures to credit risk and offer varying returns. This 
practice is completed by investment bankers - in particular, epistemic elites known 
as structurers - who devise mathematical models that are used to prescribe the 
number of AAA through to BB bonds which can be issued to investors, from a 
particular portfolio of mortgage assets. The structuring of RMBS transactions has 
spatial implications as the spatial attributes are encoded within the waterfall 
structure models to account for the effect of large concentrations of mortgages that 
are located in regions where bond-rating agencies believe that the houses are 
overvalued, which can expose investors to losses on their notes in a recession.  
 
As such, the waterfall structures are adjusted to provide additional protection for 
the AAA investors against the magnified effect that credit risks, concentrated in 
selected regions, can have on reducing bond payments. In addition to the inclusion 
of geographical data for the mortgage assets that have been securitised, 
information on the value of the mortgages, loan-to-value data and CCJs are also 
encoded into the waterfall structure. The chapter has argued that while bond-rating 
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agencies provide financial governance through the production of risk metrics, the 
use of rating methodologies by RMBS structurers, has seen bond-rating agencies 
indirectly extend their role from governance to structurers. As bond-rating agencies 
have been subject to criticism since the credit crunch, this chapter suggests that 
new modes of governance may emerge to supplement the role of the three main 
bond-rating agencies. The thesis will now seek to draw conclusions and 
summarise the key findings of the research. 
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Chapter 8 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
³3ROLWLFDOOHDGHUVDQGWKHLURSSRQHQWVOLNHWRSUHWHQGWKDWWKH\DUH
still in control of their national economies, that their policies have 
the power to relieve unemployment, revive economic growth, 
restore prosperity and encourage investment in the future. But 
UHFHQW\HDUVKDYHVKRZQDJDLQDQGDJDLQKRZWKHSROLWLFLDQV¶SODQV
have been upset by changes that they could have not foreseen in 
WKHZRUOGRXWVLGHWKHVWDWH´(Strange 1986:3). 
 
 
8.1. The beginning of the end 
 
Despite being written over 20 years ago, the quote from Strange, above, is 
startlingly accurate in describing the political response to FDSLWDOLVP¶VODWHVWFULVLV
the credit crunch. Strange stresses how politicians consistently fail to foresee 
financial crises and that once capitalism begins to shudder from its insurmountable, 
internal contradictions, politicians around the globe struggle to successfully 
overcome the effects of financial crises. As discussed in the introduction to the 
WKHVLVWKH8.¶VH[SHULHQFHRIWKHFUHGLWFUXQFKZDVFDXVHGE\WKHLOOLTXLGLW\RIWKe 
capital and interbank markets, a consequence of the US subprime market, and, in 
D ZD\ WKDW VXSSRUWV 6WUDQJH¶V DUJXPHQW EH\RQG WKH 8.¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ ,W FDQ EH
argued that the British government - along with the financial services sector ± was 
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slow to foresee and acknowledge the potential effects of the credit crunch, 
unfolding beyond its shores. As late as July 2007, newly appointed British Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown was calling for banks to increase their use of structured 
finance products, and their dependence on the international capital markets, to 
fund 25 year fixed mortgages to aid first time buyers57. By September, a few 
months later, the government had begun to prepare for the nationalisation of 
Northern Rock, the first of several high-SURILOH IDWDOLWLHV ZLWKLQ WKH 8.¶V ILQDQFLDO
sector. 
 
Aalbers (2008) has suggested that capital market funding can increase house price 
inflation, and in the case of the UK, the expansion of securitisation over the past 
decade has coincided with substantial house price increases. Between 1997 and 
WKHDYHUDJHSULFHRID8.KRXVHURVHE\SHUFHQWDVWKH8.¶VPRUWJDJH
industry and consumers alike had become financialised58. Consumers enjoyed the 
substantial growth in house prices, becoming real estate speculators, selling their 
homes to buy a larger house as an investment, or by unlocking capital by releasing 
equity from their homes (Langley 2008)ZKLOH WKHPDQDJHPHQWRI WKH8.¶VUHWDLO
and investment banks received large cash and stock bonuses, with institutional 
investors enjoying the high-dividends from UK banks.  
 
The effects of the credit crunch unravelled rapidly within the UK with disastrous 
repercussions for the banks, prior to the contagions that spread throughout the 
economy, affecting large industrial producers through to small family businesses 
and high-street consumers, DFRQVHTXHQFHRIWKHHQKDQFHGH[SRVXUHRIWKH8.¶V
financial institutions to the volatility of the international financial system. This 
                                                 
57
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6292266.stm (Accessed: 14/04/2009). 
58
 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/housing/housingresearch/housingstatistics/housingstatisticsb
y/housingmarket/livetables/ (Accessed 14/04/09) 
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exposure ± repositioned through securitisation and interbank lending - had been 
steadily growing as a response to series of events, beginning with financial 
deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s. This deregulation indirectly stimulated the 
spread of new financial technologies from the US, including securitisation, and 
business models such as centralised lenders. The implementation of these new 
ideas and knowledges began to integrate the UK¶V ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV LQ
particular mortgage lenders, into the international financial system through its 
reliance on international capital to fund the UK mortgage market. This fundamental 
shift was to have serious implications for the UK economy, which regulators failed 
to acknowledge and plan for. This final chapter will now summarise the key 
empirical findings of innovations, developments and geographies that supported 
the growth of the UK mortgage market; how the findings from the research can be 
used to inform the theories and philosophies which this thesis has drawn upon; and 
the contributions of the thesis to the wider debates ongoing within economic 
geography. 
 
8.2. Empirical contributions of the research 
 
The empirical contributions offered by the thesis concern the fluid geographies of 
UK mortgage production, that are shaped through the production of credit scoring 
technologies and the securitisation of mortgage assets into RMBS bonds, central 
to understanding how contemporary mortgage production is performed and 
financed. Chapter 5 highlighted how deregulation in the 1980s witnessed the 
emergence of new types of mortgage providers, instigated through financial 
restructuring that was stimulated by The Financial services Act (1986) and The 
Building Societies Act (1986). These two Acts allowed building societies to transfer 
their mutual status to that of a bank, an option mainly exercised during the 1990s, 
allowing them to access interbank money markets, and later securitisation, 
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allowing mortgage banks to expand their mortgage portfolios and increase their 
profits. In addition, the deregulation made it legal for banks to issue residential 
mortgages, while centralised lenders began to enter the residential mortgage 
market. The thesis discussed how the geographies of mortgage funding became 
spatially reconfigured, and in so doing addressed the second and third research 
questions which concerned the geography of mortgage production and how this 
geography has become transformed. In particular, the research has illustrated how 
the localised circuits of mortgage funding became integrated with the international 
capital markets as different types of mortgage lenders accessed their mortgage 
funding through the interbank and international capital markets.  
 
Since The Financial Services Act and The Building Societies Act were both 
passed, the UK mortgage market has undergone a series of dramatic 
transformations. The introduction of new technological infrastructure, such as credit 
scoring, discussed in Chapter 6, restructured the geographies of mortgage 
production, as the importance of branch networks declined. The thesis discussed, 
in Chapter 5, how mortgages were traditionally underwritten by the branch 
manager of a building society, and later bank managers as banks entered this 
market, but credit scoring technologies initiated a redistribution of financial power 
as the decision-making procedures were automated and moved to specialised 
centralised, processing centres. Subsequently, a geography of centralised 
processing centres emerged, which arguably exercise the power to financially 
include or exclude UK consumers from housing credit. This geography is dispersed 
across the UK, a pattern that was explained through the particular geographies and 
histories of the three different types of mortgage lenders: building societies, 
centralised lenders and retail banks. Building society processing centres are 
located close to the building society headquarters in order to exercise control over 
the centre, but also as there is no clear advantage to locating further away from 
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their headquarters and their regional market, a geography that is reinforced by the 
historical locations of building society headquarters that are distributed around the 
country. The location of retail bank processing centres are more widely distributed 
which can be explained by the national scale on which they operate, compared to 
building societies that have a tendency to be regionally concentrated, so are more 
likely to locate their processing centres in areas that have low operational costs, or 
because they have inherited a processing centre from another financial services 
provider which they have acquired. Centralised lender processing centres are 
distributed throughout the UK to benefit from low operational costs, while their 
locate headquarters are more often than not located in London as it provides them 
with access to the capital markets, law firms and investment banks as they are 
reliant on securitisation. The contemporary geography of mortgage processing is 
dynamic and will continue to change in response to regulatory transitions and 
technological innovations. It is also likely that the current credit crunch may initiate 
a new phase of restructuring, as Santander, the owner of Abbey, begins to 
streamline its processing operations following its purchase of Alliance & Leicester 
and the branch network of Bradford & Bingley. The Lloyds Group may seek to 
UHGXFH WKH QXPEHU RI +%26¶V SURFHVVLQJ FHQWUHV ZKLFK ZLOO UHVKDSH Whese 
geographies ± an area of potential further research. 
 
Mortgage lenders were only able to centralise their operations through the adoption 
of credit scoring, a decision-making technology imported from the US to the UK. 
The development of credit scoring, and its adoption within the UK, was explored in 
Chapter 6, which sought to explore the internal workings of credit scoring. In doing 
so, this thesis identified how scorecards develop and exercise their power through 
the alignment of heterogeneous materials and human relations to develop power 
asymmetries. The scorecard becomes an obligatory passage point that provides 
access to credit, for those who desire it, through the practice of surveillance and 
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the encoded performance of epistemic knowledges through software operated 
through the centralised processing centres. The research also identified how 
SURSRQHQWV RI $17 KDYH D WHQGHQF\ WR IL[DWH RQ D QHWZRUN¶V DWWHPSW WR HQURO
actors. However, credit scoring, as an actor-network, actively seeks to exclude 
specific actors that bear particular, undesirable attributes that are judged to 
UHSUHVHQW D FRQVXPHU ZKR LV D µEDG¶ FUHGLW ULVN IURP MRLQLQJ WKH QHWZRUN RI WKH
financially included.  
 
Chapter 6 sought to examine the processes used to develop scorecards, in order 
to highlight and acknowledge how human expertise, embedded within epistemic 
communities is responsible for developing the codes used by credit scoring 
software. This revealed that although credit scoring is automated and its 
construction is primarily derived from quantitative epistemologies, it is 
fundamentally reliant on social judgements, knowledges and the experience of 
credit analysts. It was also uncovered how the spaces of financial inclusion and 
exclusion are fluid and vary temporally as the capability of scorecards to accurately 
GLVFULPLQDWH FRQVXPHUV LQWR WKH FDWHJRULHVRI µJRRG¶ DQG µEDG¶ FRQVXPHUVYDULHV
overtime, as scorecards become outdated. As such, the predictive ability of 
scorecards tR LGHQWLI\ µJRRG¶DQG µEDG¶ consumers fluctuates, which reshapes the 
spaces of financial inclusion and exclusion before the scorecards are adjusted or 
replaced.  
 
I also highlighted the geographies of credit data in Chapter 6, which emphasises 
how credit data is subject to varying combinations of self-regulation by consumer 
credit lenders and the specific legislation of particular nation-states in which they 
reside. The range of available consumer data attributes and the richness of this 
LQIRUPDWLRQ LV DOVR JRYHUQHG E\ WKH KLVWRU\ DQG GHYHORSPHQW RI D FRXQWU\¶s 
consumer credit market which generates the credit data that can be used in credit 
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scoring. Countries, whose consumer credit markets are established, enable the 
financial services industry to amass substantial longitudinal databases of consumer 
data, and analysts argue that these larger, historical datasets assist them in 
producing more predictive sFRUHFDUGV 7KLV WKHVLV¶ examination of credit scoring, 
and the consumer data used in underwriting, was used to view how credit data was 
misused in the US context of subprime lending, which illustrates how the data used 
in credit scoring and underwriting are open to abuse. While the research focussed 
on the development of scorecards prior to the crunch, this raises new questions as 
to how new credit scoring products and technologies may be utilised to aid 
mortgage lenders in identifying consumers that are likely to default during the credit 
crunch. This also raises additional questions as to how the credit crunch will affect 
the credit records of individuals, with increases in missed payments and defaults. It 
is likely that an increase in adverse credit data will result in increased application 
rejections within the prime mortgage industry, which may signal an increase in 
demand for subprime products from previously prime customers, providing there is 
a subprime market with enough capacity to meet demand, an important area of 
potential future research. 
 
Detailed empirical research that has focussed on securitisation in the UK has been 
limited to the work of Pryke and Whitehead (1994) who viewed securitisation as a 
mechanism to invest capital into the built environment, and of Langley (2008), who 
examined how consumers have become embedded into high-finance through 
securitisation. In contrast, this thesis embarked on a detailed examination to 
understand how individual mortgages are converted, through securitisation, into 
bonds, with a focus on the roles performed by different epistemic elites who 
reengineer the income streams from mortgages to produce bonds and succeed in 
reducing the exposure of the transactions to taxation. The initiation of 
securitisation, despite being coordinated by mortgage lenders, occurs on the 
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boundaries of the lender, where it interfaces with the epistemic elites of investment 
banks, corporate service providers and law firms.  
 
The research identified the two main ways in which the financial service providers 
necessary for the production of RMBS were chosen by mortgage lenders. First, 
lenders chose the companies that they had successfully used on previous 
securitisation transactions. Second, the lenders would draw upon the broader 
experience of service providers that have been involved in successful 
securitisations with other lenders. The thesis investigated how deregulation and the 
µ%LJ%DQJ¶OHGWRWKHWUDQVIHUHQFHRIVHFXULWLVDWLRQIURPWKH86WRWKH8.WKURXJK
investment banks, which imported the idea of securitisation into the City and 
introduced and nurtured the formation of new epistemic elites who began to 
SHUIRUP VHFXULWLVDWLRQ LQ WKH 8. IRU PRUWJDJH OHQGHUV 7KH UROH RI /RQGRQ¶V
prominent law firms in securitisation was also highlighted, in addition to the 
importance of their clustering within London, which has fostered the development 
of legal epistemic elites, who interpret alterations to UK legislation that has proven 
instrumental in the adaption and performance of securitisation within the UK. 
 
One of the key findings of the research was the identification of the role of SPVs 
that insulate mortgage lenders from credit risk, reduce the regulatory capital 
reserves of mortgage lenders, as well as reducing the effect of tax liabilities on the 
revenue streams involved in the transaction to ensure that RMBS bond holders are 
repaid in full. This finding drew attention to the use of financial structures - used in 
the performance of a securitisation - that are constructed by law firms and 
managed by corporate service providers. Chapter 7 illustrated how the legal status 
of charitable trusts are mobilised by law firms to minimise the tax liabilities that 
affect securitisations reducing the likelihood that changes in taxation rates will 
reduce the repayments in RMBS investors. In turn, this has produced a 
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concentrated geography of RMBS SPVs. A synthesis of the variations between 
different political economies and their particular tax regimes has developed an 
enclave of UK mortgage assets in London, where billions of pounds of residential 
are associated with companies registered at a few select addresses, at the offices 
of corporate service providers. 
 
The thesis sought to replicate the sociological analysis used by academics that 
investigate the performance of financial markets (for example,  Knorr-Cetina and 
Bruegger, 2002; Maurer, 2001;  and Pryke and Allen, 2000)  to develop an 
understanding of how consumer income streams are restructured in the 
performance of securitisation. The structuring of RMBS transactions has spatial 
implications, and the spatial attributes of mortgage assets are encoded into 
waterfall structure models. This is to attempt to protect the investors of RMBS 
mores from disproportionate concentrations of credit risk from consumers 
concentrated in particular regions. During the research it was also discovered that 
while bond-rating agencies provide financial governance through the production of 
risk metrics, the use of their bond-rating methodologies by RMBS structurers to 
perform securitisation, has embedded the knowledges of bond-rating agencies 
indirectly into the waterfall structures of RMBS production, which has extended 
their role from governor to structurer, which raises questions surrounding the 
independence of their metrics. Bond-rating agencies have received substantial 
criticism from the financial media since the credit crunch, and this thesis suggests 
that new modes of governance may emerge to supplement the role of the three 
main bond-rating agencies, an area for further research to understand new modes 
of governance that may emerge from the crisis. 
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8.3. Contributions to political economic theory 
 
The thesis engaged with the diverse and contested narratives written on money 
and its value(s), discussed in Chapter 2, to explore the origins and intellectual 
traditions that seek to understand money and credit, in order to contextualise the 
theorisations that can be used to comprehend the role of RMBS notes in the 
HFRQRP\7KHWKHVLVH[DPLQHG0DU[¶VHDUO\ZRUNGUDZLQJRQWKDWRI6PLWK (1976 
[1776]) and Ricardo (1951), to develop an extensive understanding of monetary 
theory, where the value of money is derived from the human labour embedded in 
material objects based on the labour theory of value. Marx provided early 
theorisations of credit, later expanded upon by Harvey (1982), to explain how the 
value of credit money reflects the, perceived, future value of labour, not yet 
exploited by capitalists. This is important for understanding RMBS notes as a form 
of credit money, as illustrated in Chapter 7, which is used by retail banks and 
centralised lenders to allow them to continue their mortgage lending and to 
accumulate additional profits. However, instead of using the capital to buy fresh 
means of production, mortgage lenders use the money exchanged from their credit 
notes to produce new mortgage assets. This theorisation of RMBS complements 
0DU[¶V DQG +DUYH\¶V arguments on understanding the role of credit money in 
contributing to financial crises, when mortgage lenders develop fictitious capital 
through the issuance of RMBS notes. When these notes are overproduced by 
unscrupulous issuers, such as US subprime lenders, where there is little chance of 
the notes being repaid, the value of the notes is reduced as they are shunned by 
investors, as witnessed during the credit crunch. This leads to the notes becoming 
devalued, creating a crisis of trust for credit money in general as investors return to 
assets bearing less risk (Harvey 1982).  
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Criticisms by Simmel (2003[1907]) and Weber (1968) have sought to undermine 
0DU[¶V ODERXU WKHRU\ RI YDlue, instead pointing to other ways in which money 
derives its value, where people value an object based on the quantity of money 
they believe is necessary to exchange for an object. The thesis sought to 
GHWHUPLQH WKH SDUWLFXODU VRFLRORJLFDO RULJLQV RI µYDOXH¶ WKDW H[LVW EH\RQG WKH
PDWHULDOLW\ RI PRQH\¶V IRUP ZKLFK FDQ EH XVHG WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH YDOXH EHKLQG
RMBS notes, as the labour theory of value is not compatible with the development 
of RMBS notes as no material labour is exerted on an underlying commodity. 
Instead, the thesis contributes to debates on how the production of value is 
achieved through calculative practices performed by epistemic elites to understand 
how money and credit can be conceptualised.  Social scientists have focussed on 
the assemblages of elites, knowledges, objects and technology which highlight the 
importance of the relationships between human and non-human actors (Pryke and 
du Gay 2007) in the production of money and credit. This thesis provided insight 
into how money can be considered to be a symbolic cultural artefact that is 
culturally formed through conventions and social interactions (Maurer 2006) 
through the use of computers, knowledges and bond-rating manuals used to 
develop waterfall structures and RMBS notes that circulate amongst investors as 
money. The research demonstrated how value can be produced through trust and 
calculative technologies developed, contributing towards theories of money within 
economic geography and the wider social sciences. 
 
The thesis has also contributed to the ongoing work on financialisation that has 
begun to gain momentum within the wider social sciences but also within economic 
JHRJUDSK\ ,QGUDZLQJDWWHQWLRQ WR ILQDQFLDOLVDWLRQ¶VFRQWHVWHGSDVW WKH UHYLHZ LQ
Chapter 2 outlined how financialisation comprises of a series of different 
discourses which operate in a multitude of different spaces. This thesis has 
contributed to the debates surrounding financialisation by outlining some additional 
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spaces where financialisation is active, but also how specific actors modify 
particular spaces so that they become compatible with the politics of 
financialisation. )LQDQFLDOLVDWLRQ¶V SROLWLFV KDYH FRPH WR IRFXV EURDGO\ RQ WKH
spectre of shareholder value (Froud et al. 2000), in particular, the increased 
pressure of institutional investors on companies, including banks and mortgage 
lenders, to increase their profits through modifying the corporate behaviour of 
managers.  
 
This thesis argues that the politics of financialisation contributed to the 
transformation of the UK mortgage industry to increase its profitability. Chapter 5 
outlined the strategies used by mortgage lenders which have included bank 
mergers, centralisation, credit scoring and the development of programmes that 
would enable them to access the interbank markets through securitisation. The 
deregulation of the UK mortgage market combined with demutualisation, the 
entrance of publically owned mortgage lenders that were owned by shareholders in 
the 1990s witnessed the financialisation of the UK mortgage market, as building 
societies - that redistributed their profits to their members ± lost their monopoly on 
the mortgage market to retail banks and centralised lenders who passed their 
profits to their shareholders. In this sense, the distinctive non-capitalist segment of 
consumer lending which used regional circuits of capital became assimilated within 
the international circuits of capitalist accumulation. 
 
Chapter 6 examines the development of consumer subjectivities through credit 
scoring that expands on the work of Langley (2006; 2007) who has explored how 
the government is attempting to equip consumers with the ability to regulate their 
bodies and thoughts through financial literacy. The aim is to produce responsible 
investors that are able to protect themselves as the welfare state is withdrawn, by 
investing their own financial resources into pension funds and unit trusts. The 
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research in Chapter 6 on credit referencing agencies draws attention to the way in 
which credit referencing agencies produce and store consumer subjectivities, 
which act as private disciplinary technologies that govern the behaviour of 
consumers. This has emerged as consumers are able to check their credit records 
and are increasingly made aware, through the media, as to how their credit data 
will affect their future ability to access credit, which contributes to the performance 
of self discipline, prudence and planning by consumers.  
 
8.4. Contributions to economic geography 
 
Finally, the research has focussed on the role of financial centres, central to the 
circulation of international financial capital. /RQGRQ¶VUHSXWDWLRQDVDQLQWHUQDWLRQDO
financial centre was damaged after the second world war, but its prestige returned 
as a result of the burgeoning euro money markets but also as sweeping regulatory 
changes in the 1970s which witnessed an expansion of the operations of resident 
US investment banks in the City while UK merchants banks moved into investment 
banking (Plender 1986). Epistemic elites has become increasingly more important 
to economic geographers as they have begun to study the role of elites and the 
uneven geographies that they produce (Schoenberger 1991). This research has 
argued that the historical legacies of London have contributed to the embedding of 
securitisation in the City, by nurturing the development of new epistemic elites, 
working practices and education (Hallsworth and Skinner 2008) that not only 
displaced the old µJHQWOHPDQO\ FDSLWDOLVP¶ EXW introduced new financial 
knowledges and products. In this thesis I have also drawn attention to the 
importance of proximity between mortgage lenders, lawyers and investment 
bankers, in order to initiate securitisation transactions. Geographical proximity is 
necessary to draw upon the different skills and knowledges required to perform 
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securitisation, but also to circulate new ideas amongst these elites as they continue 
to develop new innovations. 
 
The research has also expanded on geographical research and the role of financial 
centres at the regional level. While there has been a tendency to focus on global 
financial cites (Amin and Graham 1997; Robinson 2006) this thesis has 
acknowledged research that has been conducted on smaller regional centres that 
act as processing spaces for financial data (Leyshon et al. 1989; Richardson and 
Marshall 1999; Bailey and French 2005). However, this thesis has attempted to 
highlight the role of what it argues are powerful, regional financial centres, that are 
linked to London and the international financial markets through securitisation. The 
research in Chapter 5 argues how these centres of underwriting exercise financial 
power through scorecards, which in turn are determined by financial elites that 
financially include and exclude particular consumers based on their personal 
characteristics. The thesis outlines a geography of regional financial centres, and 
suggests that the power of these centres has, until now been understated, and that 
although these centres are not as dynamic as London, the credit risk decision-
making performed in these centres, underpins the credit quality of mortgages and 
RMBS notes, which are later circulated though the international capital markets. In 
addition, the analysts that produce scorecards are frequently based in these 
regional financial centres which highlight how financial elites that wield financial 
power are not strictly limited to financial institutions within London, as these elites 
encode their knowledges into scorecards which determine which consumers are 
able to purchase a house with a mortgage and which assets are later restructured 
to form RMBS notes. 
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8.5. Research limitations 
 
One limitation of the research is that the findings are not definitive and that the 
research should be considered as one thread situated amongst a wider web of 
discourses that can be used to raise new questions regarding credit scoring and 
securitisation. Subsequently, the thesis should be viewed as a partial reading of 
economic geography, securitisation, credit scoring and mortgage production, as a 
complete review of the UK mortgage and securitisation markets, situated against a 
historical background were beyond the means of the thesis. The findings were also 
limited by the following issues. Framing the research was complicated as the 
research began at the end of a decade of substantial growth within the housing 
markets, when securitisation was a celebrated financial tool for providing housing 
finance and asset growth for consumers and investment opportunities and increased 
profits for the financial sector. SubsequeQWO\ WKH ILQDQFLDO VHFWRU¶V view of itself 
changed throughout the research process and some of the celebrated actors 
addressed in the research, such as securitisation and financial analysts had their 
reputations downgraded by their peers. As such, the responses of interviewees to 
certain questions changed over time as the industry began to re-evaluate 
securitisation and centralised lender business models, making it difficult to reconcile 
different views by different research participants over time. 
 
An additional impact of the credit crunch on the research was the difficulty in 
accessing research subjects as the crisis deepened, which reduced the number of 
respondents willing to participate in the research. Although the recession provided 
some new opportunities for the research, criticism of the financial sector by the 
media made research access more complicated, especially as the visibility of market 
participants began to fade as the capital markets closed. For example, it became 
more difficult and time consuming to identify and contact UK RMBS investors, at a 
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time when investors wanted to keep their exposures to RMBS investments secret, a 
problem which was exacerbated by the time limits placed on the project59. As such, 
research into the consumption of RMBS notes by investors was withdrawn from the 
project. 
 
If I was to undertake the research again, there are several changes that could be 
implemented. As attempts to contact investors were time consuming and returned 
few interviewees willing to participate in the research, this time could have been 
used differently to expand on the following three areas of research. First, it would 
have been useful to gain greater access to investment bank structuring departments 
in order to determine if there were any differences in the development of 
securitisation structures by investment banks based on their different geographical 
origins. For example, did US investment banks have more experience in 
underwriting higher risk UK transactions than their European counterparts based on 
their experiences in US subprime securitisation, or did these investment banks use 
different features in their securitisation structures depending on their attitudes to the 
risks inherent in securitisation? It was challenging to enrol research respondents 
from structuring departments and it would have been useful to have attempted to 
contact structurers that had been made redundant during the recession, in order to 
potentially gain a more critical review of the development of waterfall structures and 
any problems that were recognised by these actors, but that were not acted on by 
executives. Second, it would be useful to have explored other funding mechanisms 
in more detail, such as medium-term notes and covered bonds, to situate the 
importance of securitisation amongst other external funding techniques and to 
understand how reliant UK mortgage lenders were on capital market funding. The 
final change would seek to explore the development and implementation around 
                                                 
59
 After the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, investors did not want to 
advertise that they were RMBS investors, as other financial institutions would be concerned 
as to whether they were about to collapse from their exposure to US RMBS investments.  
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credit rationing in the wake of the recession and the socio-technical engineering 
involved to develop an understanding as to how credit scoring is altered and 
monitored in relation to mortgage lender liquidity.  
 
Finally, to draw the conclusion to a close, this research has sought to provide 
insight into the wider processes of capitalism and financialisation, though the 
dissemination and transplantation of business models, ideas and epistemic 
communities that circulate within specific spaces of financialisation. Marx may have 
forecasted the collapse of capitalism from its internal contradictions, but it was 
Braudel who provided the nuanced suggestion that capitalism will always be sick, 
but will never die (Froud et al. 2007:339). Perhaps what is important to understand 
about capitalism, and the disproportionate power wielded by economic elites, is 
their ability to create new financial products and technologies that are useful in 
reengineering capitalism, as investment banks, law firms and mortgage lenders 
have used credit scoring and securitisation to increase corporate returns. I have 
little doubt that old financial technologies and products will be modified, while new 
products and technologies will be devised to supplant the failure of the financial 
strategies that contributed to the credit crunch.  
 
This research has attempted to historicise and highlight how the geographies of 
financial knowledges and their adoption is spatially uneven, determined by the 
compatibility of these knowledges and devices with particular political economies, 
and the politics of the actors that circulate these financial knowledges and 
technologies. The thesis has aimed to offer a modest contribution towards 
understanding financialisation and the production of consumer mortgages, that has 
sought to provided a narrative as to how the technologies of securitisation and 
credit scoring have reshaped the geographies of retail finance, and how the 
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enhanced integration of the UK mortgage market into the international financial 
markets has exposed it to external shocks and systemic risks.  
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Appendix 1 
 
1. Treasury Director 
Interview in December 2007. This individual was employed by a large UK retail bank 
and had extensive experience in different retail banking roles, in other UK retail and 
clearing banks, and oversaw the running of the treasury department. 
2. Securitisation Manager  
Interview in December 2007. This manager was employed by a large UK retail bank 
and previously worked as an accountant and was responsible for managing new 
and existing securitisations. 
3. Director of Fixed Income 
Interview in August 2007. This director worked for a large global institutional 
investor.  Key responsibilities involved managing funds that invest in corporate, 
sovereign and RMBS bonds. 
4. Securitisation Manager 
Interview in September 2007. This individual was responsible for managing the 
issue of securitisations for a UK retail bank.  
5. Director of Risk Management  
Interview in February 2007. This individual was responsible for managing the 
different types of risk across a large UK retail bank. This employee had extensive 
experience in developing scorecards and risk policies. 
6. Director of Securitisation Research 
Interview in April 2007.  This director was head of the research team for 
securitisation in an investment bank. He had previously worked in securitisation for a 
different investment bank. 
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7. Director of Trade Body 
Interview in January 2007. This individual worked for a trade body that represents 
part of the UK financial sector. This employee has experience working in the UK 
retail banking and building society sectors. 
8. Electoral Services Manager 
,QWHUYLHZLQ2FWREHU7KLVPDQDJHUZDVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUPDQDJLQJDFRXQFLO¶V
electoral roll. Their responsibilities included the registration and compilation of 
electoral information. 
9. Trade Body Spokesperson 
Interview in January 2007. This employee was the spokesperson for an industry 
WUDGHERG\WKDWUHSUHVHQWHGWKH8.¶VILQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVVHFWRUDQGZDVUHVSRQsible 
for briefing the media. 
10. Director of Risk 
Interview in November 2007. This director was responsible for running a credit 
UHIHUHQFLQJ DJHQF\ 7KH\ KDG SUHYLRXVO\ ZRUNHG LQ WKH 8.¶V ILQDQFLDO VHUYLFHV
industry. 
11. Risk Manager 
Interview in December 2007. This employee developed new products for a credit 
referencing agency. 
12. Trade Body Spokesperson 
Interview in February 2007. This employee was the spokesperson for an industry 
WUDGHERG\WKDWUHSUHVHQWHGWKH8.¶VILQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVVHFWRUDQGZDV responsible 
for briefing the media. 
13. Securitisation Research Analyst 
 Interview in April 2007. This analyst worked for an investment bank and was 
responsible for compiling research and reports for use by the investment bank and 
its clients. 
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14. RMBS Trader 
Interview in May 2007. This employee sold securitised products to investors for an 
investment bank that was tasked with distributing RMBS bonds, by the structuring 
investment bank and originators. 
15. Director of Trustee Services 
Interview in April 2007. This individual was a director for a trustee services arm of an 
investment bank who held RMBS notes on behalf of investors. 
16. Director of Risk 
Interview in December 2007. This individual was a director of a credit referencing 
agency and was responsible for overseeing the development of scorecard 
production and credit referencing products. 
17. Bond-rating Analyst 
Interview in November 2007. This analyst was responsible for checking RMBS and 
other securitised products, to ensure that they were eligible for the bond-metrics 
issued by the company. 
18. Partner 
Interview in July 2007. This individual worked for an international law firm and was 
responsible for overseeing the development of the legal frameworks and contracts 
associated with securitisation transactions. 
19 Government Analyst 
Interview in June 2007. This employee was responsible for undertaking research on 
the effect of Basel II capital adequacy changes on the UK financial sector. 
20. Risk Manager 
Interview in February 2007. This risk manager worked for a large UK retail bank and 
ZDVUHVSRQVLEOHIRURYHUVHHLQJDQGGHYHORSLQJVFRUHFDUGVIRUWKHEDQN¶VFRQVXPHU
finance products.  
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21. Treasury Analyst  
Interview in April 2007. This analyst was responsible for preparing the necessary 
data and GRFXPHQWDWLRQIRUWKHEDQN¶VVHFXULWLVDWLRQVEHIRUHWKH\ZHUHVWUXFWXUHG 
22. Director of Finance 
Interview in September 2007. This individual was responsible for coordinating a 
centralised lenders financial activities and securitisations. He had previously worked 
in both investment banking and centralised lending. 
23. Director of Capital Markets 
Interview in April 2007. This investment bank employee was in charge of the arm of 
an investment bank which raised capital for companies and banks though bond 
issuances and securitisation. 
24. Director of Securitisation Research 
Interview in May 2007. This director was in charge of conducting research and 
developing reports for the investment bank that he worked for and their clients. 
25. Securitisation Structurer 
Interview in June 2007. This investment bank employee was responsible for 
designing RMBS waterfall structures and liaising with mortgage lenders during the 
production of a RMBS transaction. 
26. Chief Investment Officer 
Interview in August 2007. This individual was responsible for managing the 
investments of a large institutional investor and developing the investment strategy 
of the group.  
27. Securitisation Manager 
Interview in October 2007. This manager was responsible for coordinating the 
securitisation of mortgage assets for a centralised lender which was the arm of an 
investment bank. 
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28. Director of a Corporate Service Provider 
Interview in June 2007. This director was responsible for the management of a 
company that provides corporate services to SPVs used in securitisation. 
29. Director of Retail 
Interview in February 2007. This director was responsible for managing the retail 
banking department of a large building society. 
30. Electoral Services Manager 
Interview in October 2007. This individual wDVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUPDQDJLQJDFRXQFLO¶V
electoral roll. Their responsibilities included the registration and compilation of 
electoral information. 
31. Securitisation Manager 
Interview in April 2007. This manager was responsible for managing the issue of 
securitisations for a large UK retail bank. 
32. Director of Finance 
Interview in September 2007. This director managed the financial affairs of a 
FHQWUDOLVHG OHQGHU DQG ZDV KHDYLO\ LQYROYHG LQ PDQDJLQJ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V
securitisation programme.  
33. Bond-rating Analyst 
Interview in April 2007. This bond-rating agency employee checked RMBS deals 
and securitised products, to ensure that they were eligible for the bond-metrics 
issued by the company. 
34. Product Manager 
Interview in August 2007. This manager worked for a large institutional investor and 
designed new financial products. They had been involved in the purchase and 
management of RMBS funds in the past. 
35. Ex-commercial Bank Director 
Interview in July 2007. This director began his career in a commercial bank and was 
LQYROYHGLQVRPHRIWKH8.¶VILUVWVHFXULWLVDWLRQWUDQVDFWLRQV 
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36. Partner 
Interview in June 2007. This partner works for an international law firm and oversees 
the development of the legal frameworks and contracts associated with 
securitisation transactions. 
 
37. Director of Investments 
Interview in July 2007. This director works for an institutional investor, specialising in 
fixed income investments and was responsible for conducting analysis and 
recommending which assets, including RMBS should be purchased by fund 
managers. 
38. Director of Investments 
Interview in July 2007. This director worked for a structured investment vehicle 
managed from London and was responsible for deciding which investments to 
make, which frequently included RMBS assets. 
39. Treasury Manager 
Interview in November 2007. This employee worked in the treasury department of a 
EXLOGLQJVRFLHW\DQGZDVLQYROYHGLQWKHVRFLHW\¶VLQWHUEDQNPRQH\PDUNHWDFWLYLWLHV
and covered bond programme. 
40. Director of Commercial Lending 
,QWHUYLHZ LQ 1RYHPEHU  7KLV HPSOR\HH ZRUNHG IRU D EXLOGLQJ VRFLHW\¶V
commercial lending department and used capital market funding to fund the 
commercial loans. 
 
 
 
 
 
